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ABSTRACT 
This thesis is a special investigation of Leibniz's cosmology as it can be determined 
both from his writings and by means of a comparison of it with the mystical 
philosophy of Christian Lurianic Kabbalah. The chief protagonists of this latter were 
Christian Knorr von Rosenroth, Francis Mercury van Helmont and Anne Conway. 
They will be discussed, along with Leibniz's acquaintance with them and his 
involvement in the kabbalistic text Thoughts on Genesis. The comparison, which 
includes examinations of Leibniz's critical remarks on their writings, as well as his 
work on Thoughts on Genesis, highlights Christian Platonic elements in Leibniz 
(which are often overlooked) and seeks to yield an improved interpretation of his 
cosmology, free of the apparent paradoxes and vacillations that some other 
interpretations have been prone to attribute to him. It is argued that certain 
consequences are implied by Leibnizian principles, some of which he sought to 
obscure on account of their latent unorthodoxy, and others which he seems not to 
have fully been aware of. The comparison shows that the two doctrines are actually 
rather close on account of their shared Platonic principles. This should not be taken as 
evidence that Leibniz was influenced by the kabbalists, for these principles were 
established in his philosophy before he had any significant contact with them. 
However, there is evidence that Leibniz may have adopted some of their metaphors. 
In this thesis Leibniz's interest in Christian Lurianic Kabbalah is interpreted in terms 
of his greater goal to effect social peace, an aspiration shared by them too. This goal 
was to be realized by harmonizing the different religious traditions through the 
common base of his own metaphysics: Leibniz wanted to see whether the exoteric 
writings of Christian Lurianic Kabbalah could be grounded in his rational 
metaphysics. The thesis proposes that the proximity of these two doctrines is such that 
Christian Lurianic Kabbalah can be regarded, in many ways, as a mystical exoteric 
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Introduction 
Leibniz was born towards the end of the Thirty Years War, the horrors of which 
epitomized the reality of social and political upheaval that had been brought about by 
the disintegration of religious authority during the periods of the Reformation and 
Counter-Reformation. It is probably true to say that, from an early age, Leibniz felt it 
was to be his life's work to try to make the world a better place by working to rid it of 
social and political conflict. This would take the form of both diplomacy and the use 
of his intellect in the service of philosophy. To this end he sought to establish a single 
true metaphysics which would end intellectual disputes once and for all, and which 
would serve as the intellectual basis from which religious disputes would themselves 
be cleared up. With metaphysical and theological doctrines then unified and 
harmonized, the restored authority of reason and spirit would translate itself into 
political and social harmony. 1 
Leibniz sought to establish his single true metaphysics not by showing that the 
major philosophies were actually wrong in themselves, but, rather, that each of them 
possessed some fragment of the truth, which was fully enshrined in the underlying 
metaphysics and which, therefore, would unite these seemingly disparate doctrines 
and end intellectual disputes. Leibniz set out to do this, not by claiming that all prior 
doctrines were false, and to be superceded only by his new one, but by extracting 
from those existing doctrines a truth that had been there all along. His method, then, 
was not revolutionary but eclectic. 
Christia Mercer has argued, convincingly in my opinion, that the truth Leibniz was 
See Stuart Brown, Leibniz. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984), pp. 2-3; and Christia 
Mercer, Leibniz's Metaphysics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp. 2-3,9. 
trying to get at was that which lay behind the doctrines of Plato, Aristotle and their 
followers, and in doing this he was following in the tradition of the Renaissance 
Eclectics. 2 Renaissance eclecticism had its origin in the intellectual excitement that 
had accompanied the re-emergence, and Latin translation by Ficino, of certain texts 
which had been lost to Europe during the Dark Ages: the writings of Pythagoras, 
Plato, the neo-Platonic School, the Hermetic texts, and others. It was believed that 
these texts, including kabbalistic ones, contained fragments of a wisdom known as 
the Prisca Theologia: truths revealed to Moses which had not been written down in 
Scripture but which had found their way into the ancient philosophical writings. 
Possessed of this belief, Pico della Mirandola, Guillaume Postel, Giordano Bruno, 
Tommaso Campanella, and others, set about piecing together an eclectic synthesis of 
the fragments of the Prisca Theologia scattered throughout Ficino's texts. Believing 
that they possessed the single and indisputably true theological doctrine, these 
eclectics, claiming that the doctrine was the Christian one, set out to show how all 
people should believe in this one religion, the outcome of which would be the end of 
social discord. 
Leibniz did not believe in the Prisca Theologin premise that there existed a body of 
revealed truth outside of Scripture. But he did see in the ancient texts the existence of 
unquestionable truths, which had also been carried over into the re-workings and 
elaborations of the Renaissance Eclectics. He shared with the latter the desire to effect 
worldwide religious harmony through a single underlying true doctrine that had not to 
contradict the Christian message. Whether his motive for this condition was the result 
of his faith (that Christian doctrine was the primary indubitable truth) or the result of 
' Ibid., pp. 23-59. 
See D. P. Walker, The Ancient Theology (New York: Cornell University Press, 1972); Frances Yates, 
Giordano Bruno and the Hermetic Tradition (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1964). 
2 
his pragmatism (that the establishment of a universal religion was most likely to be 
affected from the base of Europe's already established religion) is a question that lies 
outside the scope of this thesis. 
Out of the various doctrines of Pythagoras, Plato, the Neo-Platonists, Aristotle and 
the Renaissance Eclectics, Leibniz extracted what he discerned to be an underlying 
body of truths, and this he sought to enshrine in his metaphysical doctrine. This was 
to be thoroughly rational and would be purged of whatever in the older texts he 
deemed to be unfounded, particularly the occult elaborations of certain of the 
Renaissance writers. Leibniz hoped that his metaphysical doctrine would serve as the 
common philosophical foundation from which all the differences of the various 
religions might be overcome. This perceived unification was to go beyond the 
immediate ecumenicalist goal of reconciling Catholics and Protestants, but would 
extend to all other religions and sects; for example, Judaism, Islam, and the Chinese 
religion. The bounds of this religious harmonizing would therefore spread beyond 
Europe until all the peoples of the world believed in either the same religion or 
realized that what differences there were were only differences of expression of one 
common underlying body of truth. 4 Leibniz's programme for religious harmony 
endured throughout his career, from its application to the Catholic-Protestant schism 
in his ('ulholic Demonsiralions of 1668, up to its application to the philosophy of the 
Chinese in 1715-16. 
Insofar as the body of metaphysical truth was to underlie the various religious 
See Daniel Cook, "Leibniz's Use and Abuse of Judaism and Islam", in M. Dascal and E. Yakira 
(eds. ), Leibniz and Adam (Tel Aviv: University Publishing Projects Ltd., 1993) pp. 283-297 (p. 294); 
RC, p. 2; and Yuen-Ting Lai, "Leibniz and Chinese Thought", in Allison Coudert, R. Popkin and G. 
Weiner (eds. ), Leibniz, Mysticism and Religion, (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1998), pp. 
36-168 (pp. 142-143). 
3 
beliefs of the people; and insofar as its nature was rational and therefore abstruse to 
the mass of uneducated people (the "uninitiated"); metaphysics is esoleric. 5 Leibniz 
did not seek to effect peace by gaining assent of the people to a metaphysical 
doctrine: he knew, rather, that the vast majority of people were better suited to the 
less intellectual and more metaphorical, symbolical and poetical forms that typified 
the religious type of writing; what, by contrast with the esoteric form of metaphysics, 
may be termed the exoteric. 6 On this issue, Leibniz writes in the New Essays: 
If [a judicious person] is writing for ordinary readers, he will deprive himself 
of the means for giving charm and emphasis to what he writes if he abides 
strictly by fixed significations for the terms he uses. What he must do -and 
this is enough- is to be careful not to let the variations generate errors or 
fallacious reasoning. The ancients distinguished the 'exoteric' or popular mode 
of exposition from the 'esoteric' one which is suitable for those who are 
seriously concerned to discover the truth; and that distinction is relevant 
here. 7 
Therefore, unlike Plato, Leibniz did not at all disapprove of poetry. Indeed, he was 
something of a poet himself. In 1706 he had been involved in planning a 
philosophical poem which was to be written by the theologian and poet Johann 
Wilhelm Peterson. A draft of the plan states that 
the talents of great men might serve to advance the public good to the greatest 
degree... namely [by] a fit and comprehensive work about divine matters in 
the form of a heroic poem. For theology, which shines forth in prose, would 
be even more sublime if dressed in Virgilian majesty... 
The Oxford English Dictionary defines "esoteric" as "(of philosophical doctrine etc) meant only for 
the initiated, not generally intelligible"; and this should not be confused with words like "mystical" 
or "occult", even though these are the types of teachings often described as esoteric. `' The OED defines "exoteric" as "(of philosophical doctrine, mode of speech, etc) intelligible to 
outsiders... commonplace, ordinary, popular". 
RB, section 260. 
Coudert, Leibniz and the Kabbalah (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1995), pp. 115; LBr 
720, f. 2v. 
4 
Leibniz was also involved in the editing of this poem. 
The exoteric form, by its very nature, was more susceptible to variety of 
interpretation than the "strict signification of the metaphysical form", and it was this 
variety of interpretation that was often the root cause of the very schisms that 
religious harmonizing sought to overcome. Despite this, Leibniz realized that 
metaphysics would never overthrow exoteric accounts in the minds of the great 
majority of people. The exoteric had to be admitted; and the acceptability of any 
particular teaching was a question of whether or not it could be mapped onto the 
esoteric metaphysical doctrine, by virtue of th, -- principles discernible behind its 
metaphors and symbols. 
The metaphorical forms that were not acceptable included the visions and 
utterances of persons in ecstatic states, such as the Quakers and other enthusiasts. 
Spontaneous revelations of this sort had no guarantee of truth: they had no rational 
basis in a corresponding metaphysics. Moreover, spontaneous individualized claims 
to truth ran counter to the very notion of religious harmonizing itself. " 
Regarding that species of exoteric writings known as mystical doctrine, Leibniz 
disapproves of their common assertion that, by following certain practices set out in 
the teaching, it is possible for the individual not only to "apprehend" God, but to 
"unite" with him. I will show in this thesis that Leibniz's metaphysics absolutely 
prohibits the possibility of the individual creature ever becoming united to, or 
absorbed in, the divinity. Though the universe of creatures advances towards ever 
greater perfection, ever closer to God, this process is literally endless. And apart from 
Leibniz's position on enthusiasm is discussed in Daniel Cook, "Leibniz on Enthusiasm", in Leibniz, 
Mysticism and Religion, pp. 107-135. 
5 
the metaphysical objections, Leibniz claims that the aim of union with God, cardinal 
to all mysticism, is driven by personal interest: the pursuit of a self-gratifying 
experience, such as bliss or peace. 10 Leibniz did not deny that individual creatures 
have a connection with God: indeed, he asserted that they exist in an intimate 
relationship with him, especially the rational ones. This relationship is capable of 
becoming more intimate, and such a realization constitutes an "approach" to the 
divinity (though the final attainment of this approach in the form of union is not 
possible). ''In this thesis I will set out the precise nature of this relationship as it 
exists in Leibniz's philosophy, but for now it is sufficient to stress that, for him, the 
connection and approach to God by the creature is fundamentally a ralional one. And 
this brings Leibniz into disagreement with some forms of mysticism, yet into 
agreement with others. 
It is the more specifically religious mysticisms, which deny that God, or some 
degree of him, can be known by reason or the senses. This type of non-rational 
"spiritual apprehension" is diametrically opposed to Leibniz's philosophy; and its 
spontaneity is always subject to criticism by Leibniz anyway, on account of its 
counter ecumenicalism. 
But there also exist what may be termed philosophical mysticisms in which the 
rational is asserted to be integral to the creature-God relationship. Thus, in neo- 
Platonism the mind of the rational creature is regarded as an image of the divine, a 
finite expression of God's ideas. To contemplate innate ideas is to grasp part of the 
intellect of God, which is what may be called divine illumination, for these truths are 
10 See Letter to N icaise, 1697, Wn, p. 566. 
See Joseph Politella, "Platonism, Aristotelianism and Cabalism in the Philosophy of Leibniz", 
unpublished dissertation, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, 1938, p. 27. The extent to which 
Leibniz could be considered a mystic is discussed in Donald Rutherford, "Leibniz and Mysticism", 
in Leibniz, Myslicism and Religion, pp. 22-46. 
6 
not only founded in God, they are God. But God is also known through the "book of 
the world": the order and goodness manifest amongst things is taken as a sign of his 
immanence. And the approach to God is, by the neo-Platonists, equated to that 
increase in knowledge, both of the truths of reason and of the order of the world, 
which results in "better" action and hence the experience of blessedness. 12 
It has been the opinion of some scholars that Leibniz was concerned to negate 
mysticism by showing why and how it ought to be replaced with rational 
metaphysics. Others have argued that Leibniz sought to enrich and deepen both the 
philosophical and mystical approach, by a sort of cross-fertilization. 13 1 shall argue in 
this thesis that Leibniz's philosophy is a thoroughgoing rational one, in which truth 
and reality are defined in terms of, and therefore known only through, reason. There 
is no "mystical" as some other sort of reality or other means for its apprehension. The 
only meaning of "mystical" that Leibniz assents to is as that other mode of doctrinal 
presentation: the metaphorical: as exoteric version (for the uneducated) of the esoteric 
metaphysical doctrine. If Leibniz did indeed conceive of the mystical in this way, and 
approvingly, then it would be neither true to say that he sought to eradicate the 
mystical, nor that the mystical could "deepen" the metaphysical or vice-versa. 
If Leibniz's method for obtaining the truth was eclectic, his method for presenting 
it was conciliatory. Rather than trying to impose his philosophy in an adversarial 
style, he preferred to win round his audience by presenting ideas in the form which 
would be most attractive. Having gained their attention and sympathy he would then 
employ counter arguments which were more likely to be listened to, and thus bring 
12 On these themes in neo-Platonism see, for example, Plotinus, Ennead, V, I, 10-11; IV, 3,10; 
III, 8,2; VI, 9,5. 
" See Dieter Malinke, Leibnizens Synthese von Universalmathematik und Individualmetaphysik (Halle: 
Max Miemeyer, 1925: and Albert Heinekamp, "Leibniz und Mysticism", in Peter Koslowski (ed. ), 
Gnosis und Mystik in der Geschicte der Philosophie (Zurich: Artemis Verlag, 1988), pp. 183-206. 
7 
them towards his own views. 14 To intellectual correspondents Leibniz varied his 
presentation depending on whether they were Moderns, Scholastics, Theologians, or 
whatever. This explains the apparent duplicitousness of much of Leibniz's writings. 
including the extent to which he would indulge in, or distance himself from, 
allegorical (exoteric) doctrines. To those whom Leibniz wished to be seen as a 
Modern, he concealed his interest in doctrines like alchemy and Kabbalah; but with 
those of a mystical orientation, he was prepared to engage himself much more 
fully. 15 
Leibniz's apparent ambivalence towards the neo-Platonic mysticisms can be 
explained in these terms. 16 However, Leibniz does criticize neo-Platonic mysticism 
on account of its confusion of expression, the obscurity of its allegories, and even its 
outright mystification and corruption of the original Platonic message. 17 But these 
criticisms are not directed against the mystical mode of expression per se, i. e. the 
metaphorical and non-philosophical mode (the "exoteric"). Indeed, he himself 
appropriated certain terms from the ancient mysticisms. For example, "light" as a 
metaphor for the divine power of emanation; the "microcosm" for the individual 
created being; binary numbers as an image of creation. 18 
Neo-Platonism was a hugely influential body of teaching in the form of a mystical 
recasting of Platonism. It had been put together by Plotinus and been combined with 
the philosophies of Pythagoras, Philo, Aristotle and Stoicism. It is not to be doubted 
that Leibniz knew of the mystical works of the Ancient World. When and how he 
14 See Mercer, pp. 49-59. 
1s See Stuart Brown, "Some Occult Influences on Leibniz's Monadology", in Leibnr. Mysticism and 
Religion, pp. 1-2 I; and Politella, p. 13. 
16 A discussion of why Leibniz sought to distance himself from neo-Platonism is to be found in Ross, 
"Leibniz and Renaissance NeoPlatonism", Studia Leibnitiana Supplementa 22 (1983), 126-134. 
" See Rutherford, pp. 22-24. 
 See Stuart Brown, "Some Occult Influences on Leibniz's Monadology", p. 2. 
S 
came into contact with them, and whether or not he was influenced by them. I will 
discuss below. Numerous scholars have examined, both broadly and in detail, the 
extent to which the Leibnizian doctrine is similar to those ancient mysticisms. 19 
Candidates for the position of the exoteric philosophy closest to Leibniz's, are to be 
found not amongst those religious mysticisms, with their anti-rationalism, but 
amongst the philosophical mysticisms: those which asserted that God was known and 
approached by reason, and, further, those which conformed to the Christian message. 
In short, any kind of Christianized neo-Platonism was a potential exoteric parallel to 
Leibniz's metaphysical doctrine. One such was that of Christian Lurianic Kahbalah. 
This was a synthesis of late Kabbalah (Lurianic) with Christian theology, carried 
out in Leibniz's own time. Two of the individuals who did this work were personally 
known to Leibniz: Christian Knorr von Rosenroth (1636-1689) and Francis Mercury 
van Helmont (1614-1698). The Cambridge Platonist Henry More (1614-1687) was 
associated with the project, as was his protege Lady Anne Conway (1630? -1679) , 
and her Quaker friend George Keith. More's involvement was looser and definitely 
ambivalent: his contributions were often polemical. But Conway and Keith 
collaborated with van Helmont in writing some of the key syncretistic texts; and 
Conway wrote her own book, in which many of the key ideas of kabbalistic doctrine 
were dealt with in a way that was philosophically superior to the other texts. In 
treating of the Christian Lurianic Kabbalah, I propose to draw chiefly on the works of 
von Rosenroth, van Helmont and Conway. The origin, development and doctrine of 
this body of thought is discussed in chapter 1. 
See Mercer, pp. 174-200; Rutherford, pp. 25-33; Politella, passim; Rudolf Meyer, "Leibniz und 
Plotin , S[udia 
Leibniliana Supplemen, a 5 (1971), 31-54; and G. Rodier, "Plotin: Sur une des 
origienes de la philosophie de Leibniz", Revue de metaphysique el de morale (Paris, 1902). 
9 
Although Leibniz had involved himself in the production of one or two exoteric 
accounts, for example, J. W. Peterson's poem, his primary interest in the relation 
between the rational esoteric and the metapho-ical exoteric was in the reverse 
direction: namely, in showing how various exoteric accounts could be reduced to the 
esoteric single body of truth enshrined in his metaphysics. Such reduction would 
demonstrate the fundamental commonality of multiple exoteric philosophies: and this 
was to be the particular method by which he would contribute to harmonizing the 
religions. 
Such a method implies that religious harmonizing need not require people to give 
up their own theological heritage: it would be enough if they could see and accept 
their differences were only superficial, their root principles being held in common 
(supposing that this could be shown). Leibniz, therefore, was advocating, wherever 
possible, a sort of syncretism of the world's religions and sects, based on the 
convergence of their various exoteric doctrines in a single body of esoteric truth. Only 
where this was not demonstrable should missionaries consider the traditional radical 
conversion of a people. This viewpoint is revealed by Leibniz's considerations on the 
missionary work in China. 20 
It seems to me that the main reason for Leibniz's interest in studying the writings of 
the different religions and sects was to rationalize what he could in these exoteric 
writings in order to see if they could be mapped onto his esoteric body of truth and 
thereby be harmonized with other religions. We see him doing this for the doctrines 
of the Catholic and Protestant sects in the Catholic Demons/rations; for Chinese 
theology in the Discourse on the Natural Theology of the Chinese; and for the Jewish 
20 Daniel Cook and Henry Rosemont note that "Leibniz also appreciated that no other belief system 
would have an impact in that country unless it came to terms with the country's intellectual heritage. 
He therefore wrote the Discourse [on the Natural Theology of the Chinese], attempting to pour some 
Christian wine in Confucian and pre-Confucian bottles". RC, p. 33. 
10 
and Arab traditions. 21 It is this same harmonizing interest that led Leibniz to study 
the writings of Christian Lurianic Kabbalah. Here, in this Christianized neo- 
Platonism Leibniz discovered a cosmological metaphor that came closest to his own 
doctrine. 
But there was another aspect to these writings that appealed to Leibniz: the 
Christian Lurianic Kabbalah project was itself motivated by a harmonizing zeal. In 
chapter 3I will discuss three modes for effecting theological and philosophical 
reconciliation that can be isolated in the various works of this project and the extent 
to which these relate to Leibniz's thinking. In particular I will show how van 
Helmont, in his Thoughts on Genesis, deconstructs Biblical words in a manner 
reminiscent of the kabbalists, to reveal an esoteric cosmology which is essentially 
Hermetic. Implicit in this reduction of Scripture to an underlying body of (I lermetic) 
principles is that these go a long way towards providing a unitary cosmological 
meaning, the acceptance of which would allow it to function as the single esoteric 
doctrine to which the various exoteric teachings of the religious schisms could be 
harmonized. Hermetic doctrine, which principally grew out of neo-Platonism, has an 
affinity with Leibniz's metaphysics when it is shown how these same principles are at 
the bottom of his doctrine. 22 Both the content of the Hermeticism of Thoughts on 
Genesis, as well as the mode of religious harmonizing implicit in the work, would 
have attracted Leibniz a great deal, and goes a long way towards explaining why 
Leibniz became involved in Thoughts on Genesis, and why he was able and eager to 
contribute to the project. 
2' See Daniel Cook, "Leibniz's Use and Abuse of Judaism and Islam", p. 288. 22 Bernardino Orio de Miguel has made the most thorough study to date of the Hermetic ism contained 
in Thoughts on Genesis. See OH. 
In this thesis I will show how, by setting out a detailed account of Leibniz's 
cosmology and comparing it with that of Christian Lurianic Kabbalah, the latter may 
be viewed as a symbolic exoteric parallel to the Leibnizian metaphysic. It is the 
common underlying neo-Platonic principles that allow the one to be mapped on to the 
other. The comparative work is corroborated by analysing Leibniz's own remarks on 
the kabbalistic texts and by examining the work Leibniz did on van Helmont's draft of 
Thoughis on Genesis. 
That these underlying neo-Platonic principles are definitely to be found in the 
Leibnizian philosophy long before he could have had any significant knowledge of 
the Christian Lurianic Kabbalah, strongly suggests that Leibniz was not conceptually 
influenced by this latter, and that the interest he had in it was not as a source of 
philosophical inspiration. 
Various scholars have recognized the presence of certain neo-Platonic principles in 
the writings of both Leibniz and of Christian Lurianic Kabbalah, in particular, of van 
Helmont. At the same time they have noted Leibniz's knowledge of the latter's works. 
These scholars are divided on the question as to whether Leibniz was influenced or 
not by this brand of Kabbalah. By "influence" I mean the adoption of'concepts into 
the Leibnizian doctrine. However, a problem that faces all attempts to pin down 
specific sources of neo-Platonic ideas, is the widespread currency that this doctrine 
had in Leibniz's time. 23 Where i) it can be shown that the neo-Platonic concepts were 
already established in Leibniz's cosmology prior to his familiarity with Christian 
Lurianic Kabbalah, it has to be conceded that the latter could not have conceptually 
influenced him on these themes. In this case the similarity of the two philosophies has 
23 See Mercer, p. 177, and Eileen O'Neil, "Influxus Physicus", in Steven Nadler (ed. ), Causation in 
Early Modern Philosophy, (Pennsylvania State University Press, 1992). 
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to be seen as an instance of mere intellectual convergence. On the other hand if ii) it 
can be shown that these concepts are lacking prior to, but present after, Leibniz's 
significant contact with Christian Lurianic Kabbalah, then the case for conceptual 
influence can be argued for. 
Of those studies which fall under i), Daniel Fouke notes that "as early as 1676, 
there are marked Neoplatonic patterns in Leibniz's explanation of the relation 
between the world and God". 24 He argues that the particular interpretation of the 
process of emanation which is present in Leibniz's cosmology, is the same as that 
Christianized neo-Platonism developed by Thomas Aquinas, and whom Leibniz knew 
"as early as 1670". 25 
Leroy Loemker has investigated the role that the Herborn Encylopaedists played in 
the development of Leibniz's metaphysics. He proposes that 
their primary influence on Leibniz was the transmission of a... new 
Platonistic metaphysics of universal harmony governing a multitude of 
interrelated, vitalistically conceived individuals. 26 
He shows the presence of ideas in Leibniz and the Encyclopaedists which were 
similar to those in Plotinus, Augustine, and the Renaissance eclectics Cusa, Bruno 
and Campanella. He concludes that "surely the Herborn thinkers constitute a 
neglected but significant link between these thinkers and Leibniz". 27 Loemker shows 
that Leibniz had read the Phosphorus C'utholicus by John Bisterfeld, one of the 
24 Daniel Fouke, "Emanation and the Perfections of Being", in Archiv fur Geschichte die Philosophie 
76 (1994), 168-194, (p. 183). 
25 Ibid., p. 182. 
`'`' Leroy Loemker, "Leibniz and the Herborn Encyclopedists", Journal of the History of /d as, 22 
(1961), 323-338 (p. 324). 
27 Ibid., p. 338. 
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Encyclopaedists, before 1666, and indicates that Platonic ideas found there are also 
present in Leibniz's embryonic works of the Mainz period (1667-1672). 28 
Christia Mercer, in her extensive investigation of the early Leibniz, concludes that 
"the basic features of his Platonism were in place in 1671-72". 29 She shows that it 
was as a student at Leipzig in the late 1660s that Leibniz absorbed this Platonism 
through his teachers, in particular, Jakob Thomasius and Johann Adam Scherzer. 
Through these teachers Leibniz would have learnt about the ideas of Plotinus, Philo, 
Proclus, Augustine, Ficino, Pico, et al. 30 
Bernardino Orio de Miguel has argued at length for an Hermetic interpretation of 
Leibniz's philosophy, in particular, on account of the presence of the principle of 
universal harmony, which is elaborated by Leibniz as universal vitalism and organic 
continuity. Pointing out that the Hermetic tradition had its origins in Parmenides, 
Plato and the neo-Platonists, he accepts that Leibniz's philosophy was "constructed 
around an early reading of the German mystical tradition and neo-Platonism". 3' His 
thesis is that Leibniz was concerned to extract a common denominator out of the 
eclectic array of writings broadly classed as Hermetic: those of neo-Platonism, along 
with its subsequent manifestations in, for example, Gnosticism, Kabbalism, German 
Mysticism, and the School of Florence. Most of these texts were presented in 
mystical language: they were "theosophical", "symbolic" or "coded". On account of 
the (essentially neo-Platonic) principles Leibniz found in these texts, and which he 
approved of, he sought to extract a single doctrine, purged of confusion and obscurity, 
2' Ibid., pp. 330,333-335,337. 
`"' Mercer, p. 175. Mercer does not apply the term neo-Platonism to those thinkers traditionally so 
referred, such as Plotinus or Proclus, believing there is an insufficient difference between them and 
the philosophy of Plato. On this, see ibid., p. 177. 
Ibid., pp. 176-178,200-205. 
OH, ii, 423. ["construido sobre una precoz lectura de la tradiciOn mistica germana y del 
neoplatonismo"] See also pp. 423-425,431. 
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and at the same time embraced Modern scientific thought. Orio de Miguel explains 
Leibniz's interest in Christian Lurianic Kabbalah in this way. Although this particular 
brand of Hermeticism was special to Leibniz insofar as he knew von Rosenroth and 
van Helmont, and, in particular, that he colluded with the latter on Thoughts on 
Genesis, Orio de Miguel concludes that ultimately Christian Lurianic Kabbalah had 
no special importance, but was just one particular example of Hermetic thought. 32 
Of those scholars who fall under ii) above, namely, that neo-Platonic principles are 
absent prior to, but appear after, Leibniz's significant contact with Christian Lurianic 
Kabbalah, I will mention three important studies. Allison Coudert, whilst 
acknowledging that both Leibniz and van Helmont shared the common intellectual 
heritage of Renaissance neo-Platonism, and, further, that Leibniz knew of Kabbalah 
prior to the period of his main contact with van Helmont, claims that the latter, by 
introducing Leibniz to the Luriunic". form of Kabbalah, "had a decisive influence in 
shaping Leibniz's Monadology"; that the "source for many of Leibniz's most 
important ideas was the Lurianic Kabbalah, which Leibniz came to know through... 
Francis Mercury van Helmont". 33 Coudert notes that in order to establish this 
influence it has to be shown that Leibniz's philosophy 
continued to evolve between 1694 and 1698 when his contact with van 
Helmont was most intense; and... that it evolved in ways that can be 
attributed to van Helmont's influence. 34 
32 OH, ii, 425,431-432. Justin Smith has noted that there is a continuity "between Leibniz and the 
earlier Christian Platonic tradition... which also may be seen as fusing at some points with other, 
more straightforwardly mystical traditions, such as hermeticism and Kabbalism, and thereby 
coming to include many of Leibniz's contemporaries, such as Anne Conway and Francis Mercury 
van Helmont". See his "Christian Platonism and the Metaphysics of Body in Leibniz", British 
Journal for the History of Philosophy, forthcoming. 
Coudert, Leibniz and the Kabbalah, pp. 8,5. 
34 Ibid., p. 13. 
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This view is also the opinion of Anne Becco, who writes that Leibniz's 
interest in van Helmont is central to [his work], through the influence it had 
between 1694 and 1696, the key moment of the definitive rooting of the 
Leibnizian system. 35 
However, she does not claim that van Helmont was a source of ideas new to Leibniz, 
and so influenced him in this way. She accepts that Leibniz had known of neo- 
Platonic ideas and terminology since his youth, but argues that these did not become 
accepted into his philosophy until the 1694-1696 period. Van Helmont's role in their 
acceptance she describes as one of "reactivation". 36 
The case for conceptual influence depends on showing that certain concepts 
present in the doctrine of Christian Lurianic Kabbalah enter Leibniz's philosophy 
after about 1694 and can be shown to be attributable to a source such as van Helmont. 
Coudert, in mentioning emanation and its cosmological ramifications, rightly notes 
the presence of this in Lurianic Kabbalah and how it forms the basis of Leibniz's 
mature conception of monadology. 37 Although Coudert, like Becco, does not claim 
that van 
Helmont was the unique source for these ideas, she too argues that it was at the time 
of Leibniz's most intense involvement with van Helmont (1694-1696), that he 
adopted them. 
In arguing this point, Coudert attaches much weight to Leibniz's involvement in 
Thoughts on Genesis. She writes that "Leibniz wrote this book for van Helmont", 
's Anne Becco, "Leibniz et F. M. van Helmont: Bagatelle pour des monades", in Studia Leihniliana 
Sonderhe/i, 7 (1978), 119-142 (p. 137) ["L'intdret philosophique de van Helmont se situe en fait au 
point central de l'oeuvre de Leibniz, par'influence qu'iI a eue entre 1694 et 1696, moment cl6 de 
I'enracinement definitif du systeme leibnizien". ] 
" Ibid., p. 141. 
" Coudert, Leibniz and the Kahbalah, pp. 84-85,78-79. 
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implying not so much that he edited a draft version already taken down from van 
Helmont, but rather that the ideas contained in the published work are Leibniz's than 
van Helmont's. She goes on to say that 
behind this text written by Leibniz in van Helmont's name lies another text 
written by van Helmont, a text that first appeared in the first volume of' the 
Kabbala Denudala. 38 
This other text is the C. 'abbalistical Dialogue, one of the better cosmological works of 
Christian Lurianic Kabbalah. Thus, Coudert is arguing that the presence of certain 
ideas in Thoughts on Genesis is evidence of Leibniz's having adopted them, and that 
it was in the Cabbalistical Dialogue that he got them. She argues that "Leibniz 
specifically says he 'read over' the Kabbala Denudata and therefore read this text". 
However, there is no such evidence that Leibniz ever did read the ('ahbalisiic'al 
Dialogue. 39 
Coudert argues that an "evolution" of Leibniz's philosophy began at this time. She 
cites as evidence apparent differences between the New System and the Monadology; 
the former representing the old doctrine yet to be influenced, and the latter 
representing a doctrine which has evolved under kabbalistic influence. She writes that 
the "discontinuity between minds and mindless substances still appears in the NOV 
System of 1695, but it entirely disappears in the Monadology" . 
40 However, the New 
Syvem had been written primarily for a Cartesian audience. In accordance with his 
usual conciliatory mode of presenting his philosophy, Leibniz would have sought to 
colour his account of substances in such a way that it would not be unfavourably 
38 Ibid., pp. 84-85. Leibniz's precise involvement in Thoughts on Genesis is discussed in chapter 2.3. 
_`' Ibid., p. 86. Leibniz's knowledge of the Kabbala Denudutu and his knowledge of the Cuhhu/istica/ 
Dialogue is discussed in chapter 2.2.1. 
40 Ibid., p. 79. 
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received, though, at the same time, would not actually contradict his fundamental 
principles. 41 
Whilst not claiming that van Helmont was the original source, Becco's claim that 
he "re-activated" key concepts for Leibniz nevertheless implies that they were not a 
part of the latter's philosophy before 1694-1696. But the evidence suggests that these 
concepts had been in place since about 1670, and were never relinquished. The 
apparent lack of them in different texts at different times can be explained by their 
simply having been left unstated and merely implicit, according to the conciliatory 
42 method of presentation. 
Mention should also be made of Carolyn Merchant's study, which emphasizes 
Anne Conway's role, in addition to van Helmont's, in the development of Leibniz's 
philosophy, with particular regard to the concept of the monad. Whilst not claiming 
that they conceptually influenced Leibniz -she says that "the basic elements that went 
into Leibniz's concept of the monad had been well developed by 1686"- she does 
argue that they were a key factor in the refining of this concept, that they "served to 
confirm and buttress his vitalistic view of nature and to stimulate the coalescence of 
his ideas into a'monadology"'. 43 Merchant appears to equate Leibniz's adoption of 
the term "monad" with the coalescence of his ideas on it. The term first appears in 
Leibniz's writings of the 1694-1696 period, which was the time of his greatest 
involvement with Christian Lurianic Kabbalah. Whilst not disagreeing that Leibniz 
may well have decided to use the term following his kabbalistic interactions, I have 
41 See Stuart Brown, "Leibniz's'New System' Strategy", in Roger Woolhouse (ed. ), Leihni: s 'New 
S, pstem' (1695) (Florence: Leo S. Olschiki Editore, 1996), pp. 37-62. 
42 Christia Mercer notes: "those commentators who have made a careful analysis of a particular work 
or collection of closely related works from Leibniz's middle period have concluded that there is a 
group of unstated principles, assumptions, or simple philosophical tendencies that lie beneath the 
explicit statements of Leibniz's thought". See Mercer, p. 468. 4' Carolyn Merchant, The Death of Nature: Women, Ecology, and the Scientific Revolution (San 
Fransisco: Harper and Row, 1979), pp. 267,268. 
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found no new evidence that definitely suggests that it was from this source that the 
term came. It appears to be more associated with Anne Conway than van Helmont, 
only appearing in those works which she had been involved in (the Principles, the 
Adumhratio Kabhulae Christianae and the Cabbalisticul Dialogue), and not in the 
draft notes to Thoughts on Genesis, nor, seem; ngly, in the conversations between 
Leibniz and van Helmont. Although Leibniz read the Principles in 1696/7, the term is 
only once used and rather insignificantly. The usage that might have inspired Leibniz 
was that in the Cabbalistical Dialogue. Merchant, like Coudert, seizes on this text; 
but she too cannot substantiate her claim that Leibniz read this text when he 
encountered the Kabbala Denudala. 44 A variety of sources have been argued for over 
the years, such as Nicolas of Cusa, Girolamo Cardano, Giordano Bruno, Henry More, 
Ralph Cudworth and Jakob Thomasius. 45 It seems to me that Merchant goes too far 
in trying to pin down specific Christian Lurianic Kabbalah texts as the sources of 
inspiration for this change of nomenclature and, by association, of the "coalescence" 
of Leibniz's thought on this concept. 
The primary aim of this thesis is not to add to the work already done on when 
Leibniz's work was fully mature. I do, however, in my account of his cosmology, 
refer to texts written throughout his philosophical career, which support the argument 
that the key underlying principles are there all along from 1670. What this thesis does 
aim to add to the scholarship is an explanation as to why Leibniz was interested in 
Christian Lurianic Kabbalah and in being involved in the Though/s on Genesis 
project, it as seems to be the case, he was not after all inspired conceptually by it. 
44 Ibid., p. 265. 
45 Bruno as source is argued for by E. Thouverez (ed. ), Discours de Metaphysique (Paris, n. d. ) and 
against by Ludwig Stein, Leibniz und S'pino_a (Berlin: Reimer, 1890); More and especially 
Cudworth are cited as sources by Catherine Wilson, Leihni: s Metaphysics: A Historical and 
Comparative Study (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989); and Aiton argues for Thomasius 
in Leibniz: A Biography (Bristol: Adam Flilger, 1985). 
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In Part Two of this thesis, a detailed interpretation of Leibniz's cosmology is 
presented and compared with an account of Christian Lurianic Kabbalah cosmology. 
Other extensive comparative work carried out in this area has been done by Coudert 
and Orio de Miguel. Coudert, though keen to prove Christian Lurianic Kabbalah 
importantly influenced Leibniz, has provided an excellent comparative study of the 
two, focussing on the issues of the monad, individual freedom, theodicy, causation 
and language. Orio de Miguel has focussed on the Hermetic elements that are 
common to Leibniz and van Helmont; and he has made a special investigation of this 
by means of a close study of Thoughts on Genesis. 46 
This thesis is a study of cosmology and the cosmogonical process, both as they can 
be determined from Leibniz's writings alone, and how they compare with the 
(relatively symbolic) account of Christian Lurianic Kabbalah. Apart from 
highlighting the many parallels to be found in these areas (a convergence that 
interested Leibniz from the viewpoint of religious harmonizing) this detailed 
comparison brings out many Christian Platonic elements which are embedded in 
Leibniz's thought, but which are usually overlooked. This is particularly pertinent to 
the subject matter of the final chapter "The Strata of Being", where it is argued that 
the kabbalistic Adam Kadmon is a potential metaphor for the Leibnizian plenum, 
whose monadic elements share the same divine and creaturely nature that Adam 
Kadmon does. 
See OK and OH. Shorter discussions that compare the doctrines of Leibniz and Christian Lurianic 
Kabbalah include Orio de Miguel's "Adam Kadmon: Conway, Leibniz and the Lurianic Kabbalah", 
in Leibniz and Adam, ed. by M. Dascal and E. Yakira (Tel Aviv: University Publishing Projects, 
1993) pp. 267-282; and his "Leibniz und die'Physischen Monaden' von F. M. van Helmont", in 
Siudia Leibniliana Supplemenla, 27 (1990), 147-156. See also Stuart Brown, "F. M. van Helmont: 
His Philosophical Connections and the Reception of his later Cabbalistic Philosophy", in Oxford 
Studies in ! he History of Philosophy, ed. by M. A. Stewart, 2 vols (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), 
pp. 97-116. 
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By unearthing these elements I hope to have derived an improved interpretation of 
Leibniz's cosmology: one which does not throw up the seemini; paradoxes, or suggest 
vacillation on Leibniz's part, that other interpretations have been prone to do. 47 
To summarize the thesis: 
Part One provides a background to Christian Lurianic Kabbalah and Leibniz's 
relationship to it. Chapter 1 provides a short history of Christian Lurianic Kabbalah 
and introduces its principal exponents. An account of its cosmological doctrine is set 
out, preparatory to the comparative work of Part 2. Chapter 2 deals with Leibniz's 
contact with the key exponents and their writings, and his collaboration on 7houghis 
on Genesis. Chapter 3 discusses aspects of the ecumenicalist motive of the project 
and Leibniz's reaction to them. 
Part Two presents an interpretation of Leibniz's cosmology and compares it in 
detail with that of Christian Lurianic Kabbalah, utilizing Leibniz's critical remarks 
and examining his contribution to Thoughts on Genesis. Subjects dealt with are: 
epistemological issues (Chapter 4); space, matter, time, motion, the nature and 
relationship of soul and body, the continuum (Chapter 5); creation (Chapter 6); and 
the relationship between God, the cosmos and individual created beings (Chapter 7). 
This comparative work will look for similarities between the two doctrines and make 
conclusions about them in regard to the question of influences on the development of 
Leibniz's thought. This work will identify the cosmological imagery used by 
Christian Lurianic Kabbalah and assess the extent to which it legitimately parallels 
Leibniz's doctrine. From this, general conclusions will be drawn concerning Leibniz's 
" See, for example, Wilson; and Glenn Hartz, "Leibniz's Phenomenal isms", Philosophical Review 101 
(1992), 511-549. 
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interest in Christian Lurianic Kabbalah and the philosophical status that he came to 
attach to it. Along the way, this comparative work will also highlight some 
problematic and less well known issues in Leibniz's cosmology, such as, questions 
about the evolution and revolution of souls, and the divine or mundane status of 
monads. 
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PART I LEIBNIZ AND CHRISTIAN LURIANIC KABBALAI4 
Chapter 1 Christian Lurianic Kabbalah 
LI Jewish Kabbalistic Origins 
In the second half of the twelfth century a book called Sekr ha-Bahir emerged in 
Southern France. This book, now generally taken to be the earliest extant kabbalistic 
work, combines, for the first time, the kabbalistic doctrine of the sefiroi with Jewish 
mysticism. 1 The conception of the sefiro[ had their origin in a small work entitled 
Se/i? r Yezirah or Book of Creation, which was written between the third and four 
centuries, and which shows the influences of Neo-Pythagoreanism. 2 In this book, the 
first four seflrol emanate out of each other sequentially. Spirit emanates air, which 
emanates water, which emanates fire. God "engraved" on air the twenty two Hebrew 
letters from which the world and all its creatures were made. The cosmogonical 
process is thus emanative and linguistic; yet, the sefirol taken together are not 
considered to be identical with God. 
In the refer ha-Bahir the ideas in the Safer Yeziruh were developed under Gnostical 
and mystical influences. The sefirol are now associated with divine attributes: they 
are ten archetypes which together constitute a manifestation of the previously 
undifferentiated and unknowable godhead. The powers and symbols associated with 
these sefirotic modes of God are derived from, and corroborated by, the Sekr ha- 
Bahir's mystical interpretation of the Bible. 
Twelfth and thirteenth century Provence saw the early kabbalists developing 
Jewish versions of Neo-Platonic cosmology. This reached a high point with the work 
Gerschom Scholem. On the Kahhalah and its Symbolism (New York: Schocken Books, 1969), p. 90. 
Gerschom Scholern, Kahhalah, p. 27. 
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of Isaac the Blind. He developed the symbolism in the Se/er ha-Buhir and wrote a 
commentary on the Seer Yeziruh, in which he presented a neo-Platonized version of 
the theory of the sefirot. Scholem defines Kabbalah "as the product of the 
interpenetration of Jewish Gnosticism and neoplatonism". 3 
However, these two, Gnosticism and neo-Platonism, represent opposing 
tendencies. On the one hand, there were kabbalists who produced cosmologies of a 
highly imagistic sort, utilizing the symbols of a judaized Gnosticism, such as the 
Se/Cr ha-Bahir. On the other hand, there was the desire for a more philosophical 
approach, in which the imagery of the established kabbalistic theosophy was regarded 
as merely the mythical exponent of some underlying set of concepts. This rather 
apologist tendency sought to substitute kabbalistic symbols with Platonic concepts. 4 
In thirteenth century Spain, the more philosophical approach is typified by Azriel ben 
Menahen of Gerona and Isaac ibn Latif. Both drew on Jewish sources of neo- 
Platonism; but Isaac was additionally influenced by the Arabic interpretation of neo- 
Platonism (from where he took the theory of the Divine Logos), and he was an 
admirer of Maimonides's Guide for the Perplexed. 5 
Towards the end of the century the tension between the philosophical and mythical 
currents became the creative force behind the greatest work of Spanish Kabbalah, the 
Zohar. Its author was Moses de Leon, also an admirer of Maimonides. He distributed 
installments of his work, claiming that he had merely copied them from an ancient 
work which had fallen into his hands, and which had originally been composed in the 
? Ibid., p. 45. 
4 There is something of the exoteric-esoteric distinction here. Scholem, Kabbaluh, p. 50, notes that 
"from the very beginning two opposing tendencies appear among the kabbalists, the first seeking to 
limit Kabbalah to closed circles as a definitely esoteric system, and the second wishing to spread its 
influence among the people at large". On the tension between the Gnostical-symbolical and the 
philosophical-conceptual in the history of Kabbalah, see ibid., pp. 52-57 and On the Kuhba/uh and 
its Svntholisin, pp. 96-100. 
Scholem, Kabhaluh, pp. 49-53. 
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second century in Israel. It is this myth that was responsible for its being considered 
by the advocates of Christian Lurianic Kabbalah, amongst many others, as a Prisca 
theologia text. " Von Rosenroth placed three sections of this work in the Kabbala 
Denudala. 
An associate of Moses de Leon, Joseph Gikatilla, wrote a work which combined 
not only the philosophical and mythical Kabbalah but also that expounded in the 
Zohar. This work, entitled Shu'urei Orah, was utilized by von Rosenroth in his 
lexicon of the Kabbala Denudatu. 
Amongst the several destinations to which the Jews migrated following their 
expulsion from Spain in 1492, two are particularly important with regard to the 
history of Kabbalah. One was Italy, the other Palestine. In Italy, kabbalistic 
documents came to the attention of Pico della Mirandola, who instigated their 
translation. He came to believe that they represented a Prisca theology. In his 900 
Theses, he sought to demonstrate that these kabbalistic texts proved the truth of both 
the Incarnation and the Trinity, and, further, the implication that Kabbalah and 
Christianity must be concordant. Following Pico, Johannes Reuchlin, in his De arle 
cuhalistica, developed this conception of a Christian-Kabbalah. 
In Palestine, in sixteenth century Safed, Jewish Kabbalah underwent a 
revolutionary development at the hands of Moses Cordovero and Isaac Luria. 
Cordovero was probably the greatest philosophical thinker ever to call himself a 
kabbalist. It is not possible here to go into the new interpretations that he brought to 
such areas of kabbalistic study such as the Zohur and the theory of the sefirol. He was 
' On the historiography of the Zohar, see ibid., pp. 213-243. 7 On the history of Christian Kabbalah, see Frances Yates, The Occult Philosophy in the E/i: uhethun 
Age (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1979); J. L. Blau, The Chrisliun Interpretation o/'the 
C. 'uba/a in the Renaissance (Port Washington: Kennikat Press, 1944); and Francois Secret, Lew 
Kubba/isles L'hreliens de la Renaissance (Paris, 1964). 
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strongly influenced by Maimonides; and his major work was the Parties Rimmonim. 
which appears in the Kabbala Denudala. But it was he who taught Luria, through 
whom the new school of Lurianic Kabbalah became established. Luria wrote little 
himself, but through his personality and oratory gained a discipleship who regarded 
him as the Messiah. 8 After his death it was his disciples who had to set down his 
ideas using notes they had, but often filling the gaps themselves or adding their own 
elaborations. These disciples included Hayyim Vital and Joseph ibn Tabul. Their 
writings are included in the Kabbala Denudala, along with the works of the later 
Lurianic propagators, Israel Sarug, Naphtali Bacharach and Abraham Herrera. In the 
Kabbala Denudatu, Hayyim Vital's work is represented by his commentaries on the 
Zohar (KD 2,2,3-47 and 2,2,145-186) and his Revolulion of'Souls (KD 2,3,243- 
478). Ibn Tabul's Druschim is an exposition of Lurianic cosmology (KD 1,2,28-51). 
This sparked the series of exchanges between Henry More and von Rosenroth, which 
followed the Druschim in the Kabbala Denudala. Naphtali Bacharach's work Emek 
hu-Melech (KD 1,2,150-172 and 2,1,151-346) is another detailed account of Luria's 
cosmology, which includes natural language ideas from the Sefer ) eziruh. Abraham 
Herrera is represented by his Poria C'oelorum (KD 1,3,1-192), which is Lurianic, 
and infused with neo-Platonism and natural language theory. Also included is his 
Belh Elohim (KD 2,3,188-242). 
" Scholem, Kabba/ah, p. 76. 
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1.2 Christian Knorr von Rosenroth, Francis Mercury van Helmont and 
Lady Anne Conway 
"Christian Lurianic Kabbalah" I use to refer to that body of writings which, in various 
degrees, drew on the doctrine of Lurianic Kabbalah and sought to connect it in some 
way with Christian theology. Some of these texts are primarily syncretistic; some 
simply blend in kabbalistic ideas with Hermetic and alchemical notions; others 
expound philosophies and note the existence of parallels in kabbalistic writings. 
The principal exponents of this were Christian Knorr von Rosenroth, Francis 
Mercury van I lelmont and, to a lesser extent, though more philosophically, Lady 
Anne Conway. All three were at some time or another involved in the production of 
these different kinds of Christian kabbalistic synthesis. 
The primary motive behind the project was the endeavour to bring an end to 
religious conflict by reconciling the apparent differences between theological 
doctrines. In chapter 3I will discuss three different modes for doing this as they can 
be discerned amongst the writings of von Rosenroth, van Helmont and Conway. 
Von Rosenroth was based in Sulzbach, Germany, where from 1668 until his death 
in 1689 he held a high advisory office at the court of Prince Christian August, Duke 
of Sulzbach. Van Helmont, despite an association with the court from the early 1650s. 
lived the life of a roaming scholar. 9 In 1662, as a prisoner of the Inquisition, he wrote 
his first book, the Alphubeti vere nuturalis. This book expounds a natural or Adamic 
The best bibliographical account of these individuals is to be found in Allison Coudert, The hnpael of 
the Kahbaluh in the Seventeenth Century: The Life and Thought of Francis Mercury van Helmont 
(1614-1698) (Leiden: Brill, 1998). 
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language theory reminiscent of that in the Emek hu-Melech and the Purlu ('uelorum, 
both of which von Rosenroth would publish in the Kabbala Denudala. "' 
From 1670 until 1679, apart from brief visits abroad, van Helmont resided at 
Ragley Hall, Anne Conway's Warwickshire home. It was during this time, with its 
inmates of Anne Conway and van Helmont, and Henry More a regular visitor, that 
Ragley Hall became an English satellite of Sulzbach: tracts to be included in the 
Kabbala Denudala would be sent to Ragley from von Rosenroth, where they would 
be commented on or edited before being sent back. At times Ralph Cudworth would 
be drawn into the process. 11 It was at this time that More wrote a number of essays 
critical of aspects of Kabbalah, which were included in the Kabbala Denudaiu. 
Henry More's philosophy, like that of the other leading Cambridge Platonist Ralph 
Cudworth, developed as a reaction against the mechanical philosophy. More had 
criticized Descartes for removing mind from nature, the consequence of which was 
that, with the exception of the human body, all matter was rendered inactive: no 
sufficient reason for a body's motion or existence could be given if it had no mental 
or spiritual principle in it. Whilst retaining the Cartesian dualism of mind and matter, 
More, with his hylarchic principles, and Cudworth with his plastic natures, sought to 
re-introduce spiritual principles as the explanatory elements in nature, thereby re- 
uniting physics and metaphysics. It was the presence of a spiritual metaphysics that 
aroused More's interest in Kabbalah and neo-Platonism, and he accordingly studied 
the Christian Kabbalah, sifting the various ideas he discovered there, rejecting or 
10 The Aiphuheli and its sources are discussed in Allison Coudert, "Some Theories of a Natural 
Language from the Renaissance to the Seventeenth Century", in Mugiu, Nuiurullis und die 
Enisiehung der Modernen Nalirwissenschujien. Sludia Leihniliana Sonderheft, 7 (1978), 56-1 14 (pp. 
56-91) and in her Impact of the Kabbalah, pp. 58-99. 
Richard Popkin, "The Spiritualistic Cosmologies of Henry More and Anne Conway", in Henry More 
(/6/4-/687): Tercentenary Studies, ed. by Sarah Hutton (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 
1990), pp. 97-114, (p. 105). 
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accepting, adapting and modifying, as they would serve his purposes. More, like von 
Rosenroth and van Helmont, thought Kabbalah was a Prisca Theologie, transmitted 
from Moses via the Egyptians, Pythagoras and Plato. In his Conjec[ura Cuhhulislica 
of 1653 there is contained a blend of the Prisca texts, Pythagoreanism, Platonism, 
Cartesianism and Christian kabbalism. This latter drew on the christianized Spanish 
Kabbalah of writers such as Pico della Mirandola and Johannes Reuchlin, for it was 
not until the 1670s, when von Rosenroth began sending More tracts that would be 
included in the Kabbala Denuduta, that he learned of the later Lurianic version. But 
More's overall attitude to Kabbalah was highly ambivalent. Though he found much in 
it to support his re-spiritualizing programme, there was also "rubbish in amongst the 
gold", a result, he believed, of contamination during its transmission down through 
the ages. The Lurianic development he felt was a further corruption ol'the original 
Kabbalah, and he called it, amongst other things, crass, anthropomorphic and 
needlessly enigmatic, the result of Aristotelian obfuscation. 12 
Anne Conway shared More's objections to the dead mechanism of Cartesianism, 
but what came to constitute for her a solution to the ontological problems it raised, 
did not conform with that of More. 13 With van Helmont's arrival on the Ragley scene 
she found herself exposed to his interpretation of kabbalistic ontology in the form of 
monism. Whereas the Cambridge Platonists More and Cudworth maintained a 
dualism of mind and matter, two essentially distinct substances, the former informing 
the latter, van Helmont espoused a monism of which mind and matter were merely 
the names given to relative positions on a continuum that consisted of but one type of 
12 There is an extended discussion of More's relationship with Kabbalah in Brian P. Copenhaver, 
"Jewish Theologies of Space in the Scientific Revolution: Henry More, Joseph Raphson, Isaac 
Newton and their Predecessors", Annals of Science, 37 (1980), 489-548. 
'A comparison of the doctrines of More and Conway is made by Popkin, ibid. See also Carolyn 
Merchant. 
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substance. This vitalist metaphysics was the one towards which Conway was drawn, 
and she set down her ideas in her Principles oof'the Most Ancient und Modern 
Philosophy, seemingly between 1672 and 1673.14 The Principles is the most 
philosophical work within the corpus of Christian Lurianic Kabbalah. It contains 
references to the Portu Coelorum and the Drusehim. 
There were other developments that would take place at Ragley. Van Helmont, who 
had mixed in Quaker circles for some time, discussed their ideas and practises with 
Conway. Soon representatives of the sect would be paying visits to them at Ragley, 
including their founder George Fox. But it was George Keith who was to be the most 
important visitor. He had been struck by what he saw as remarkable similarities 
between Quaker doctrine and that of the Kabbalah. Quakers eschewed the idea that 
Christ's presence had departed at his historical death, leaving men with only the 
(dead) written words of his life and teachings and the traditions built on them by the 
Church. Rather, they thought that the presence of Christ continued to dwell on Earth 
in each individual; and, amongst other similarities, it was the vitalism in kabbalistic 
metaphysics which provided a basis for this inner presence. 15 Keith eventually 
collaborated with Conway and van Helmont to write A Cabbalistical Dialogue, the 
Adumhraiio Kubbalue Chrislianue and Two Hundred Queries. 16 
1' The MS was taken by van Helmont, following her death in 1679, to the continent, where it was 
published as the first item in the Latin Opuscu/a Philosophica. See Merchant, p. 257. In the same 
year, an English version appeared in Amsterdam, then in London in 1692. See Popkin, p. 103. 
Coudert, The Impact uJ the Kabhalah, pp. 181-92. 
16 On the joint authorship of the Cabbalistical Dialogue, see Brown, T. M. van Helmont", p. 104: and 
of the Two Hundred Queries, see Coudert, The lmpnet uf'lhe Kahbalah, p. 241. Scholem attributes 
the Adumhratio to van Helmont, but he does not cite his evidence. See Gershom Scholem, 
Kahhalah (New York: Meridian, 1974), pp. 200,417. Copenhaver points out that parts of 
Conway's Principles are very similar to the ideas of George Keith and those expressed in the 
Adumhraiio. See his, "Jewish Theologies of Space", pp. 527-528. It seems likely that this work, like 
the Cahhalislica/ Dialogue, which also appears in the Kabbala Denudala, in the same dialogue 
format, was jointly produced by van Helmont, Conway and Keith. Indeed, chapters 4 and 5 of the 
Adumhraiio make specific references to the Cahbalistical Dialogue. 
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A cabbalistical Dialogue in answer to the Opinion of'a learned Doctor in 
Philosophy and Theology that the World was made of'Nothing... is a cosmological 
text inspired by Lurianic Kabbalah. As the fuller title indicates it was written as a 
riposte to Henry More's essay Foundation. /or philosophy or, for the Eagle-Boy-Bee q/ 
the cabbala, which criticizes kabbalistic creation theory. It was included in the 
Kabbala Denudala immediately following More's essay. 
The Adumhratio Kahhalae C'hristianae is an example of a syncretistic text which 
parallels Lurianic Kabbalah with the New Testament. It too was included in the 
Kabbala Denudaia. 
The Two Hundred Queries moderately propounded concerning the Doctrine o/ the 
Revolution of Humane Souls, and its Conformity with the Truth of'the Christian 
Religion seems to have been written between 1674 and 1679.17 An important source 
for this book was the Revolution of'Souls by Hayyim Vital. 
In 1676 van Helmont, a Roman Catholic, converted to Quakerism; and he was 
followed the next year by Anne Conway, who had been in the Anglican church up to 
that time. Their actions indicate the passion with which they held to their 
philosophical ideas, since the Quakers were looked on with suspicion and disdain, 
and their conversions were socially very radical acts. More, in particular, was 
appalled. 
In 1679 Anne Conway died aged 49. Van Helmont's position at Ragley was no 
longer tenable and he left England. Over the years that followed, until his death in 
1698, van Helmont would publish several further books. For most of these an 
amanuensis would be employed, who would note down van Helmont's ideas then 
present them in the way he thought best for publication. The works that appeared 
17 Coudert, The Impact u/ the Kabhuluh, p. 241. 
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during this last period, and which I shall drawn on, fall into three categories. i) There 
are those which set out van Helmont's essentially Hermetic doctrine of nature: the 
Paradoxal Discourses of 1685, The Spirit of'Diseases of 1692 and The Divine Being 
of 1694. Each of these includes important sections that deal with cosmology. ii) There 
is the Seder Olam of 1693, which syncretizes Christianity and Lurianic Kabbalah. 1K 
iii) There is the Rabbinical and Paruphrastical Exposition of'Genesis I of] 682 and 
Thoughts on Genesis of 1697, which seek to re-interpret the words of Genesis in 
terms of Helmontian Hermeticism. The amanuensis for this latter was none other than 
Leibniz: proof of this and the precise nature of Leibniz's involvement will be 
discussed in chapter 2.3. 
1.3 Cosmological Doctrine 
Although the fundamental neo-Platonism of Christian Lurianic Kabbalah was not 
uniquely derived from what was implicit of it in Jewish Kabbalah, the specific 
cosmology which it embraced did come from the Lurianic writings that von 
Rosenroth had amassed. The literature clearly shows the presence of distinct features 
of Lurianic cosmology: the cosmogonical event of the zinrum; the world as emanated 
18 Scholars have vacillated over the issue as to whether or not van Helmont was the author of this 
book. It is probably the case that, as with most of his publications, van Helmont was the source of 
the ideas, of which the text appears by way of an amanuensis, who took notes then arranged them in 
a suitable form for publication. It seems reasonable in such cases to refer a book to the originator of 
the ideas. Leibniz says to different correspondents at the beginning of 1695 that he believes that a 
medical friend of van Helmont had written the book. (See letters to von der Hardt, 28 December/7 
January 1695, A, I, xi, 851, and to Hertel, 8 January 1695, A, 1, xi, 852. ) But in his journal record 
of conversations he had with van Helmont on 9 August 1696, he reports that "I remonstrated with 
him about his [sein] Seder Olam... ". (See Pe, p. 191. ) This suggests that Leibniz is now apprised 
as to whom the contents of the book are best referred to. Furthermore, the Seder 0/um includes in 
its binding an appended work called A Few Questions, of which van Helmont is explicitly stated to 
be the author. In his critique (of 1694-95), which covers both works, Leibniz makes no suggestion 
that he is dealing with different authors when his remarks pass on from the Seder (glum to A Few 
Questions, as is evident by his use of "author" in the singular: "... and the author says further on 
(question 24, on the Apocalypse) that... ". (See FoL, p. 52. ) 
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by God, but not substantially identical with him; the four "worlds" or strata of being; 
universal vitalism and the emergence of matter; the revolution of souls; and, in 
particular, the conception of Adam Kadmon as the cosmological ens medium. 
The rest of this chapter is given over to an exposition of the cosmology of Christian 
Lurianic Kabbalah, preparatory to its comparison with Leibniz's cosmology in Part 2. 
This comparison will allow an assessment of the extent to which parallels might exist 
between the two. 
For my account of the cosmology of Christian Lurianic Kabbalah I have drawn on 
the following publications. i) Anne Conway's Principles. ii) Van Helmont's 
Alphabeti, A Puruphruslical Exposition, Two Hundred Queries, Paradoxal 
Discourses, Spirit of Diseases, Seder (glum, The Divine Being and the draft notes for 
Thoughts on Genesis. 19 iii) Von Rosenroth's Kabbala Denuduta, including: his own 
contributions; original Jewish Lurianic texts published there, such as Abraham 
Herrera's Porto Coelorum, and Naphtali Bacharach's Emek ha-Malech; and the joint 
contributions by Conway, van Helmont and George Keith: the Adumhrutio Kabbalue 
('hrislianue and the Cubbalistical Dialogue. iv) I have also drawn at times on the 
work of modern scholarship, principally that of Gerschom Scholem, to supplement 
my interpretation of Lurianic creation theory. 
Since the published version of Thoughts on Genesis follows Leibniz's editing, a purer account of van Helmont's ideas is to be found in the pre-edited draft. What Leibniz added to this draft will 
be used in Part 2 for comparing the cosmologies of Leibniz and Christian Lurianic 
Kabbalah. 
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1.3.1 The Fundamental Nature of the Cosmos 
Space, Mutter, Time und Motion 
In the cosmology of Christian Lurianic Kabbalah, space is considered to be a mode of' 
created substance, and should be comprehended in the same way as for numerical 
notions. In The Spirit of Diseases, van Helmont writes that "Three-fold Dimension or 
Locality, is onely an Accident and not an Essential Property of Bodies". 20 That space 
is a modal relation of an ideal numerical kind is also apparent in Conway's discussion 
both of the number and magnitude of creatures, and of the containment of creatures 
within each other. Since any number, however great, can always be increased, and 
that infinitely or without end, so there is no limit to the number, the quantity, or the 
magnitude (either of the individual or of the totality) of creatures that God can create: 
If the universe were divided into such tiny atoms that one hundred thousand 
were contained in a single poppy seed, who could deny that the infinite power 
of God could make this number greater and greater by multiplying to 
infinity... which can never be so great that it cannot be increased to infinity by 
addition or multiplication? 21 
Conversely, any measure of space, since it is a numerical entity, can be decreased or 
divided infinitely, or without end, such that there can be no limit to the small, or, 
there can be no atoms: 
The same argument shows that not only the entire universe or system of 
creatures as a whole is infinite or has infinity in itself, but even every creature, 
no matter how small, which we can see with our eyes or conceive of in our 
20 The Spirit (? /'Diseases, section 45. 
'' Principles, p. 16. 
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minds, has in itself such an infinity of parts or rather of entire creatures that 
they cannot be counted... And since no creature could be so small that a lesser 
could not exist, so no creature is so big that a larger one could not always 
exist. 22 
How it is that an infinity of creatures can be produced out of God's mind will be 
investigated later; but for now it is important to indicate that this, combined with the 
conclusion that there is no upper or lower limit to spatial magnitude, points to the 
plenum: that everywhere in nature, no matter how small or large the volume 
examined, not only will created being, but an infinity of such created beings, always 
be found: "In every creature, whether spirit or body, there is an infinity of creatures, 
each of which contains an infinity in itself, and so on to infinity. " 23 
When "body" is defined as that aspect of a creature which is extended, it follows 
that, since space is a mere ideal relation, body is not a real substance in itself 
extended through space, but rather a mode. What is called "body" is nothing more 
than an ideal limitation, imposed on nature, and not a real separation into absolutely 
distinguished bodies: which is what is meant when van Helmont says that truly all 
bodies are united in the one body of spiritual water: 
When we say that a Body is of such a Dimension in Heighth, Length and 
Breadth, this is no more than a Limitation made in our Thoughts to distinguish 
one Body from another: For to speak properly, there is no separation or 
Division of Bodies, with respect had to the Universe, but all Bodies are so 
united together, that it is impossible indeed and in truth, to separate one Body 
from another: because the whole World being one Creature, no part of it can 
be so separated from the other, as that it should be no more in the World; even 
as all things, that is, all particular Bodies proceeded from one and the same 
Principle the Water, and can be resolved again into the same, as hath already 24 been showed. 
22 Ibid., p. 17. See also p. 20: "There can be no actual division in matter which cannot always be further 
divided... without end. " 
Ibid. 
''' The Spirit of Diseases, section 15. 
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If matter, like body, is defined as that which is extended, then, matter also is nothing 
but a mere order relation, a mode imposed on "spiritual water", a mere appearance: 
Mutter as such, is not allowed to be so much as a substance, but to be only a 
certain exirinsecal and accidental mocüficution of a spiritual. substance... 
Mailer, as such, is not a spirit; but only that very Substance itself, which 
appeareth under the form of Mutter. 25 
The material body of a creature, then, is not a substantial thing in itself, but a certain 
(modal) delimitation of some underlying spiritual substance, which, on account of the 
infinite divisibility of nature must itself be a plenum; and so this corporeal 
delimitation does not represent a single being of the underlying substance separated 
out, but rather embraces the (infinite) multiplicity of beings that will constitute any 
particular volume of the plenum. 
But what is the nature of these beings which are aggregated into the appearance of 
matter? Conway is certain that they are not the physical atoms such as those proposed 
by Henry More. His belief that the divisibility of matter has a limit in smallest parts 
which are yet "discerpible" no further, and which constitute nature, is rejected by 
Conway as a "fallacy which logicians call comparing incomparables, namely, joining 
words or terms which imply contradiction or absurdity. " 26 Rather, a body is a three- 
dimensional modification of spiritual substance: not a single spiritual being existing 
by itself, but, as a volume of the spatial plenum, an aggregation of infinite single 
spirits, or monads: "Mailer is made by a Coalition or Clinging together of Spirilual 
degenerate dull Monades or single Beings. " 27 
2 C'abbulistical Dialogue, p. 8. See also Principles, pp. 41-42: "Creation is one entity or 
substance in respect to its nature or essence... so that it only varies according to its mode of 
existence, one of which is corporeality. " 
2(. Principles. p. 19. 
27 C abbalislical Dialogue, p. 9. 
36 
Christian Lurianic Kabbalah, in speaking of the type of spirits contained in a body 
of matter, emphasizes an essentially negative quality about them: they are privation. 
or degeneration of spiritual nature, now darkened, dull or at rest: Matter is the 
appearance of spirit "in its blindness or darkness... its dull rest, and privation of its 
former happiness", 28 and "might be said to consist in... singular monads, points 
destitute of proper motion". 29 
In Christian Lurianic Kabbalah, time, like space, is a modal relation dependent on 
(already existing) substances: it is consequent on the world, is a relative order of 
successive configurations between individual substances. As van Helmont says in The 
Divine Being: 
Time is no thing else but a Limitation, we conceive in our thoughts, either 
according to the Course of the Sun, or the motion of any other thing from one 
place to another. Now where there is a Limitation or Measuring, there must of 
necessity be some Created thing, by or according to which the said Measuring 
is performed. 30 
Space is the order relation between a plurality of substances, and both time and 
motion represent an ordering of changes between one spatial configuration and 
another. Conway says: "Time is nothing but the motion or change of creatures from 
one condition or state to another", 31 and " times [time periods]... are nothing but 
successive motions and operations of creatures". 32 Like space, time is to be treated as 
a numerical entity. That is, in the same way that any numerical quantity can be 
increased or decreased indefinitely, so any time period, whatever its magnitude, and 
irrespective of whatever units of measurement are employed, can be increased or 
28 Ibid., p. 8. 
2" Adumhraliu, p. 29. See also C ubbulistical Dialogue, p. II: "Matter is the privation ofspirilual 
nulure. " 
Section 105. 
Principles, p. 5I. 
Ibid., p. 13. 
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decreased without end. Consequently, there can be no limit to how great a time period 
can be, which means that there is no definite greatest length of time with bounded 
limits, i. e. no ultimate beginning or end to time; nor can there be a limit to how small 
a time period can be: however much a length of time is reduced, there will never be 
reached a point at which there is no real change in the (spatial) order between 
substances through that time period. Indeed any and every time period may be said to 
contain an infinity of smaller time periods. Conway writes: 
Just as no time is so great that it is not possible to conceive of a greater, so 
likewise no time is so small that a lesser may not be imagined, for a sixtieth 
part of a minute may be divided into sixty other parts and these into still 
others, and so on to infinity. 33 
Like space, the infinite divisibility of time results in the plenum: there can be no point 
reached at which, between two points of time, however close, there is no motion, no 
change of (spatial) configuration amongst substances: with respect to time, nature is 
fundamentally in flux. 
The Nature and Relalionship gf'Soul and Body 
Does Christian Lurianic Kabbalah consider that a creature is nothing more than a 
bodily amalgam of dull spirits, those "spiri[uul degenerate dull monades" referred to 
in the C abbalistical Dialogue? If so, creatures could be nothing more than mere 
modal differentiations of the spirit plenum, and so not real individuals at all, which at 
the same time opens the door to pantheism. There is evidence throughout many of 
Ibid 
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their writings that this is not the case, but, rather, that the notion of creature includes 
not only that of body but also that of soul. In Two Hundred Queries it is asserted that 
creatures, vegetable, animal and human, consist of two parts or aspects: a subtle 
substantial one (the "seed kernel" or soul) and a gross insubstantial one (the "husk" or 
body): 
What is sown consisteth of two parts viz. The pure substance of the kernel, or 
Grain, which most properly is the Body, and the Inner Husk or shell that 
containeth it... The body of man hath in it two parts answering to these two in 
a grain of corn: one part more subtil and refined, which rather cleaveth to the 
body, than is a part of it. Now this gross part may be said to have no sense, or 
feeling, of what belongs to a Man, no more than a piece of red Earth or clay, 
which yet makes up a great part of the visible body of that which is commonly 
called the body of Man. 34 
Inasmuch as "body" refers to the spatial extension of a creature across the spirit 
plenum, it refers to an (infinite) multiplicity of spirits; but "soul", on the other hand, is 
referred to but a single such spirit. This is why the soul "rather cleaveth to the body, 
than is a part of it" because, though a soul is inextricably linked to a body (cleaveth to 
it), as a non-extended being it, necessarily, cannot be a (spatial) part of this body. 
Thus the ontological foundation of the body and the soul of a creature does not differ 
--it is the spirit plenum in both cases. Their difference resides in numerical quanta: 
the body consists of infinite spirits, but the soul only of one: "The distinction between 
spirit and body is only modal and incremental, not essential and substantial". ;s The 
explication of the nature of body and soul, and their relationship, therefore is to be 
discovered in the nature and relationship of the spirit substances of the plenum, 
specifically, how one of these (as soul) might be related to a multiplicity of them (as 
'4 Two Hundred Queries, section 118. See also ibid., section 114: "For shall not every seed [or soul] 
have its own body? " 
Principles, p. 40. 
39 
body). Since space is merely ideal, or a mode of substance, the bodily aggregate, 
though composed of real substances, is, as aggregate defined by spatial extension, a 
mere mode; whereas the soul is not a collection of substances, modal or otherwise, 
but is a single actual substance. Now, what is a substance is immutable, and what is a 
mode is mutable. Soul, as an actual spirit substance, is therefore immutable: and 
body, as mode, is mutable, for the spirits which make up its aggregate come and go, 
and because of the infinite divisibility of time, this coming and going is unceasing, 
i. e. the body is in flux. The substantial soul is therefore incorruptible and exempt 
from annihilation, and endures for ever, whereas its associated body is in constant 
flux and does not endure for a moment: 
This unity [soul] is so great that nothing can dissolve it (although the unity of 
the greater number of ministering spirits [its body] ... may be dissolved). Thus it happens that the soul of every human being will remain a whole soul 36 for eternity. 
Even when this quality and manner of being changes suddenly, i. e. the dissolution of 
the body, or what is commonly called "death", the soul still endures, though, as I will 
show below, it endures still with an associated body, but a now much reduced one. It 
is on the basis of this argument that Christian Lurianic Kabbalah asserts the doctrine 
of the revolution of souls: 
Why may there not also be a revolution of bodies, seeing the first matter, or 
substance of bodies [the soul] is incorruptible and is not annhiliated, or 
evanished? 37 
Ibid., p. 55. See also Two Hundred Queries, section 114: "Though [a creature, over 
time] be not the same in quality and manner of being, yet shall it not be the same substance? " 
Two Hundred Queries, section 123. 
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Hence all creatures are eternally mutable: eternal by virtue of their souls, mutable by 
virtue of their bodily outward forms, of which no soul is ever without, and which 
mutate unceasingly and for all time. 
But how is the single spirit substance of the soul related to the multiple spirit 
substances of the body, such that the soul always, inextricably, has a body? 
According to Conway the single spirit of the soul is a centre, ruler anti principal of 
the multiple spirits of the body. In order that a certain volume of the plenum can be 
meaningfully separated off from the rest of the plenum and be called "this body", it is 
necessary that there exists a principle which both provides a commonality to those 
spirits which are to be subsumed under that body, and which, at the same time, 
distinguishes them from what is "other" or "external" to that body. It is in this sense 
that a single principal spirit of the creaturely fragment of the plenum is called a 
centre: 
This central, ruling or principal spirit... is called central because all the other 
spirits come together in it, just as lines from every part of the circumference 
meet in the centre and go forth from this centre. 38 
But this spirit is not only a principle of representation, but is also said to be the cause 
or formative principle of its body. To the extent that the aggregate spirits of the body 
as a whole are as they are by virtue of the principal spirit, so the soul is called the 
ruler of the body: it orders the spirits of the body, which collectively are to be 
considered its domain, and each of which stand in a causally subordinate relation to 
the ruling soul-spirit as soldiers to their general: 
'x Principles, p. 55. 
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The spirit of man or brute is also a countless multitude of spirits united in [a] 
body, and they have their order and government, such that one is the principal 
39 ruler. 
With this conception of the soul-body relationship, the body is accordingly relerred to 
as the instrument of the soul, for which the latter is the principle of motion. Conway 
states that there is an: 
intimate union or bond which exists between spirits and bodies, by means of 
which spirits have dominion over bodies with which they are united, so that 
they move them from one place to another and use them as instruments in 
their various operations. 40 
The relationship between the soul and the body is illustrated further by alchemical 
terms. Some of these are what today would be called purely symbolical or analogical; 
others, however, easily fit into the context of energy physics. In all cases, the notion 
of the soul as active principle, and body as passive principle, is clearly expressed. 
That matter, out of which particular bodies are derived, is a "spiritual water", has 
already been met with ("All particular Bodies proceeded from one and the same 
Principle, the Water. " 41). But "fire" is also to be found: as the corresponding 
principle to the active soul. Since every creature has both a soul and a body, The 
Spirit u/Diseases says that "the World and all the Creatures in it, consisteih of these 
Iwo principles, and no more: viz. Fire und Water. " 42 And since these two are 
inextricable in the creature, so "as every creature hath its vivifying Spirit or Fire, so it 
Ibid., p. 39. See also, The Spirit c)J'Diseuses, section 33: "The fiery Spirit [soul] 
hath many spirits under its Dominion, which greatly differ from one another in their Efficiency or 
Operation... The fullest assurance that we can have of their truth, is from our own selves, when we 
consider of how many various Parts and Operations our Body consists, which different Parts must 
have their differing Spirits; though all of them under the Government and Superintendence of our 
Central Spirit. " 
'o Principles, p. 56. 
41 The Spirit of Diseuses. section 45. 
42 Ibid., section 25. 
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must likewise have its female or Watery Essence. " 43 And "as the nature of the fiery 
essence is to excite and make alive, so the watery being of a cooling nature inclines 
creatures to rest. X 44 In the draft notes for Thoughts on Genesis, van Ilelmont seeks 
to found the fire and water principles on Scripture using a kabbalistic interpretation of 
"schamaim", the Hebrew word for "heaven". As shall become apparent later, 
"heaven", in the Hlelmontian cosmology, is the spirit plenum out of which all 
creatures are made. By breaking down the Hebrew word "schamaim" into "esch" and 
"maim", which respectively mean "fire" and "water", van Helmont believes that he 
has proved from the revealed word of God that heaven, and thereby all the creatures 
derived thereof, are founded on these two principles: "Schamaim contains fire and 
water. Now esch is fire, and maim water... all things were made out of these two. " 
Further on he mentions that "fire and water... is... matter and soul, light and dark. " 45 
It is a small step from this pair of terms to that of heat and cold as indicating the 
nature of soul and body. The soul is the active (fiery, hot) principle of the creature; 
the body is the passive (cold) and maleable flux (watery) principle. Both soul and 
body have the same ontological basis in spiritual substance: 
The soul must consist of'the same principles, whence the body takes its 
original. For if the soul did not consist of the very same principles whence the 
essence of the body doth proceed, she could never have any communion or 
fellowship with the body, because two things of'a different original can never 
unite or co-operate... And therefore we conclude that the soul consists of a 
spiritual, fiery and watery essence. 46 
a' Ibid., section 18. 
44 Ibid., section 21. 
' OH, I, 83,85, LH. I. V. 2g, fol. 35. 
46 The Divine Being, section 90. 
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In the alchemical cosmology of The Paradoxical Discourses the pairs of terms are 
subsumed under the astronomical bodies of the Sun and the Moon. The Sun, which is 
male, the father, is the source of heat and fire, and consequently the active principle, 
the Moon is the female, the Mother, who is the principle of coolness and passivity. 
These solar and lunar principles are the active and passive principles present in every 
creature and which are modes of the underlying plenum of spirit substances: 
And such a spiritual, and not corporeal Being, must we suppose the coolness 
of the Moon to be, by means of the spiritual coalition and commixture of 
which, with the spiritual warmth of the Sun, all comprehensible Beings are 
produced. 47 
It has been pointed out above that since the soul is a single spirit, rather than an 
extended collection of spirits, it is not a spatial part of the creature. The connection a 
soul has with its body is therefore not that of corporeal interaction: the soul does not 
rule and affect its body by physically colliding with its parts (but then the parts of the 
body are only collections of spirits, so even here, efficient cause by physical collision 
does not exist). And yet it is stated that the fiery principle informs and moves body, 
and does so as an incorporeal entity "more subtil and refined, which rather cleaveth to 
the body, than is a part of it", 48 and which ubiquitously penetrates this body "by a 
kind of penetration which is different from what any body or matter, however subtle, 
can accomplish, namely by its intimate presence. " 49 And this intimate presence is 
that presence of soul as cause, to body as effect: soul as the reason for the form and 
changes of each and every part of the body: the intimate presence of the causal 
agency of rational order, inextricable from any and every part, as effect, to the point 
" Paradoxa/ Discourses, p. 10. See also p. 7. 
" Two Hundred Queries, section 1 18. 
49 Principles, p. 68. See also The Spirit (? /'Diseases, section 13. 
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of intimacy. This "power" of the soul within the creature to effect or unfold the 
changes in its body (to impart motion to it) is called an internal motion by Conway: it 
is the vitality of a creature, which proceeds from the will of its soul. External motion, 
or efficient cause, is "local and mechanical and in no way vital, because it does not 
proceed from the life of the thing so moved. " Moreover, 
if motion were communicated by local motion, this motion would be 
communicated by another, and this again by yet another, and so on to infinity, 
which is absurd. 
Rather, 
every motion which proceeds from the proper life and will of a creature is 
vital, and I call this the motion of life, which clearly is neither local nor 
mechanical like the other kind but has in itself life and vital power. This is the 
virtual extension of the creature. 50 
The (spatio-temporal) extent to which a soul is the ordering agent for a body, that is, 
is a ruler of a domain of spirits subordinated to it, is what Conway here calks the 
virtual extension of a creature. 
The soul and the body, as they have now been defined, are mutually 
interdependent: it as senseless to speak of a body without a soul, or a soul without a 
body, as it is to speak of a cause without an effect, or an active principle without a 
passive, or Iight without dark, and so on. hence a creature always has both a body 
and a soul. Now, since what a body really is is a multitude of spirits, each one of 
which, as single spirit, is a soul; and since a soul always has a body, it follows that all 
the individual constituent spirits of a body are themselves also at the same time souls 
Principles, pp. 69,70. 
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ruling over their own bodies or multitudes of spirits, each of which is a soul itself; 
and so on. Conway says that there 
is also a countless multitude of spirits united in this body, and they have their 
order and government, such that one is the principal ruler, another has second 
place, and a third commands others below itself, and so on for the whole, just 5ý 
as in an army. 
The General Continuum 
Christian Lurianic Kabbalah affirms that every spirit has both an active and a passive 
aspect: it is active in relation to those spirits (the body) for which it is the causal 
principle in the rational order of nature, and which collectively are the domain over 
which its rulership extends; and it is passive in relation to that one spirit (the soul) for 
which it, along with the other spirits which make up a collection of spirits, is the 
effect in the rational order of nature, is that which is ruled over. This relationship of 
action-passion between individual substances is clearly a re/alive one; and 
consequently so too is the distinction of soul and body derived from it: souls are not 
pure activity, and bodies are not pure passivity; rather, the one is active in relation to 
the other, or, in Conway's words: "In every visible creature there is body and spirit, or 
a more active and a more passive principle. " 52 There is no real distinction between 
soul and body: rather they represent the two directions along the continuum of active- 
passive, cause-effect, as it exists between individual spirit substances. What is active 
Ibid., p. 39. See also The Spirit q/ Diseases, section 33: "The fiery Spirit hath 
many spirits under its Dominion, which greatly differ from one another in their Efficiency and 
operation-, many whereof have again their particular Dominion over others, like as in an Army, the 
Generalissimo commands the whole Army: but besides this very Regiment, Corps, etc have their 
own commanders, subaltern officers... " 
5 Principles, p. 38. My italics. 
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in the particular creature finds itself passive in the general continuum, as what is 
passive in the particular is yet active in the general; that is, the soul of any particular 
creature also has the aspect of body (on the general continuum), as the particular body 
also has the aspect of soul. It is in this sense that expressions that equate the spiritual 
and corporeal should be interpreted. Van Helmont says: 
Seeing therefore every Spiritual thing is corporeal, and every corporeal thing 
is Spiritual, in some degree or measure; therefore all Creatures, from the 
highest to the lowest, have some relation and natural Affinity one to another, 
the highest to the lowest, and the lowest to the highest. 53 
Conway says: 
Spirit and body are of one original nature and substance, and that body is 
nothing but fixed and condensed spirit, and spirit is nothing but volatile body 
or body made subtle. 54 
Every spirit is the soul (active principle) of a (spatially extended) bodily aggregate 
(passive principle) of spirits, which it subordinates; each of which in its turn is the 
soul of a smaller body of spirits, and so on. Van Helmont and Conway refer to the 
soul as a central spirit, and its body of spirits as a surrounding sphere, which is 
illuminated by the soul in the sense that the soul is that which activates its body of 
Scder 0/um, section 32. See also section 28: "Therefore Spirit and Body are not contrary Essences, 
as many do vainly and falsely affirm; 1or every created Spirit is corporeal, having in it the true 
essence and nature of a Body, viz. it is an extended Being, bounded, circumscrib'd with place, 
moveable, etc. " And section 30: "For as every Spirit or Soul in the whole creatural system is a 
Body, having in it the true Essence and Attributes of a Body; so every Body is in some degree or 
measure Animal and Spiritual, i. e. hath Life, Sense and Knowledge; or at leastwise capable of those 
Attributes. " See also the draft notes for Thoughts on Genesis, OH, I, 108; LH, I, V, 2g, fol. 40, 
where van Helmont says: "Incorporeal spirit is minimum body" 
Principles, p. 61. See also p. 5I: "Nor is there any difference between body and spirit... except that 
body is the grosser part and the spirit the more subtle. " 
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spirits, and which can be enlarged or shrunken accordingly as the domain of rulership 
of the soul subsumes more or less other spirits of the plenum: 
Spirit is better defined in the Kabbala Denudala as the central nature, which 
has the ability to emit a luminous sphere and to enlarge and to shrink it, which 
appears to be the meaning of Aristotle's entelechy. 55 
In the draft notes for Thoughts on Genesis, van Helmont says that created things 
consist of a light or seed (or soul) and an expanse of space around it (which he calls 
its "heaven"). This heaven is commensurate with the extent of the soul's rulership 
through the space surrounding it, and clearly relates to body. The influence of 
rulership van Helmont relates to illumination. Darkness is also present in the creature 
insofar as its rulership is subordinate to a higher one in the general continuum: 
An expanse means a heaven, and there are as many heavens or expanses as 
stars. Every creature is its own heaven, for which it rules, even though it 
might be under another heaven which rules it... Each is its own enclosed 
heaven as long as it is a ruler. 56 
Because the soul-body aspect of creatures exist on a general continuum, in which soul 
is simply the active direction and body is the passive, all creatures may be said to 
possess a degree of corporeality, as well as a degree of spirituality, and to move 
towards the spiritual when their souls, as active principles, enlarge their spheres of 
influence, or to move towards the corporeal when their spheres of influence shrink: 
"There are many degrees of [corporeality] so that any thing can approach or recede 
more or less from the condition of a body or spirit. " 57 
5S Ibid., p. 5I. 
OH. I. 92; I. M. I. V, 2g, fol. 36r. See also OH, I, 86; LH, I, V, 2g, fol. 35r: "Every [created being] 
was a heaven, or a light, though dark was included in it. " 
57 Principles, p. 42. 
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To procede from any point on the soul-body, active-passive, continuum, in either 
direction, is to discover creatures in every degree along the way. Now, because space 
is endlessly divisible, this containment and subordination of creatures within 
creatures is likewise endless: there can be no point reached at which the spirits 
subordinated in a body do not yet themselves subordinate further substances: the 
hierarchical chain of descent does not end in spirits which are purely passive. The 
conception of matter as that absolutely devoid of activity and life is that nature to 
which bodies are reduced when they die, according to common opinion. But in the 
philosophy of the vitalistic continuum there can be no absolute privation: "prime 
matter" does not exist. The corporeal is only privative relative to soul; and no body is 
without activity: 
When common people perceive no motion in bodies, they call them from 
ignorance dead bodies without spirit and life. But truly there is no body 
anywhere which does not have motion and consequently life or spirit. '' 
An endless descent into ever more passive spirits, implies the existence of an infinity 
of ever darker spirits. The biblical phrase "darkness was upon the face of the deep" is 
interpreted by van Helmont in the draft notes to Thoughts on Genesis as "darkness 
was upon the faces of the abyss". The "faces" are the spiritual creatures which exist in 
the endless and ever darker abyss, that is, the passive direction of the continuum: 
There must be infinite darkness, because there must be an infinite elaboration 
of light and dark. From where the abyss or that which has no bottom is 
attributed... 
Now as many as there are creatures in the abyss, so there are faces of 
darkness, namely an infinity. 
58 Ibid., p. 51. 
5' OH, I, 88,89; LH. I, V. 2g, fol. 36. 
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And these ever darker spirits do not finish in absolutely dark ones: "Darkness is not 
nothing or privation". 60 
With prime matter disposed of, and the corporeal conceived only as a mode of the 
spiritual, and vice-versa, Cartesian dualism is accordingly rejected: 
Nor is there any difference between body and spirit (if body is taken not in 
their [the Cartesians'] sense, who maintain that it is merely a dead thing 
lacking life and the capacity for life, but in a proper sense, as an excellent 
creature of God, having life and sensation, which belong to it either actually 
or potentially), except that body is the grosser part and the spirit the more 
subtle. 61 
And if there can be no thing devoid of motion, there can be no thing devoid of life; 
and so, what we call death cannot be the opposite of life, but merely its diminution: 
"Death or Dying, to speak properly, is not contrary to life. " 62 
As space is the expression of the relation between spirits, and provides by virtue of 
its infinite divisibility the endless containment and subordination of creatures within 
creatures, towards the infinitely small, so, by virtue of its infinite aggregability, space 
also provides for an endless containment and subordination of creatures within 
creatures towards the converse direction: towards the infinitely large. That is, there 
can be no point reached at which the subordinating single spirit of a soul is not yet 
itself subordinated by another spirit: the hierarchical chain of ascent does not end in a 
spirit which is purely active (not a purely active created spirit: only God is such a 
one). "A body is always able to become more and more spiritual to infinity. " `'' And, 
concerning a body or "enclosed heaven... there is an infinite expansion and 
Ibid. 
Principles, p. 5I. 
`' The Spiril gf'Diseases, section 32. 
`'` Principles, p. 42. 
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unlimitedness as long as there is the power of advancing". 64 On such a continuum it 
is therefore the case that every thing, no matter how apparently small or static, is 
spiritual and vitalized: "Whatever is, is a Spirit, whether it be only fundamentally so 
as a dead man is a man, or whether it be also formally and really so, as is a Soul, an 
Angel, God. " 65 Even stones and minerals are merely fallow life: "A stone is a part of 
the Great World, as of the whole, and is a right true living member in the body of the 
Great World. " 66 
Christian Lurianic Kabbalah embraces the kabbalistic system of the worlds, in 
which the lowest three, Beri'ah, Yezirah and Asiyyah, are stratifications of the 
continuum upon which created being is founded. 67 Asiyyah, or the world of 
fabrication, is that stratum of the continuum where what is called matter exists: that 
is, where those spirits more subordinated, less vitalized, are ordered into collections 
called bodies. For any particular creature, its outward body is said to be in the realm 
of Asiyyah; and the grade of vitality which its corporeal spirits possess is termed 
nefe. sh, also after the kabbalists. 
bx Yezirah, or the world of formation, is that stratum 
of spirits which are the immediate active principles or entelechies of the bodies of 
Asiyyah; and their grade of vitality is termed ru'ah, which means spirit: more 
specifically, the central ruling and ordering spirit of a creature, its principle of 
`A OH, I, 92; LH, I. V, 2g, fol. 36r. 
(s Cabbalislical Dialogue, p. 13. 
`'`' Paradoxa! Discourses, part 1, p. 20. 
`'' See C'abhalistical Dialogue, p. 14: "[It] is expressly concluded by us, that there is... a systeme of 
separate Beings, which comprehendeth the Briaiick, the Jezirathick and the Asiuthick. Isaiah 43 
v. 7. " See also Seder Olam, section 42: "All this is expressly confirmed by Testimony of Scripture 
itself Isaiah 43 v. 7. Every one that is called in nay Name have I created, formed and made: and 
consequently, according to these words of Scripture, the Hebrews call the World of Creation Briah, 
the World of Formation Je=iruh, and the World of Fabrication Asiah. " 
`'s See Seder Olam, section 41: "The life and spirits of the external Body are termed by the name 




The transmission of causal order from the active principle, or central spirit, of a 
creature to its passive principle, or body, is likened to a radiation of vitality: one 
which proceeds from the active stratum of Yezirah to the passive one ofAsiyyuh, 
pervading all the body in the sense that every one of the corporeal aggregate of ne/esh 
spirits are "touched" by the causality of the central ru'ah spirit. Hence, in effect, 
Asiyyuh is said to have arisen out of Yeziruh, as fabricated bodies arise out of, are the 
effect of, their formative central spirits: 
The Jezirulick World, from whence (as from its root) the Asialick World 
proceeded, penetrates and pervades the whole Asiuück World in every part, 
with its vital and essential Rays. 70 
In the sense that the central spirit of Yeziruh, by subordinating the netcsh spirits of 
Asiyyah, extends itself spatially and takes on a corporeal aspect. van Helmont says: 
"Neephesh is the cloathing or Vehicle of the Ruuch. , 71 
But on the continuum of created nature, active spirits are yet passive in relation to 
spirits higher up the order: that is, the ru'uh spirits of Yeziruh are not only the active 
principles of bodies of nefcish spirits in Asiyyah, but are also the passive spirits 
aggregated into the bodies of higher souls. These bodies in Yezirah are not the usual 
material ones of the realm of Asiyyah but "this Ruach is a certain Subtile and Spiritual 
Body, of which sort are the Bodies of Angels. " 72 The active principles of these subtle 
bodies in Yezirah are themselves assigned their own stratum called Beri'uh or the 
See ibid.: "The Spirit pertains to the World of Formation... This Spirit by the Hebrews is called 
Ruuch. " See also Principles. p. 5I: "The Hebrew word rauch, which means spirit, also 
signifies air. And because air has such swift motion, all the swiftness of motion is attributed to the 
spirit which is in a moving body. " 
70 
. Seder (glum, section 
45. 
71 Ibid., section 41. 
72 Ibid., section 42. 
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world of creation, and their grade of vitality is neshumuh. 73 And in the same way that 
central ru'ah spirits in } eziruh "cloathe themselves" in the nefesh spirits of Asijyah, 
the stratum passive in relation to their own, so the neshamah souls in Beri'ah clothe 
themselves in the ru'uh spirits of Yeziruh. 74 Likewise, as Yeziruh causally pervades 
As"iyyuh with its rays of vitality, so Beri'ah pervades Yezirah. But since ) e: iruh 
depends on Beri'ah for its vitality, van Helmont says that "the Briaiick world, by the 
diffusion of its vital and essential Rays, penetrates the whole Jeziraiick and As. siulick 
world. " 75 
7.1 See ibid., section 41: "The soul which is called Neshumu, pertains to the World of Creation. " 
74 See ibid., section 42: The souls of "men are created in the World of Creation; secondly, formed in 
the World of Formation (where they assume their Cloathing and Vehicle... ". 
's Ibid., section 45. 
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The System of the Worlds in Christian Lurianic Kabbalah 
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lt is therefore the case that there is here one vitalistic continuum, but which has been 
divided into three categories: the three kabbalistic worlds of created nature, along 
with their respective categories of spiritual vitality. 
In the draft notes for Thoughts on Genesis, van Helmont, though not referring at all 
to the kabbalistic system of the worlds, mentions "Adamah", which seems to 
represent the category of Assiyah: "Adamah is the complex or assembly of spirits 
which live in darkness. " 76 The "darkness" refers to the devitalization of such spirits 
as those of Assiyah. 
Now, the transmission or pervasion of vitality down the continuum, through the 
three worlds, is in fact the procession of true ideas as they flow from their antecedents 
according to the rational order of nature. Each spirit is a true idea, and there is an 
infinity of them in the plenum. In that a certain subject entails certain predicates 
which logically flow from it, so it is said that a central spirit emanates and rules over 
a body of other spirits. The extent of any spirit, as active principle subordinating a 
body of other spirits, in this ideal schematic, is correlate to the extent of the spirit's 
knowledge: 
[Amongst the] infinite Myriads of Spirits... there comes to be a secretion or 
separation made ... and that of as many degress, as there are degrees of 
Knowledge, even unto the very last extremity, which is the privation thereof'... 
A Spirit considered in itself, is, to us, indefinite, and its amplitude, or 
extension is such and so great, as the degree of its Knowledge and Union doth 
admit. 77 
Moving down the worlds of the continuum towards the more passive, less vital, the 
degree of knowledge diminishes, becomes more deprived, as spirits subsume less but 
"' OH, I, 125; LH, I, V, 2g, fol. 44. 
77 Cabbulislical Dialogue, p. 15. 
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are subsumed more. The converse is to be found by moving up the worlds. 
The subjective microcosm of a particular creature in this idealism is accordingly a 
stream of ephemereal thoughts or perceptions that emanate from its enduring central 
spirit, its fiery or active principle, as predicates logically flow from a concept. This 
"fire or life (as we find by experience) doth form our very thoughts. " 78 T'he thought. 
perception, knowledge, that a subject has is its extension, by subordination, over its 
surrounding spirits. Since each of these spirits is itself a subject with a thought or 
perception of its own, it can be said that any perception contains a multiplicity of sub- 
perceptions. And because of the plenum, this multiplicity is in fact infinite. Conway 
almost certainly has this analysis to mind when she writes that: 
All knowledge requires a variety or multitude of things as the subject or 
receptacle of that knowledge... Thus, when I look at something, I see it with 
my two eyes... and two things do not appear to me, but one. And if I could 
see something with ten thousand eyes, just as I see with two, that thing, 
whether it be a horse or a man, would not appear as anything but one single 
thing... Consequently, every creature which has any life, sense, or motion 
must be multiple or numerous; indeed, from the perspective of every created 
intellect, it must be numerous without number or infinite. 79 
In Kabbalah, knowledge, or the degree of it, is also to be found as one of the 
attributes used to distinguish the three worlds. Whereas nefesh spirits of Asiyyah have 
only a basic animal vitality, neshamah souls of Beri'ah have rationality and therefore 
a priori knowledge. The ru'ah spirits of Yeziruh, though themselves the souls of 
bodies, and therefore of a higher rank in the rational order of nature than basic nek"sh 
vitality, do not possess rational knowledge. They, therefore, seem to be of a grade 
between the rational and the animal. The basic animal vitality of nefesh is probably 
best conceived 
"` The Spiri[ (# Diseases, section 13. 
79 Principles, pp. 54-55. 
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as relatively blind or unconscious action. Clearly the distinction of the worlds by 
degrees of vitality also applies to the degrees of knowledge. On the continuum, 
proceeding towards the "lower end" of Asiyyah, as vitality ever diminishes but never 
ceases in absolute passivity, so knowledge must likewise ever diminish but not cease 
entirely. Proceeding towards the "upper end" of Beri'ah, the unceasing increase in 
vitality must be accompanied with an unceasing increase in knowledge. Indeed many 
kabbalists saw the rational understanding of the universe as a religious apprehension 
of God, which underlies the essential neo-Platonism of kabbalistic cosmology. t{" 
1.3.2 The Creation of the Cosmos 
The Meaning of "Creation" 
The meaning of "creation" in Christian Lurianic Kabbalah is that of the inslanlialion 
of individual substances, understood as a contrast and opposition to the notion of 
'nod4iculion. The modification of an already existent substance is but a change (of' 
the attributes) of that substance, and is not the creation or inception of a new 
substance. Mere modification of the divine substance is pantheism; pantheism and 
creation are mutually exclusive concepts. Creation must be the effecting of a 
substance by another, and which effect is a separate being from the one which is its 
cause. Now, all beings which depend on some other as the cause for their existence 
are precisely what are called creatures: they are created, or subsist by virtue of sonne 
other being. Only that mode of being which depends on no other, is an uncreated 
"' See Scholem, Kabhalah, p. 155. 
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being: it is not a creature but a creator. Such a self-subsistent being is a necessary 
substance, and accordingly, as the effect of no other, has nothing of effect in it: rather. 
as cause of all other beings, it is pure unlimited cause, what van Belmont calls "an 
infinite efficient": 
Creation, properly so call'd, [is] the efýcýction ufan infinite efficient, whereby 
a separable Being is constituted, or made. This definition of Active Creation, 
may also be easily applied to Passive Creation; or to that which is Relative. 
that is, to that respect which the Creator hath to the Creature. 81 
Creatures neither are, nor can subsist of themselves; for could they subsist of, 
or from themselves, then would they no longer be Creatures, but Creatours. 82 
The instantiation of the creature by the creator is of a causal nature, and is the 
reification of an idea in God's mind into that of a separable substance. A spirit 
substance is created causally from or by God; it is not made oul of'a spatial portion of 
the divine substance, for it is an ideal entity, not a corporeal one extended in space. 
The C'uhhalislical Dialogue uses the Latin particles ah (from or by) and ex (out of) to 
draw this distinction: 
The Particle (ex) out of does only denote or properly belong to mailer; nor can 
it Properly belong to Spirit; which yet is the most proper Subject of Creation, 
properly so called: and of this (Spirit) it can no wise be said, that it is, or is not 
(Ex) out q/ another, but only that it is (ah) or from another: just as we say, not 
that an ldaea or conception is made out of the Soul, or out of the Mind, but 
from the Soul, or from the Mind. 83 
81 Cubbulislical Dialogue, pp. 2-3. 
82 Spirit of Diseases, section 3. 
" Cabbalislirul Dialogue, p. 3. 
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Thus, in answer to the question, how "will the Effect be posterior to, or aller its 
cause? ", the answer is: "In the order of Nature, though not in the order of Time", 
meaning the logical causal order of nature. 84 
This creative instantiation, the details of which will soon be laid out, as the causal 
transmission of a reifying truth from the necessary substance to certain of its 
thoughts, is referred to by van Helmont as a production by the power or spirit of God: 
For as much therefore as this most Perfect Being doth produce and create all 
things, it is evident from hence that the word to create, cannot import the 
production of a thing out of nothing, but out of, or by the Power or Spirit of 
this most Perfect Being, which we call God. Now this Power or Spirit of God, 
or whether it be called his Command or Will, is Essential. x5 
The type of creation envisioned in Christian Lurianic Kabbalah is emunalion. 
Creatures originated in the substance of God where they pre-existed as his ideas. 
They passed to the status of independent substances when they were causally 
instantiated. The important point to be made now is that these individuals pre-exi. wed: 
which is thus a rejection of the doctrine of creaiio ex nihilo. Throughout the 
I ielmontiana explicit denials of this doctrine are to be met with. In the C'uhhalislicul 
Dialogue several pages are devoted to this end. The point is made that the notion that 
something can come out of nothing is a logical contradiction: 
As, To be, and not to be, dose imply a contradiction, so it is a consequent of 
this contradiction, out of Not-being, to be; if we should speak accurately, and 
according to the Laws of the Essential Descriptions of Causes. 86 
"a Ibid., p. 7. 
, Spirii uJ Diseases. section 
5. 
"`' C'uhhulisürul Dialogue, p. II. 
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In the Paradoxical Discourses, that creatures "sprang and came of nothing" is 
rejected because this would require either that God, as creator, contains an hiatus, 
some nothingness, in him; or, that he first create some nothingness, from which 
creatures might be produced. The first is impossible because God, as the infinite 
substance, cannot possibly have a void of being in him: "This cannot be, because by 
this means, a nothing must be conceived to be in God: whereas indeed he is the 
Eternal Being of all Beings... ". The second is simply absurd, it is "a contradiction, 
because a Nothing cannot be made, but whatever is made or is, must be 
something. " " Indeed, as the Spirit of Diseases states, the theory of crealio ex nihilo, 
as an absurd illogicality, necessarily fails as an explanation: 
If to create signifies the Production of a thing out of nothing, then is it an 
absolutely unintelligible expression, neither can any man know what is meant 
by it, because no thought or conception can be framed of nothing; whereas the 
use of words is to conveigh to us the signification and understanding of 
things, whereof they are the marks and indications. xR 
The explanation of creation should rather be that of emanation: creatures were 
uninstantiated ideas of God for which the term "creation" stands for their passage into 
instantiation, into creatures, in the logical order of nature: what is repeatedly referred 
to as "the visible coming out of the invisible": 
it is manifest... that what is essential in all things was in God without 
beginning, so that by the word Create cannot be understood, that God should 
bring forth new Beings, which were not in God without beginning... Whence 
therefore follows that the word Create betokens the bringing, forth, or 
production of something, out Of the invisible into open view to he seen und N9 
Perceived 
R' Paradoxa! Discourses, part 2, p. 5. 
RR Spirit of'Diseases, section 6. 
R`' Divine Being, section 27. See also The Spirit of Diseases, section 7: "Scripture also contradicts this 
false and inconsistent signification of this word [creatio ex nihilo]; for it expressly teacheth us, that 
to create, is to produce something visible, out of that which is spiritual or invisible. " In the Lexicon 
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The account of creation given in the Zohar and nearly all other kabbalistic writings 
that God expanded himself outwards into space when he made the world was rejected 
by Isaac Luria on the grounds that, since God was the infinite being, it made no sense 
to speak of his expanding into a new realm which was not already a part of him. 
Developing an idea he had discovered in a thirteenth century treatise, Luria located 
the creation process where it could only be located when all existence was that of an 
infinite being, namely in that being. 90 And since creation means the instantiation of 
what is not God, or at least what can be distinguished from him in some way, then 
that event internal to God must at the same time be an alteration of the divine 
substance. The zimzum, as the conception of a contraction or withdrawal of the divine 
substance at some point in God, is accordingly an attempt to re-schematize the 
creative process purged of its previous illogicalities. In the Adumhratiu, the Cabbalist 
says that "this very contraction of himself [God] is the formal means of immediate 
creation"; 91 and Conway writes: 
For the sake of his creatures (so that there might be a place for them) he 
diminished the highest degree of his intense light. Thus a place arose, like an 
empty circle, a space for worlds. 92 
But there is another aspect to the bifurcation served by the zimzum, which is of an 
epistemological kind, though, given the idealism of this cosmology, is easily seen to 
be implicit in it. And this concerns the nature of God as the infinite substance. What 
is infinite, that is, undifferentiated and so without the attributes of space and time, 
of the Kabbala Denudala (I, I. 665) under the entry for "contractio", von Rosenroth 
writes: "When the infinite God wished to send forth the things destined to emanate, lie contracted 
himself in the centre of His light, so that this most intense of all lights withdrew into itself toward 
the sides and toward a sort of circumference". 
See Scholem, A9ujor Trends in Jewish Mysricism (New York: Schocken Books, 1961), p. 260. 
P. 6. 
92 Principles, p. 10. 
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cannot meaningfully be conceived to expand and create the world in this way, since 
"expansion" is a concept inapplicable to a being without spatio-temporal 
differentiation. In the same way, such a being is also incomprehensible: we only 
know (things) by virtue of space and time: the infinite undifferentiated being is 
necessarily beyond, inaccessible and invisible to, the comprehension of finite beings. 
And what cannot be thought of, can even less be uttered: thus the oft-repeated 
assertion by mystics, the kabbalists included, that God is ineffable. This aspect of 
God as unknowable and hidden has a special name in Kabbalah: Ein-Sof; and there 
the epistemological gulf that separates creature from creator is further transformed 
into a metaphysical transcendence of Ein-Sof to the world. This notion becomes 
fundamental in kabbalistic creation theory, which is hinted at by Conway: 
According to the Hebrews, the infinite God, whom they call Aentioph, is said 
to exist outside the place of the world because a creature could not 
comprehend the immensity of his light. 93 
But for all his unknowability, due to his infinity, his existence cannot be denied, for 
he is the ground and origin of being, the creator, and there "must be" a creator. This 
creator, or God (Jehovah), is thus known only through the manifestation of his power 
(or through "Elohim") . As van Helmont says in the draft notes to Thoughts on 
Genesis, Jehovah is "the first ineffable name; because Elohim is the executor of 
Jehova in bodies or creatures, the strength of Jehova is not known to us except 
n 94 
through creatures. 
9' Ibid., p. 18. See also p. 10: "[Creatures] could in no way endure the very great intensity of his light. 
These words of Scripture apply to this: 'God dwells in inaccessible light. No one has ever seen him, 
etc. ' (I Timothy 6: 16)". 
94 OH, I, 103; LH, I. V, 2g, fol. 39. 
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So the imzum notion is both that of metaphysical distinction: God and world as 
substance undifferentiated and differentiated; and that of epistemological distinction: 
God and world as what cannot be and what can be an object of knowledge. Amongst 
certain of the kabbalists the creatio ex nihilo theory was re-interpreted according to 
this epistemological distinction. The nihilo now stood for the nothingness of what is 
incomprehensible, i. e. that realm which cannot be an object of knowledge, but which 
nevertheless precedes the things of the world in the ontological order of nature. 
Indeed, this version of "nothingness", Ayin in Hebrew, was, by some, even asserted to 
be a manifestation of the infinite hidden Ein-Sol beyond the world of things, one 
"sees" Ayin, the, albeit negative, closest glimpse one can have of the Ein-&)f" But 
this aspect of the preparatory creative event of zimzum is never explicitly developed 
by the Sulzbach-Ragley kabbalists; and they never seek to re-interpret the doctrine of 
crealio ex nihilo, but only to refute it in its standard conception. 
The Creative Event 
In Lurianic Kabbalah, the zimzum is the conception of the separating of the intensity 
of the substance of God. Where God withdraws, a "space" arises, albeit one which is 
of infinitesimal size in relation to God, and which is called lehiru by the kabbalists. 
The divine substance is both within and without the lehiru: outside it, it is still that of 
the infinite unlimited and undivided substance of Ein-Sof, which the kabbalists assert 
to be unchanged by the zimzum, as an immutable being should be, inside, the lehiru is 
See Scholem, Kabbalah, p. 94; and Daniel Matt, "Ayin: The Concept of Nothingness in Jewish 
Mysticism", in Essential Papers on Kabhalah, edited by Lawrence Fine (New York: NYUP, 1995), 
pp. 67-108. 
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still filled by the divine substance, but the withdrawal of the infinity of Ein-Sof leaves 
a substance of mere finite, limited or diminished intensity, a sort of "precipitation" or 
"residue". The Hebrew term for this residue is "reshimu"; and this first precipitation 
of Ein-Sufis called the vessel of Primordial Air, or Avir Kadmon. Though some 
kabbalists, including Hayyim Vital, denied that the lehiru contained a residual 
plenum of the divine substance immediately following the zimzum, this was the belief 
of Luria himself, and certainly seems to have been that which Christian Lurianic 
Kabbalah took over. 96 In the Kabbala Denudala, von Rosenroth refers to the oft used 
kabbalistic analogy for the zimzum as the emptying of a bottle of fragrance: 
That evacuation of the Jews [the lehiru] is to be explained not as if that space 
in God were completely a vacuum, but that the most glorious abundance of 
the infinite light was there diminished, as when fragrance is not completely 
taken away but is at least diminished, as when a glass full of fragrant oil is 
emptied. `ý 
And Conway writes: 
This void was not privation or non-being but an actual place of diminished 
light, which... filled this entire space... was united with the entire divine 
light, which remained in the void to a lesser degree, so that it could be 
tolerated. 98 
According to the Lurianic kabbalists one of the essences of the divine being was 
Judgement, or Din in Hebrew, meaning limitation or differentiation, and this was 
especially responsible for the creative process, both for the separation of Ein-Sof into 
" See Scholem, Kahbuluh, pp. 130-3 1, 
'" Kabbula Denudala, 1,2,89. See also ibid., p. 150: "God contracted his presence to 
create the worlds, which space is called primaeval Air. In this remained vestiges of the divine light, 
which also are called the primaeval Air. ". 
Principles, pp. 10- 11 I. 
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Ein-Sof and reshimu, in the zimzum event, but also for the differentiation of the 
reshimu itself into individual constituents. As Scholem puts it: 
The essence of the Divine Being, before the Tsimisum took place, contained 
not only the qualities of love and mercy, but also that of Divine Sterness 
which the kabbalists call Din or Judgement... In the act of Tsimisum, however, 
[Din] crystallized and became clearly defined, for inasmuch as Tsimisum 
signifies an act of negation and limitation it is also an act of judgment. It must 
be remembered that to the kabbalist, judgment means the imposition of limits 
and the correct determination of things. 9 
Following the zimzum existence is, then, conceived to be separated into two: on the 
one hand there is the universal substance in finite mode, i. e. differentiated into a 
multiplicity, and on the other, the same substance, yet infinite, undifferentiated and 
one. The relationship between the one (Ein-Sqf and the many (reshimu), especially 
given their commonality of substance, accords to that relationship between the 
perceiver and perceived. Thoughts or perceptions do not occur where there are no 
individuals, and there are no individuals where there is no differentiation: thus, in this 
cosmological idealism, the zimzum represents the transition from a non-thinking 
existence to one where such does occur. The zimzum is the emergence of God as the 
(universal) thinking being: the bifurcation of existence into that of single perceiver on 
the one hand and multiple perceptions on the other. Ein-Sufis the perceiver, the tehiru 
is the "realm" or "container" of the totality of his thoughts, and is, so it seems to me, 
the mind of God. 
It has to be said that the nature of this first immediate precipitation of the zimzum is 
barely, if at all, discussed in Christian Lurianic Kabbalah, and not much more so by 
the Jewish kabbalists themselves. However, my interpretation that this initial reshimu 
" Scholem, Major Trends in Jewish Mysticism, p. 263. 
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equates to the mind of God will be seen to be the only viable one when the very next 
stage in the creative process is examined, namely the exercising of God's 
will as the actual instantiation of creaturely substances. For the account given of the 
freedom of God's will by the Sulzbach-Ragley kabbalists hinges on his wisdom being 
prior to his will, hence his mind must already be established. 
Now, the thoughts which belong to God must be true: they must flow from, or 
indubitably follow from, his necessary substance. A true thought is a possible real 
being, or an idea which God might choose to create. The total collection of'thoughts 
is a possible universe of creatures which God might create. Indeed, the only 
restriction on what God can (in hypolhesi) create, is that the idea of it, either as a 
singular possible creature or, as a universe of creatures, does not suffer from logical 
contradiction. As Conway writes: "God can do anything which does not imply a 
contradiction. " 10° That both the individual creature and the universe pre-existed as 
ideas in God's mind prior to their creation is stated explicitly throughout various 
Christian-kabbalistic texts. For example in The Divine Being: 
God had all things essentially in him before the Creation, and that he can in no 
wise be omniscient, but by having the Ideas, (or that which is essential) of all 
things in him, and consequently that all things did not then first obtain their 
Beings, in their Creation, but were all before the creation essentially in 
God. 101 
Van Helmont, in his Explication to chapter 1 of Thoughts on Genesis, says of the 
opening lines of the Bible: "When, therefore, the time of [the world's] production was 
101 Principles, p. 16. 
101 Section 15. See also Paradoxal Discourses, part 2, p. I: "The Creator of all Beings, before the 
foundation of the world, and before ever they were brought forth, had and contained the same in his 
mind and wisdom, even the little world as well as the greater. "; and see Principles, p. 10: 
"In God there is an idea which is his image or the word existing within himself, which in substance 
or essence is one and the same with him, through which he knows himself as well as all other things 
and, indeed, all creatures were made or created according to this very idea or word. ". 
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come, [God] conceived it IN THE HEAD, or central principle of the mind, by thought 
or thinking. " 102 And, in the draft notes, he offers a kabbalistic interpretation of the 
first three words of the Bible. "Bereshil tiara Elohim", usually translated as "In the 
beginning God created" is re-interpreted as "In the head God created", by extracting 
"rosch", meaning "the head", out of "reshit". 103 
In Lurianic Kabbalah descriptions like the "'roots of divine judgement' subsist in 
chaotic mixture with the residue of divine light", 104 or "the power of Din that was left 
in primordial space... was intermingled in a confused fashion with the remnants of 
the light of Ein-Sof... this inchoate mixture", 10` indicate an unordered and 
undeveloped reshimu. This is applicable to the interpretation of the reshimu as the 
ideas of possible creatures and universes existing in the mind of God in an as yet 
unchosen undecided infinite multiplicity. 
In the next stage of the creative process, according to Lurianic kabbalah, a ray of 
light from Ein-Sglenters the vessel ofAvir Kadmon, the unordered reshimu. In the 
Lexicon of the Kabbala Denudate von Rosenroth wrote: 
Around the evacuated place, for the worlds had not yet come forth, the light of 
the infinite itself was encircling, and then the light was let into the . puce; but 
this light of the infinite flowed into the space by a certain rarefied line or 
channel. And that light is the Emanative Principle and emits (or gushes out 
and is the source of Emanation). 106 
This light ray is "a'cosmic measure' or kav ha-middah, that is, the power of formation 
and organization", which enters the inchoate mixture of the reshimu and imposes 
order on it, causing a second precipitation or crystallization of that residue of divine 
102 Thoughts on Genesis, pp. 7-8. 
OH, I, 82; LH, I, V, 2g, fol. 35: "Bara creavit Be in, Rasch capite. ". 
1" 0Scholem. Major Trends in Jewish Mysticism, p. 263. 
1`5 Scholem, Kubhuluh, p. 130. 
10`, I I, 146. 
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light left by the zimzum. 107 Since the organizing ray is itself of the light ol'the 
divinity, the event clearly involves no other substance that that of the divine one. and 
is, indeed, but an interplay of different modes of it: The reshimu is God as object; and 
the ray is God as subject. I have already suggested that the bifurcation of the Z im-zum 
be interpreted as that of perceiver and perceived. This ordering of the reshimu, (the 
divine light as object), is accordingly that of the ordering of the perceptions or ideas 
of God. But these multiple (indeed, infinite) possible combinations of ideas in God's 
mind is a very miasma, where an unlimited number of universes (or combinations of 
ideas) all have equal rational validity, but whose co-existence is certainly irrational. 
Thus the ordering of the reshimu of ideas in God's mind necessitates the elimination 
of this co-existence of multiple total idea combinations: or, a principle of selection is 
needed. The ray from Ein-Sof, or the divine light as subject, as the orderer of this 
miasmic reshimu, is, thus, this principle of selection: is Goths will. 
That God thinks first then acts; that, in the creative process, his mind precedes his 
will, is made quite explicit in the discussion of the freedom of the divine will by van 
Helmont and Conway. They reject the notion that freedom of will is indifferent 
action, i. e. action not determined by the knowledge of the states consequential on the 
act. To act without fore-knowledge of the consequences is to will out of ignorance, 
out of mere finite wisdom, a willing not available to God, since his wisdom is 
infinite. God knows all the consequences of all his possible actions. Thus: "God doth 
all things according to his infinite Wisdom, therefore there is no indifference of Will 
in him. " 1" Conway writes: 
it is possible utterly to refute and eliminate that inditterence of the will which 
the Scholastics and those falsely called Philosophers believe to be in God and 
107 Scholem. Kahbalah, p. 130. 
""Seder (slam, section 2. 
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which they incorrectly call free will... That indifference of acting or not 
acting can in no way be said to be in God, for this would be an imperfection 
and... [God would act] from pure will but without any true and solid reason or 
the guidance of wisdom. 109 
Accordingly, there must be a principle which serves to determine a specific course of 
action for God's selecting from amongst the "miasmic" multiplicity in God's mind; 
and such a principle must be an essential attribute of God, since he is the creator. This 
essence of God which determines his will turns out to be his omnibenevolence: God 
"must do whatever he does... since his infinite wisdom, goodness, and justice are a 
law to him which cannot be superseded. " 1 10 
Though God's will is necessitated by certain of his essences, it is still "free". Both 
van I-lelmont and Conway define freedom as not being determined by another being, 
and so, since God is an autonomous and uncreated being, whatever he does wholly 
originates in him: 
The will of God is most free so that whatever he does... is done without any 
external force or compulsion or without any cause coming from the creatures 
(since he is free and acts spontaneously in whatever he does). 1 '' 
Hence, "in all things [God] doth, he is a necessary Agent, and yet also the most free 
Agent". 1 12 
10`' Principles, P. 15. 
Ibid. p. 16. See also, p. 13: "God is infinitely good, loving, and bountiful; indeed he is goodness and 
charity itself, the infinite fountain and ocean of goodness, charity, and bounty. " 
Ibid., p. 15. 
112 Seder Olum, section 2. See also, Principles, p. 16: "God is both a most free agent and a 
most necessary one. " 
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The Creation of'ihe Plenum and of creatures 
The kabbalistic account of creation is presented using elaborate imagery, and this is 
continued beyond the initial creative act, the zimzum, for which it is necessary that I 
now give some account. 
In Lurianic Kabbalah, the zimzum produced out of the divine substance a first 
precipitation or reshimu called the vessel of Avir Kudmon. This precipitation is then 
ordered or clarified by a ray of light which enters it from Ein-Sof "a raising and 
lowering of the 'cosmic measure"', after which it is called the vessel of Adam 
Kadmon. 113 The same production of Adam Kadmon, as a secondary precipitation, 
produced by the divine ray of light, the cosmic measure, is also to be found in 
Christian Lurianic kabbalism: 
For as the Infinite God is said to have made a space by his contraction... there 
is some vestige left behind in that space, which will be the subject and as it 
were a vessel for all the light poured in there, out of which was produced your first Adam. 114 
Van Helmont and Conway equate Jesus Christ to this Adam Kadmon. Conway writes 
that the space created by the zimzum "was the soul of the Messiah, called Adam 
Kadmon by the Hebrews, who filled this entire space. " 115 Van Helmont refers to 
"Christ the Heavenly Adam" repeatedly in the Seder Olam. 1 "' In the draft notes to 
Scholem, Kabbuluh, p. 130. 
14 Adunlhratio, p. 26. See also p. 12: "Concerning this first Adam our men [kabbalists] accordingly 
say: with the contraction of the infinite having been made, the first space arose, and this very space 
and place of producing the worlds was as it were the very substance of the first man, in which he 
assuredly received the determination of his being. " 
"` Principles, p. 10. 
'"See Seder 0/um sections 11,12,15,23, etc. In the Aduntbratio, p. 6, the Christian says: "And in 
that space of yours, at first, the soul of the Messiah is produced, which was of so great a size that it 
occupied all this space... The Divine light shared itself, by flowing out, which with our followers is 
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Thoughts on Genesis the term "Elohim", which is frequently used, is explicitly 
identified by van Helmont with Adam Kadmon, the Messiah and the spiritual 
universe: "Elohim corresponds to Adam: Adam Kadmon... Elohim is the 
Messiah. " 117 
In chapter 3 of the Adumbratio, the correspondences between Christ and Adam 
Kadmon are expounded at great length. The Adam Kadmon/Messiah, as reshimu, is of 
the divine substance; and, as that ordered reshimu, displays distinguishable attributes. 
Since these are the products of God's will, a determination founded on essential 
attributes of God's being (e. g. judgement, goodness, wisdom), they must themselves 
be the divine attributes: what the kabbalists call "se/irot". Adam Kadmon is, thus, the 
one divine substance, but now conceived under a mulliplicily of attributes (or sefiro! ). 
In the Adumhrulio, the kabbalist says: 
Our First Adam is moreover divided into ten enumerations [the setirot]... 
which, as they are causally and eminently in the first cause, so they are said to 
be contained ideally and exemplarily in him. 118 
The nature of each sefrah as it appears in Adam Kadmon is then set out. The 
Christian then replies that "Ten similar measures are also severally attributed of the 
Messiah. " 
In this Adam Kadmon/Messiah, the Ein-Sot, previously ineffable and unknowable 
by virtue of being infinite or without particular attributes, is now revealed through the 
distinguishing se/irot: hence Adam Kadmon/Messiah is a manifestation or image of 
called the Divine Nature of the Messiah. And indeed that which is called by you Adam Kadmon, is 
called by us Christ. " 
117 OH. I. 84; LH, 1, V, 2g, fol. 35: "Elohim respondet Adamo: Adam Kadmon... Elohim est Messias. ". 
118 p. 14,15. 
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God. The Adumhrutio interprets the quotations from John: "Who sees me, sees the 
Father", and "Who sees me, sees him who sent me", in this way. 119 
The Adam Kudmon/Messiah, as essentially a determined set of ideas in God's 
mind, stands in a passive relation to God by virtue of being an effect of his will. As 
passive principle, analogies of hypostatical union can be found applied to the 
relationship of God and Adam Kadmon/Messiah. Hence the passive principle of 
Adam KadmonlMessiah is referred to as the body of the divine active principle as 
soul: "Christ is... as it were a certain Body for the Divinity. " 120 The passive principle 
of Adam Kudmon/Messiah is also referred to as the begotten of the divine active 
principle as begetter: "it is said of the Messiah in the Gospel that he is the only horn, 
who (is produced) gfthe Father, John i v. 14. " 121 And the passive principle of Adam 
Kudmon/Messiah is also referred to as the instrument of the divine active principle as 
agent: "Adam Kadmon is the instrument and medium for all subsequent 
principles. " 122 
This determined set of divine ideas, Adam Kadmon/Messiah, is, in its totality, the 
macrocosm: the entire universe as ideal prototype in God: "Elohim [Adam 
Kadmon]... is the glorious spiritual universe. " 123 The universe as ideal prototype in 
the single substance of the Adam Kadmon/Messiah is attributed to the highest grade 
in the ontological strata of the kabbalistic system of the worlds: that of Azilul: 
There is understood another World, more noble, and (in the order of Nature), 
more antient than the rest, immediately flowing from the Author, God 
himself, called in Hebrew Aziluih, which signifies the Nearest to the most 
"`' Ibid., p. 10. 
120 Seder Olam, section 25. 
121 Adumhralio, p. 8. 
122 Ibid., p. 9. 
123 OH, 1,84; LH. I. V, 2g, fol. 35: "Elohim... estque Universum spirituale gloriosum. ". 
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high and supreme God himself, and this cannot agree to any other than Christ. 12 
This state of the universe is that only of the ideas of all things to come, not conceived 
as separate substances in themselves, but only as perceptions emanated of the one and 
only divine substance: 
But as the Aziluthick, as it is the noblest of all, so it is the greatest, and but 
only one; altho' the Hebrews distinguish it into ten Emanations; the distinction 
of which Emanations, nevertheless is only modal and not essential. 125 
Now, the light ray which entered the original reshimu, produced the Adam Kadmun 
not only by virtue of its imposing order, but also by increasing the "density" of that 
vestigial light: 
At God's command the final yod of the Name [the light ray from Ein-Sot] 
descended and blended a somewhat denser light into the first air, for the 
worlds had not been able to come forth in that place because of the excessive 
fineness of the light which abounded there. 126 
I would suggest that this increased densification can be interpreted in terms of 
idealistic rationalism as that "hardening", that making concrete, that is associated with 
the notion of making actual. Into the inchoate reshimu, which I have argued equates 
to the realm of all possible ideas of things in God's mind, the light ray descends, 
which is the will of God determining on one set of ideas, the truth of which flows 
from the attribute of his goodness, and which truth bestows reality on the ideas of the 
things so selected. God's will, this ray of light from Ein-So,; thus both orders the 
reshimu and densities its vestigial ideal contents into concrete actual substances. The 
'24 
. Seder 0/am, section 
43. 
'''s Ibid., section 44. 
12" Kabhula Denudala, 1,2,150. 
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Adam Kadrnon/Messiah is accordingly the universe of infinite things, conceived to 
exist not only as an infinity of true ideas, as intelligible universe in passive relation to 
its emanating divine perceiver, but also as infinity of actual substances (or spirits or 
monads), each of which, as substance, is an active principle itself. 
Now, for these entities to be active, there must be others which stand in a passive 
relationship to them, in order to confer the status of active principle, or substance. on 
them. In my exposition of the nature of the created world as conceived in Christian 
Lurianic Kabbalah, creatures consist of nothing but configurations of spirits, and the 
fundamental attributes of soul and body are, at bottom, given only in terms of the 
causal relations that hold between these spirits. Specifically, one spirit, as cause, is 
the soul or active principle of a multiplicity of spirits, as effect, body or passive 
principle. Thus, if those infinite ideas of things in Adam KadmonlMessiah are at the 
same time to be considered as substances, then, as active principles, whose very 
notion depends on having relations with other substances which stand in a passive 
relationship to them, then these substances must simultaneously have relations 
amongst themselves. Since inter-substantial relations precisely constitute what it is to 
be a creature, it follows that creatures must be co-existent with that very plenum of 
substances called Adam Kadmon/Messiah. Therefore, when the will of God, as the 
ray of light, produces the Adam Kadmon/Messiah, the determined universe existing 
both as infinity of ideas and as infinity of substances, it will, at the same time, 
produce an infinity of creatures. Creation, therefore, as the production by God of 
active principles additional to himself, by his bestowing of his power into ideas of 
possible substances to make them actual, at the same time necessitates the production 
of creatures, since these are precisely those inter-substantial relations without which 
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there would be no possibility of activity or exercise of power by the said spirits. As 
The Divine Being states: 
The word Create [signifies]... the pulling of'the Beings or Spirits into their 
proper states, or the imparting of'such qualities, or such capacilie unto them, 
as gives them a power to work of themselves. 127 
Thus it is that the spirit substances of the plenum are the bases for creatures. Since 
Adam Kadmon/Messiah precisely is this plenum, so he is said to be both a medium 
for the production of creatures, and the vessel within which they are all contained. In 
the Adumhrulio it says: 
And it is through his son [the Messiah], that whatever is in the Heaven or in 
the Earth, whatever is observed, and whatever is not observed... All things 
were created through him and in him. 128 
On the one hand, inasmuch as the souls of creatures are single spirits of the plenum of 
Adam Kadmon/Messiah, whose ontological stratum is that of the divine world of 
Azilut, where these souls have an existence as ideas in God's mind, van Helmont says 
that: "The souls of men have not their first being in this world, but do come into this 
World out of another. " 129 On the other hand, inasmuch as souls, as the active 
principles or efficient causes of creatures, are spirit substances in Adam 
Kadmon/Messiah, so in the Adumbratio the Cabbalist says: "The first Adam... is the 
most perfect efficient cause of all things. " 130 
'`' Section 27. 
''R Adumhratio, p. 9. See also ibid. p. 6: "Inside the first Adam or Messiah, the remaining creatures 
were produced, by way of a determined order of distribution. "; and see Principles, p. 22: "It is said 
that all things are contained in him [Christ] and have their existence in him, because they arise from 
him just like branches from a root. "; and Seder Wain, section 12: "God, by this medium, to wit, 
Christ created and produced all Creatures whatsoever. " 
12" Two Hundred Queries, questions 157-58. 
10 Adumhralio, p. 10. 
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Now, the bodies of creatures are no more than relations between spirit substances, 
and since all spirits are derived of the plenum, whether they exist as the passive or 
active aspect in a particular creature, so bodies too have their origin in the Adam 
KadmonlMessiah. The plenum, as inexhaustible number of spirits capable of 
subordination by souls into bodily aggregates, is thus referred by van Helmont to be 
the single "spiritual watery body" out of which all particular creaturely bodies are 
derived: "All things, that is, all particular Bodies proceeded from one and the same 
Principle the Water. " 131 Creatures arise out of the spirit plenum of Adam 
Kudmon/Messiah when certain individual spirits enter into a relation with a 
multiplicity of others: the single spirit as soul or active fiery principle; the group of 
spirits embraced by it as its body or passive watery principle. This is why Christian 
Lurianic Kabbalah says that creatures are not produced out of nothing; rather, the 
emergence of a body, as that aspect of a creature extended in space (and time), is the 
emergence of a grouping relation between already existing substances. Hence, van 
I lelmont asks "Is not the body confessed by all to be a Praeexistent matter or 
substance? ". 132 All spirit substances, as active principles, by definition must 
dominate over some other spirits; therefore the soul of every creature, as such a spirit, 
must always have been in a grouping relation, or always have had a body. Thus the 
production of a new body can only be an apparent novelty: really it is the entrance 
into discernible extension of a pre-existing spirit grouping previously too small to be 
detected: 
Whence therefore follows that the word Create betokens the bringing, firth, or 
production of'something, out of'lhe invisible into open view, to he seen und 
13 1 The Spirit u/Diseases, section 45. 
132 Two Hundred Queries, question 159. 
76 
perceived... The word Create [signifies] the production of the Visible out of 
the Invisible. 133 
Out of the plenum of spirit substances, which are the actualized ideas of God, as they 
exist in the realm of the Adam Kadmon/Messiah, or the kabbalistic world ofAzilul. 
creatures, as configurations of these spirits, are secreted or separated. Though this 
lower realm of creatures is actually a continuum of the active-passive relationships 
between spirits, since it originates from the divine end of this continuum, those 
creatures with the greatest vitality imported to their active principles, take precedence 
over the less vital, at least in the order of nature. Thus, in terms of the tripartite 
division of the creaturely continuum into the kabbalistic strata of the lower worlds, it 
is the Neshumah spirits of the world of Beri'ah which are created first, and from 
which, as their passive principles, the ru'ah spirits of Yezirah flow, followed by the 
nefcsh spirits of Asiyyah: 
And hence it is, that from this World of Creation [Beri'uh], other worlds also 
burst out, to wit, the World of Formation [Yeziruh]... Lastly, from the 
Inferiour World of Formation proceeded this World of Fabrication 
[Assiyuh]. 134 
The Origin of'Mailer 
In the Lurianic account a great deal of detail was afforded to the imagery of "lights" 
which shone out of Adam Kadmon and which were responsible for the production of 
the creaturely worlds. Out of Adam Kadmon "supernal lights were produced, which 
'" The Divine Being, section 27. See also ibid. section 26: "So that according to the common use, the 
word Produce, cannot signify anwhing else, but this, that these things [creatures] thin hethre were 
invisible. and not knowable, do now become visible and discernible. 
'"' 
. Sec/er Ulum, sections 
38-39. 
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came forth in five Sefirotic decades... for the production of the lower worlds. 135 To 
cut a long story short, the lights which shine out of Adam Kadmon are derived of the 
original light ray from Ein-Sof, now displayed severally as the distinguished attributes 
of God (the sefirot) as they are manifested in Adam Kadmon. Since the attributes are 
inherent in the spirit plenum of Adam Kadmon, the creaturely realm too must 
manifest these . cefiro/, including its ordering into three worlds. The shining lights, as 
representing emanative causality, in this sense, produce (the ordered division of) the 
worlds. But the cosmological process was not over yet. According to Lurianic 
Kabbalah, this first arrangement of the spirit plenum, the Adam Kudmon, was 
inherently unstable: it was not strong enough to contain the power/light that continues 
to flow from Ein-Sof: The imagery of that light differentiated by sefirotic attribute and 
manifested in the Adam Kadmon, included, as well as the shining lights, vessels fier 
each of those lights, symbolizing the worldly reception of the divine light. At some 
point part of the structure collapsed and fell back into chaos. In the Lurianic imagery. 
this was described as the "breaking of the vessels". The vessels associated with the 
lower seven sefrrol broke, and the divine light which was formerly collected and 
dispersed orderlily by them, now spewed out chaotically or returned back to 
Ein-. So!. 136 With this loss of the organizing light/power, the spirit substances, along 
with their dependent creatures, suffered a loss of order and power themselves, and fel 
away from God: from the infinite source of light, vitality, order, goodness, etc., 
slipping down the continuum towards the dark, sluggish, anarchic and evil. The three 
strata of the lower worlds themselves "fell down" the continuum, since their 
constituent spirits had fallen. Those spirits of the lowest world of Asiyyah called 
Kabhula Denudala, I. 3.72. 
ý'`' See ibid., I. I. 698-700; and Scholem, Kabhulah, p. 138. 
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Neksh, when they fell, suffered a diminution of vitality such that the bodies they 
formed took on a discernibly corporeal appearance. Thus was the material world, as 
we call it, produced. 137 
This version too is followed in the Adumhraiio; yet in the Seder Olum, van 
Helmont implies that Asiyyah never existed until after the Fall, effectively identifying 
it with matter, rather than a previous grade of spirits which just happened to sink 
further into that sluggish state we call matter: 
But as for this Asialick World, this has its rise and original from the. Jezirutick 
World, by reason of some great fall of the Souls contained therein for 
transgressing the Law of God: And if these Souls had never fell, this Asia[ick 
World which is the World of Fabrication, had never existed. 138 
But, contradicting this, the Seder Olum also states that this dullness of vitality is 
ultimately only relative to the world of Yeziruh/Formation, for no part of 
Asiyyuh/Fabrication is absolutely devoid of life. Vitality, 
nevertheless is to be understood in comparison to the Superiour Worlds, 
where indeed the vital principle is far more predominant, than in the inferiour 
World, nor is this inferiour World in any, even the most stupid part of it 
wholly, and in every degree deprived of life. 131' 
Apart from the Adumhratio, the Helmontiana do not refer to the imagery of the 
breaking of the vessels. However, in Thoughts on Genesis, van Helmont is clear 
about the causes of the Fall. On account of the freedom that substances have, a 
preference for self-interest arose at the expense of the general harmony. It is as if a 
localized ordering, which grows and intensifies around a soul, pursuing its own 
''' See Scholem, Kubhuluh, pp. 162-63. 
"8 Seder 0lum. section 47. 
1`9 Ibid. 
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interests, forms a sphere of influence, a body, which is excessively localized, a 
densification which 
gives rise to the appearance of a bark or cortex surrounding the deviant spirit: 
Since they [souls] were in liberty, they indulged too much in their glory and 
individuality and enjoying this prohibited fruit, turned aside from other things 
and were enveloped in themselves, and assumed rinds. 140 
But the pursuit of self-interest is at the expense of the general divine order, and is, at 
the same time, the refusal of a soul to strive to perfection: a substance which deviates 
thus cannot maintain its vital condition, its sphere of ordering influence, against a 
macrocosm antithetical to it: it falls down the scale of creaturely perfection, at the 
same time as it acquires a denser, more corporeal, body. Van Helmont uses the 
analogy of a rower who rows against the flow and who, when "lie does not row and 
slackens his arms against the flow, is carried off... Substances, disordered in 
themselves, were covered over and fell. " 141 
In the Cahbalistical Dialogue the Fall is described as having happened only "for 
some certain cause or reason", which is not given, though it is the loss of vitality and 
order in this fall that generates matter: 
That some of these Spirits, for some certain cause or reason, are slipt down 
from the state of knowing, of Penetrating, or of moving into a state of 
impenetration. That these Monades or single Beings being now become 
spiritless or dull, did cling or come together after various manners. That this 
coalition or clinging together, so long as it remains such, is called nwullei% 142 
141, OH, I, 86; LH, I, V, 2g, fol. 35r. 
141 Ibid. 
142 Cabbalistic-u! Dialogue, p. 4. 
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Before the Fall, or the breaking of the vessels, all the substances of the created worlds 
were perfect replicas of their ideal counterparts in the azilulic world. In this state, the 
perceptions of souls flowed out of their essences in a true and real fashion, since all 
those souls, as actualized ideas, were still'in perfectly ordered relations to each other 
as originally established in the divine mind. But with self-envelopment, individual 
souls became dislocated from the universal order, and the hitherto rational how of 
perceptions ceased and was replaced by a localized form of knowledge gathering, 
based only on each soul's (spatially extended) sphere of influence. This seems to he 
what van Helmont has in mind when he dicusses the Adam and Eve myth in Thoughts 
on Genesis. God says to Adam and Eve, 
That on the day you eat from it [knowledge]... your eyes will be opened, you 
will receive an external, corporeal sign of things... 
The eyes of both were opened, their corporeal eyes that is, so that things 
were seen corporeally, which before were seen mentally or ideally. 143 
Hence, self-envelopment concerns not only that of localized rulership, the dislocating 
of an individual from God's general plan, in its pursuit of its private tastes, but also 
concerns that of localized knowledge gathering, the dislocating from the divine ideal 
order; both breaks of which manifest as the corporealization of the Fall: 
If dreams were guided, we would see all things perfectly. The Fall of Adam 
was an awakening out of that pleasant and active dream, by which he passes 
over into this corporeal world. 1 44 
'''' OH, I. 119,117, LH. I. V, 2g, fol. 42r. 
144 OH, I, 130; LFi, I. V, 2g, fol. 81 r. 
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1.3.3 Interaction between God, the Ens Medium and Creatures 
Conway affirms that the "order of things... [is] only three, namely, God as the 
highest, Christ as the mediator, and the creation as the lowest rank ofall". 145 The 
second, or middle ontological order, Christ or the Adam Kadmon or Elohim, is the 
infinity of things of the world, which exist ho/h as the (determined) ideas of God's 
mind, und as the (actualized) spirit substances of the created world. The third and 
lowest order is that of the infinity of creatures, which consist of nothing more than 
relationships formed between the spirits of the plenum of the second order, and which 
are, therefore, not substantially different from this second order, but are merely 
modes of it. Thus: 
This creation is one entity or substance in respect to its nature or essence... so 
that it only varies according to its modes of existence, one of which is 
corporeality. 
146 
Because the spirit basis of the created world is a plenum, relations between spirits can 
be found both towards the infinitely small and the infinitely large, where the smaller 
is the less vital and more corporeal, and the larger is more vital and more spiritual. In 
other words, creatures exist on a continuum, partaking of a degree of spirit and body, 
but both of which are without limit, i. e. creatures could be found which are ever more 
spiritual and vital and therefore closer to God, and conversely ever more corporeal 
and sluggish and further from God: 
There are many degrees of [corporeality] so that any thing can approach or 
recede more or less from the condition of a body or spirit. Moreover, because 
spirit is the more excellent of the two in the true and natural order of things, 
145 principles, p. 41. 
"u, I bid., pp. 41-42. 
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the more spiritual a certain creature becomes... the closer it comes to God, 
who, as we all know, is the highest spirit. Thus, a body is always able to 
become more and more spiritual to infinity. 147 
The created world is therefore a continuum; and it is divided into three "worlds" by 
the kabbalists, of which Asiyyah is that degree of corporeality which is discernible as 
what is commonly called "matter". Each stratum of this cosmological structure (God, 
Adam Kadmon/Messiah/Elohim, creature) is, according to Christian Lurianic 
Kabbalah, both united with and distinguished from the stratum adjacent to it. They 
speak of "unions", or causal connections, which are, in more theosophical language, 
the immunences of one stratum in another. And they also speak of "distinctions", 
which are the ontological separations, the Iranscendencies, of one stratum over 
another. Thus God, by being the cause of the existence of created spirits is said by 
Conway to be "present in everything most closely and intimately in the highest 
degree. " 149 Van Helmont says the same: 
The C'reulor produced first of all infinite Myriads of Spirits united to him, and 
with him, in the supream degree of most happy perfection (in which the 
Messiah did still abide) so that God might be all in all. 149 
The Messiah, as the totality of all such created spirits, is thereby also in a union with 
God, and in one which, like that of the soul and the body, is hypostatical: "Jesus 
Christ... is eternally in God and perpetually united to him so that [he] is his vehicle 
and organ, just like the body in respect to the soul". "0 Moreover, "the fulness of the 
Godhead dwells bodily in this most divine Medium Jesus Christ", who is the "beloved 
14' Ibid., p. 42. 
148 Ibid., p. 9. 
14" ('uhhu/isilcal Dialogue, p. 15. 
"1 Principles, p. 21. 
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and blessed Consort of God". However, though the "Flesh and Blood of Christ are of' 
a Divine and Spiritual Nature", they are "not the very Essence of God". 15, God is 
distinguished from the Adam Kudmon/Messiah/Elohim by a numerical-spatial 
distinction. God, as the one infinite substance, is absolutely without any 
differentiation or limitation; whereas created spirits are: 
For every Spirit is not the Divine Essence... in a numerical Identity... But that 
the Divine Essence can be divided... that we admit not o1 but most highly 
adore the Unity which is in it... The Divine Essence itself therefore is not 
conslringed, but that which was Analagous to it, viz. a Created Spirit. 152 
And these limited created spirits exist not only as plurality, whereas God is one, but 
in an infinite number: "Creatures are infinite [in number] and created in an infinity of 
ways, so that they cannot be bounded or limited by number or measure". 15; But even 
this infinity of created spirits does not add up to God's infinity, which is that concept 
of infinity as the undifferentiated or unlimited. The "Messiah... is not limitless like 
Aensoph". 154 and "as one infinity is greater than another, so God is always infinitely 
greater than all his creatures, so that nothing can be compared to him". 155 Indeed, this 
limitlessness of God refers also to the infinity of his mind: his omniscience is another 
essence by which God transcends created spirit. This is how Conway interprets the 
separation, the bounding off, of the created world from Ein-Sof'in the zimzum: 
According to the Hebrews, the infinite God, whom they call Aensoph, is said 
to exist outside the place of the world because a creature could not 
comprehend the immensity of his light. '56 
15' Seder Olam, section 25. 
`52 Cabbalislical Dialogue, pp. 14-15. 
"' Principles, p. 16. 
154 Ibid., p. 18. 
iss Ibid.. p. 17. 
's`' Ibid., p. 18. 
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Furthermore, because spirits depend on God for their being, their wills are limited, 
but God, who is self-existing, has an unlimited or infinite will. However, as was 
shown above, Christian Lurianic Kabbalah asserts that though God was the source of 
the power of each spirit, when he created them, the ownership of that power passed 
over to them: each became the director or active principle for that power; otherwise: 
if the Creature had no own working... then the Creature would be nothing else, but a 
meer instrument" of God. 1'7 
Thus the middle stratum of Adam Kudmon/Messiah/Elohim, or the plenum of 
spirits, stands in a relationship to God in which God is both immanent and 
transcendent. Yet, if the relationship of spirits to bodies is recalled, it will be found 
that the same double-aspected relationship holds between the middle stratum and the 
lower stratum of creatures. For, since spirits are the active casual principles of 
creatures, immanent in them as effects to which they are united, so Conway writes of 
the Adam Kudmon/Messiah, that 
the son himself is immediately present in all these creatures... 1-le exists 
among them... If he were not present everywhere in all creatures, there would 
be an utter chasm and gap between God and creatures. 159 
However, individual active spirit principles are not the same as creatures, which 
consist in their conception as a collection of such spirits. Accordingly, the middle 
stratum, which is of the genus of all such spirits considered individually and 
separately is to be distinguished from creatures as being transcendent to them, 
"' The Divine Being, section 33. 
15" Principles, pp. 25-26. See also p. 11: "The light of [the Messiah's] divine nature was shared with 
them [creatures]"; and p. 22: "All things are contained in [Christ] and have their existence in him... 
They remain forever in him in a certain way". 
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"because that mediator is far more excellent in terms of its own nature than all the 
other created beings which we call creatures". 159 
The precise nature of this medial being between God and creatures is not easily 
made clear. The Adam Kadmon/Messiah, according to Conway, is not really a third 
being intermediary between God and creature, since that would prevent God's 
immediate presence in creation: 
No one supposes that the son is the kind of intermediary between God and 
creatures, which implies that God himself is not immediately present in all 
creatures. 
160 
Conway states that God is pure spirit, as opposed to that of any creature, which 
always has some accompanying body or corporeal aspect. What the meaning of this 
ens inec/ium might then be becomes quite paradoxical when Conway proceeds to 
affirm that there is a medium between these two states: 
How can the human soul, even in the highest state of purity, be united with 
God, since God is pure spirit, whereas the soul, though pure in the highest 
degree, always partakes of corporeality? I answer that this happens through 
Jesus Christ, who is the true and appropriate medium between the two. 16 
If this is supposed to mean that the ens medium is both essentially pure spirit and 
corporeal, surely this is a conlradictio in udiecto? But the solution, it seems to me, is 
to understand this ens medium as a sort of overlap zone between God on the one hand 
and the spirits which constitute creatures on the other, such that the entities in this 
zone can be said to have the attributes bosh of God and creature. Such a double aspect 
of substance has already been met with above when I set out the kabbalistic doctrine 
Ibid., p. 25. 
Ibid. 
"'' Ibid., p. 60. 
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of creation. I interpret the Adam Kadmon, the Messiah, Elohim, or the world ofA: ilua. 
as the plenum of things, which exists hoch as the infinity of ideas (of things) in God's 
mind, und as the infinity of spirits (ideas of things determined upon by God's will and 
actualized as spirit substances) in the world. Thus individual spirits are both pure 
spirit in that they are thoughts of the divine mind, and yet have a corporeal aspect, in 
that their conception as active principles necessitates they have a corollary passive 
principle, or body. And yet, as essentially individual and separale spirits, they arc not 
creatures (which are related collections of such). Thus they are neither God nor 
creature. The account of Christ in terms of the word of God, as both essential and 
revealed, comes close to this explanation: 
Jesus Christ signifies the whole Christ, who is God and man. As God, he is 
called logos ousios, or the essential word of the father. As man, he is the logos 
proforikos, or the word which is uttered and revealed, the perfect and 
substantial image of God's word, which is eternally in God and perpetually 
united to him so that it is his vehicle and organ, just like the body in respect to 
the soul. 162 
To the extent that the spirits which constitute creatures ultimately derive their being 
from God; that they pre-existed as ideas in his mind; and, further, that their own 
creation and continued existence depends on the presence of God's will; so it is that 
God can be conceived to be immanent in creatures; yet this only via the ens medium: 
[God] is present in all things and immediately fills all things... yet he 
nevertheless uses this same mediator [Christ] as an instrument through which 
he works together with creatures. 163 
`2 Ibid., p. 21. 
Ibid., p. 25. See also Paradoxul Discourses, part 2, p. 2: "Since then the Creator in and through the 
Son of God, is every where present in the Creatures, in the greater as well as in the lesser world... 
filling the same in all parts, and working in and with the same. "; and see the draft notes to Thoughts 
on Genesis, OH, I, 84; LH, I. V, 2g, fol. 35: "Elohim is the executor sitting to the right hand of 
Jehovah and is plural of number, because he is this executor in all things". 
87 
This presence of God in creatures, via the Messiah, is referred to the Holy Ghost by 
the Christian kabbalists. The Son, the Messiah, the spirit plenum out of which 
creatures are formed, is also filled with the divine presence. These two, along with the 
infinite God himself, constitute the Christian Trinity of Father, Son and Holy Ghost: 
The Trinity represents God. The first concept is the infinite God himself, 
considered above and beyond his creation; the second is the same God insofar 
as he is the Messiah; the third is the same God insofar as he is with the 
Messiah in creatures. 164 
To the extent that certain attributes of God are communicable to created beings, he is 
said to be immanent in them; but as long as there remain some attributes which are 
incommunicable, then God's essence remains unique and distinguishable from created 
beings, or, God is transcendent, really creates, and the cosmological system is not 
pantheistic. 
""" Principles, P. II. 
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Chapter 2 Leibniz's Association with Christian Lurianic Kabbalah 
2.1 Leibniz and the Exponents of Christian Lurianic Kabbalah 
Christian Knorr von Rosenroth 
Leibniz seems to have first met von Rosenroth in 1671 in Sulzbach through van 
Helmont. 1 It is not known what they discussed at this time, but it was the beginning 
of a relationship that would last until von Rosenroth's death in 1689. 
On the 9 January 1688 Leibniz arrived in Sulzbach where he remained as a guest of 
von Rosenroth for about ten days. 2 It was here and at this time that Leibniz first 
encountered the Kabbala Denudala and discussed its contents with the editor. 
Leibniz's overall opinion of this celebrated scholar and translator of Jewish mysticism 
was universally favourable. Very soon after leaving Sulzbach Leibniz writes to 
Landgraf Ernst von Hessen-Rheinfels and reports his admiration for von Rosenroth's 
erudition and endeavours: 
I find again a very capable man at Sulzbach named M. Knorr von Rosenroth, 
who is the chancellor. He spends what time his duties allow in investigating 
nature by way of chemistry and in bringing to light the cabbalistic antiquities 
Coudert, The impact aaf the Kabhulah, p. 308. 
2 Foucher de Cared has written that Leibniz arrived in Sulzbach on 3I December 1687 /9 January 
1688, not departing until 1/11 February , 
"after a month's sojourn in that town". FoL, p. 56. Allison 
Coudert follows this, inferring that such a long stay would have furnished Leibniz with a significant 
knowledge of the contents of the Kabbala Denudata. See Coudert, Leibniz and the Kuhha/uh, 
pp. xiii, I. 
However, it appears that, in fact, by 10/20 January Leibniz has already left Sulzbach and is at the 
frontier with northern Bohemia, looking for J. D. Craf 1, whom he eventually found at the end of 
January (new style) in a place called Graupen. Even then, he does not return directly to Sulzbach, 
but, rather, spends the first half of February (new style) following a route which takes him through a 
number of mining towns. He probably returned to Sulzbach shortly after the middle of February, but 
by 11/2 1, he has left for Amberg. See Aiton, pp. 143-44; and K. Muller and G. Kronen, Leben und 
Werk von Gut! jried Wilhelm Leibniz: eine Chronik (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1969), pp. 85- 
87. Indeed. Leibniz himself describes the Sulzbach visit as a mere passing through: "When I passed 
through Sulzbach... ". See Letter to Placcius, 27 March 1696, D, vi. 70. 
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of the ancient Jews... Few Christians have seen it or can understand it. Many 
still make fun of such undertakings, but I think otherwise. 
To Gerhardt Molanus in April 1688 he writes that "there is scarcely anyone today 
among Christians more versed in the hidden knowledge of the Jews". 
Leibniz continued to speak highly of von Rosenroth after his death and was 
involved in the posthumous publication of some of his works. 5 These included the 
Messias Puce (though this never actually found itself into print), the Harmony 0j'/he 
Evangelists, and a German translation of Boethius's Consolations of'Philosophy. 6 "1'0 
this latter, though it appeared under van Helmont's name, Leibniz wrote the preface, 
in which he testifies to von Rosenroth's skills as a translator: "He was so skillful that 
many learned people did not find any difference between the original text and the 
translation". 
In some remarks written between 1706 and 1710 on J. G. Wachter's Eluciduriu. s 
C'ahhalisticus, Leibniz defends von Rosenroth and states the even-handedness with 
which he worked on the presentation of the Kabbala Denudata: 
The author [Wachter] says that Knorr has not so much unveiled the true 
Kabbalah, or the secret philosophy of the Jews, as its worthless veneer: but 
Knorr gave both the good and the bad as he found it. 8 
Coudert, Leihniz and the Kahbalah, p. 47; A, I, v, 43. 
' Coudert, Leibniz and the Kabbalah, p. 48; A, I, v, 109. 
' In 1692, for example, in a letter to Vincent Placcius, Leibniz writes that "He [van Helmond himself 
had a great friendship with Knorr Rosenroth... who meditated excellently on the very hidden things 
of the Jews, which the Kabbala Denudala sets forth. When I passed through Sulzbach, he showed me 
a book composed by himself, with the title Messias Puer. ". See D, vi, 70. 
`' Pe, pp. 210-213. 
Coudert. Leibniz and the Kahbalah, p. 64; LH, I, Theologie, V, 2, fol. 25r. 
8 B, p. 2. 
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In 1707 Leibniz mentions that "many times I spoke with Herr Knorr about the Cabala 
of the Hebrews", that the "subject should not be scorned" and that "I applaud his 
extensive and full interpretation". 
Francis Mercury van Helmunt 
Leibniz first met Francis Mercury van Helmont in 1671 in Mainz. As well as 
discussing alchemy, it was arranged that Leibniz would have his first introduction to 
von Rosenroth. 1' They would not meet again for eight years until when, in 
December 1679, they both happened to be visiting the sick Princess Elizabeth at 
Herford, Germany: van Helmont having recently left England following the death of 
Anne Conway. 11 Seventeen years will pass until they next meet in Hannover in 1696 
with the Electress Sophie. 
In a letter to the Electress in 1694 Leibniz refers to the Divine Being which van 
Helmont had sent to her and which she had forwarded on to Leibniz for his 
opinion. 12 But Leibniz's visit to Sulzbach in 1688 would already have furnished him 
with a general view of van Helmont's thoughts, gleaned through his conversations 
with von Rosenroth, and possibly through some reading of the Kabbala Denudalu. In 
some remarks made by Leibniz in 1695, he groups van Helmont with von Rosenroth 
and More, distinguishing them from the usual run of "spiritualizers" or mystics, who 
' To Louis Bourguet, GP, iii, 546. See also letter to Bourguet, 1714, GP, iii, 563: " As regards 
that which is from the Cabbalists, the Kabbala Denudata of Mr. Knorr, who was a man of great 
erudition and one of my friends, deserves merit; he wanted to reduce it to a system. ". 
A. I. iii, 442. Allison Coudert has investigated the relationship between Leibniz and van Helmont at 
length. See her Leibniz and the Kabba/ah, pp. 25-77. 
" Aiton, p. 100. 
'' 3 September 1694: L Br 389, fol. 9 ff. 
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shun the philosophical approach. 13 And in a letter written in the same year he notes 
that "strange [mira] things about religion and philosophy are being published" by van 
Helmont, who "derives many things from the cabbalists of the Jews and the unusual 
words of the chemists". 14 
But the Electress was not only responsible for bringing van Helmont's writings to 
the attention of Leibniz, for in the March of 1696, nearly twenty five years after their 
first meeting in Mainz, she brought the two together in her study for conversations 
which would take place almost daily over a period of a fortnight. 15 Leibniz thought 
that "many of Mr. Helmont's opinions still remain vague and unproven" though he is 
"in agreement with him on many things about which neither common teaching nor the 
new opinions of the Cartesians can agree. " 16 
It was at this time that direct correspondence between Leibniz and van Flelmont 
began, and which would last for the following two years until the latter's death. In 
forwarding a letter to van Helmont from von Rosenroth's son, Leibniz's covering 
letter states a hope that he and the Electress will be able to "enjoy your conversation 
for years on end"; and that "I recall our conversations and I am glad to learn that you 
have resolved to communicate before long to the world some of your fine and 
important ideas. " 17 This last might hint at a provisional arrangement for Leibniz to 
set down van Helmont's ideas, which would eventually be the work known as 
See notes made on William Penn, 1695, Gr, i, 91: "I see that most of those who pretend to a grander 
spirituality, in particular the Quakers, endeavour to bestow a disgust for the contemplation of natural 
truths. But to my way of thinking they should do the exact opposite and not be willing to maintain 
our laziness or ignorance <and that is what I find in Helmont, Knorr, More and Poiret, who are more 
reasonable than most of the others, even though I night not wish to sanction many of their opinions 
where they deviate from the church>. ". 
To Thomas Smith, 1695; Gr, I, 94. 
15 Letter to Thomas Burnett, March 1696; GP, iii, 176. 
"' Coudert, Leibniz and the Kubbalah, p. 81; L Br 389, fols. I ff. 
17 Coudert, Leihni_ and the Kubbaluh, p. 49; L Br 389. fol. 23. 
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Thoughts on Genesis, for this was the only communication of van Helmont's ideas 
remaining to be published by 1696. 
Later in this year van Helmont returned to Hannover. Leibniz's journal refers to a 
conversation with him on 7 August, and regular conversations took place until his 
departure on 23 September. They spoke about various matters, as the journal entries 
show, but it seems very likely that it was at this time that Leibniz took down 
extensive notes of those ideas of van Helmont which he would base Thoughts on 
Genesis on. 18 Also at this time Leibniz appears to have written the set of notes Grua 
entitled De homine, beatitudine, deo, christo, and which seems to contain ideas 
inspired by his conversations with van Helmont. 19 In addition, Leibniz also wrote a 
"report" summarizing van Helmont's ideas and the extent to which he, Leibniz, was 
able to grasp them. 
20 In the first paragraph of this report, Leibniz writes: 
There is no one here in this country, who has had as much patience as I, not 
only to deal with him [van Helmont] but also to listen to him; not only to ask 
questions, but also to wait for his responses and for him to reformulate them 
again one more time, until it was not possible to get any further. How many 
times I took the pen in my hand in his presence to formulate diverse 
expressions and connections and sketch an outline of his view, but hardly ever 
were we able to reach the end. 21 
Within two years of this visit van Helmont was dead. When he left Hannover he 
would not return, and he and Leibniz never met again, though they corresponded up 
to the time of his death. 
A detailed discussion of Leibniz's involvement in van Helmont's last work follows in the next 
section. 
Gr, i, 96-98 contains selections of this piece (translated into French); and this is further translated 
into English by Coudert, Leibniz and the Kubbulah, pp. 128-30. A complete transcript of the 
original Latin of sections 13-27, which Grua merely summarizes, is at OK, ii, 1056-61 from 
L Br, 67, fols 52-53. 
20 See OK. ii. 909-19; LH, IV, iii, 8c, fols 7-8. Various editions, such as those by Klopp, Feller 
and Gerhardt, have reproduced fragments of this report. Orio de Miguel has collected a single 
complete text here. 
'' OK, ii, 911; LH , IV, 
ii, 8c, fol. 7. 
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Lady Anne Conway 
Leibniz never met nor corresponded with Anne, Viscountess of Conway. Possibly the 
first time he learnt anything about her was when he met van Helmont in 1679. Van 
Ilelmont, recently returning from Ragley following the death of Conway, would no 
doubt have mentioned her to Leibniz; indeed he had on him the manuscript of the 
Principles. But the meeting was brief, and the occasion was the sickness of a common 
friend, so it is unlikely that the lady or her philosophy were discussed at length. But 
during the Hannover meeting of seventeen years later, in March 1696, van Helmont 
tells Leibniz about Conway, as Leibniz reports in a letter to Thomas Burnett in the 
same month: 
For the past few days M. Helmont has been here with us... He was a close 
friend of Madame, the Countess of Kennaway [Conway], and he has told the 
history of this extraordinary lady. 22 
No doubt during his visit later in the same year, in August and September, van 
Helmont spoke further of this woman whose home he had lived in for nine years, and 
which had been a key centre in the development of seventeenth century Christian 
Kabbalah. Referring to the author of the Principles in a 1701 book review, Leibniz 
says: "This lady was Countess Conway, the sister of Chancellor Heneage Finch, as 
one remembers often to have heard from Monsieur Helmont". 23 
22 Coudert, Leibniz and the Kabhalah, p. 38; GP, iii, 176. 
23 Coudert, Leibniz and the Kahbalah, p. 116, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz: De /'Horizon dc la Doctrine 
Humaine (1693)..., ed. by M. Fichant (Paris: J. Vrin, 1991), p. 97. 
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2.2 Leibniz and the Cosmological Texts of Christian Lurianic Kabbalah 
2.2.1 The Kabbala Denudala 
Evidence that Leibniz had knowledge of the contents of the Kabbala Denudulu comes 
primarily from the entry in his journal made during his visit to von Rosenroth in early 
1688. Some later writings also point at knowledge of particular items in the work. 
First, though, here is the journal entry: 
M Rosenroth has published, he says, different things without using his name, like 
the Kabbala Denudaia, part one and two. The first contains a procedure for 
dyeing cloth taken from some Jews and which is bound to be excellent. The 
second part has some fragments from the Zohar, the Zohar published in Hebrew, 
5 with old commentaries. Guillaume Prostel [=Postel] began a translation of the 
Zohar from that which someone had sent him from Oxford, but he did not 
understand it sufficiently. He was deprived of the assistance that we have now. 
The Jews are editing at this moment in Sulzbach a New Syriac Testament in 
Hebrew characters. He has edited a harmony of the Gospels; Luther's translation 
10 is printed in German characters. The Gospels of Matthew, Mark, Luke and John 
are designated by the letters abcd, that which is found in one of them is marked 
by a single letter, that which is found in several is marked by several letters. fie 
has some handsome oriental books, which are listed at the end of the Kabbala 
Denudalu. He has translated from English certain questions on the pre-existence 
15 of souls; there are there opinions which he does not embrace as his own. lie has 
taken trouble over the German edition of the works of Helmont and added some 
commentaries. The New Helicon is a collection of sacred songs printed, I believe, 
in Frankfurt and which one can find at Nuremburg at Felsekern. 
I have glanced through the Kabbala Denudata with him, from which I have 
20 drawn the following: 
The infinite being consists in an indivisible point, and the emanated light or the 
sphere of activity despatches its light by its will. 
The first born of the creatures, the Messiah, in as much as he is a creature, is 
called Adam Kadmon; he receives the first rays of the light and forwards these on 
25 towards the creatures. 
The second class is Adam or the body of souls. 
The third class is that of the intelligences superior to souls. 
The fourth is microprosvpon, or more briefly the passions. 
The fifth class is that of the inferior intelligences which have fallen and which 
30 he calls Adam Belial. 
The last class is that of the kingdom, or the sephirs in which the spirits or 
substantial forms are contained. Seized with disgust for the supreme light and 
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obscured in their fall, the six classes contained in Adam Belial experience a certain 
suffering as inferior creatures, it is this then that St. Paul refers when he speaks of 
35 the suffering of creatures. This same corruption is extended up into the superior 
classes; but the Messiah descended and put the superior classes in the place of the 
fallen ones. From the fallen angels he made the husks, that is the obscured lights. 
These are those who afterwards have led the souls in captivity, and it is thus that 
the souls are enclosed in the husks from which they will be extracted little by little 
40 by generation, which supposes [Leibniz remarks] that their choice is removed. The 
souls are divided into the soul of the head, the neck, etc. The body comprises eight 
times the measure of the head, and this indication is cabalistic; it indicates the 
eighth millenium of the world. 
Man, who is at the time the summary and last term of the creation, is a world in 
45 abridgement, or microcosmos. When the husks are exhausted, that is to say, when 
all the souls have been extracted, that will be the time of the consummation. All 
souls have sinned in Adam and Eve, whence came original sin. The Messiah took 
a body, it is therefore necessary to distinguish three things in him: his divinity, his 
class [as] the first born of the creatures, and finally that he was born in time, of a 
50 virgin. There are different interpretations of the divine persons. The Son 
corresponds to the class of the Messiah, and the Holy Spirit to that of the souls. St. 
Paul appears to distinguish between God and the Father of Our Saviour Jesus 
Christ. fie fixes the coming of the Messiah and his reign on earth about the year 
1832.24 
Before indicating which sections of the Kabbala Denudaia may be referred to here, I 
would like to point out a number of features of this report which makes it clear that 
what Leibniz has seen of the Kabbala Denudala at this time is only superficial. 
1) At lines 2 to 3 he mentions something in part one of the Kabbala Denudata, 
namely a "procedure for dyeing cloth". Tome I of the Kabbala Denudulu contains a 
large lexicon of kabbalistic terms, essays by von Rosenroth, More, van Helmont and 
Jewish kabbalists, the large Lurianic work Porla Coelorum, and the many diagrams 
in part 4. One is at a loss to explain how the only thing that was salient in Leibniz's 
mind about this tome was a process for dyeing cloth. At the very least, however, it 
strongly suggests that he had not read anything properly of tome I at this time. 
24 FoL, pp. 57-59. 
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2) At lines 13-14 Leibniz states that there is a list of oriental books "at the end of the 
Kabbala Denudata". I have not seen such a list myself in the several different editions 
I have examined. 
3) At line 19 Leibniz writes "Ich habe mit ihm ein buch so ein Cabbala Denudata 
durchgangen, daraus folgendes zu wissen... ". 25 The verb durchgangen is the past 
participle of durchgehen, correctly translated as "gone through". Though this could he 
construed as "read", that he had done this "with him" (von Rosenroth) implies a 
looking over: one glances through books with others: one does not read properly large 
tomes with other people. Foucher de Careil in his publication of these notes follows 
this using the French "J'ai parcouru", which in English means "glanced through", 
"perused", "looked over", "run through". 26 
4) "the Kabbala Denudala is a work of over 2,500 pages. In a visit to von Rosenroth 
lasting about ten days it is improbable that Leibniz would have found time to make 
any kind of serious study of the book, particularly since, as a guest, he is unlikely to 
have shut himself away. On the contrary, during this time he had meetings with 
others, including a local fossil collector with whom he discussed mineralogy, and also 
visited a lead mine. 
27 Although none of this can preclude Leibniz's having read some 
items properly during his time in Sulzbach, his overall knowledge of the contents of 
the Kabbala Denudala has to be sketchy at best. Indeed, these notes may well be the 
outcome of a simultaneous perusal and discussion; and the intercalation of "he says" 
and "he calls" at lines 1 and 30 strongly suggests this. 
From the notes reproduced above, knowledge by Leibniz of at least the existence of 
certain items in the Kabbala Denudaia can be ascertained. 
25 RJ, fol. 35r. This is the facsimile of the original German MS in Leibniz's hand. Foucher de Careil 
has given a typescript French translation of this. 
26 FoL, p. 58. 
27 Aiton, p. 144. 
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1) At line 4 he refers to "some fragments from the Zohar" in the second tome: these 
are those of the Sifru de-Zeni'uia, the Idra Rabba and Idra Zuta. 
2) At line 5 he mentions old commentaries on the Zohur: a reference to tracts 4 and 5 
of tome 2 of part 2, by Hayim Vital and Naphtali Bacharach. 
3) At lines 14-15 he refers, without naming the author, to the contributions by Henry 
More (the critical essays translated from English and which von Rosenroth does not 
agree with) and which appear in part 2 of tome 1. 
4) Lines 21 onwards, which may well be nothing more than a resume of a 
conversation and going over of the Kabbala Denudala with von Rosenroth, on the 
other hand might indicate something approximating to a reading of the final section 
of the work, the Adumbrutio Kuhbulue C'hristianue. Firstly, if von Rosenroth were to 
direct Leibniz to a succint summary of the christianized Lurianic Kabbalah, then this 
essay would be one of the best suited. Secondly, the list of classes of being and the 
language used to describe them by Leibniz in his journal (lines 23-30), follows rather 
closely that of a passage in the Adumbraiio: 
6 PC [The Philosophical Christian: ] So in the first class was located the Soul of the 
Messiah, which immediately attached itself by its contemplation and love to the 
highest object of all: that is, that grade of Divinity communicated to itself, which 
in our Trinity is called the Son; and is that Light admitted into the first Adam. For 
with this grade the soul remained united, and will always remain united, without 
any interruption of its affection. Hence this mark of Divinity was itself set forth 
for him and has to be contemplated and loved under the name of the crown. 
7 In the second class was located the whole body of human souls, of which the 
Messiah was the head. And these, under the form of a united human body, which 
is called Adam Protoplastes, were fashioned into the class of Wisdom, which is 
actually called , that is man; on account of the number 
that is 45. (See Apparatus Pt. I p. 48) 
8 In the third class were located the Angels, who are now called the good ones, 
having been fashioned into the class of Understanding: whence they are still 
called, by custom, by the name of Intelligences by the Greek as well as the 
Barbaric philosophers. 
9 In the fourth class were located those spirits, who are now called evil Angels, 
having been shaped into the class of Microprosopus, or of the six following 
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numerations, namely mercy, severity, beauty, victory, glory and foundation: 
of which the head was that spirit, who now after his fall is called by the 
Cabbalists Samael, and in the Gospel Beelzebub, the leader of Daemons. 
Luke 11.15, as the Lord of this dwelling-place of the worldly citizen: of 
which the appearance was Daath or Knowledge, or the Soul of your six 
numerations: just as he set down the whole body, which is now called 
Adam Belial, 2 Cor. 6 v. 15. 
10 In the fifth class were located those spirits, who are now called seminal forms 
and are in matter; of whom the appearance then was the Kingdom, or the 
lowest numeration. 28 
The references to Paul that then appear in the journal also appear in the Adumhralio 
soon after the above passage. 
Thirdly, the name "Adam Belial" (lines 30 and 33 in the journal) I have been 
unable to locate anywhere in the Kabbala Denudala, except in the Adumhrulio where 
it appears several times. 29 
5) Chapter IV of the Adumbratio (as well as chapter V) makes reference to the 
('abbalislical Dialogue of tome I part 2. It is possible to speculate that Leibniz may 
have gone on to read this essay here also, especially as it is a mere five pages long. 
However, this work is never mentioned anywhere in Leibniz's extant writings. 
6) As for the question as to whether Leibniz might have read item 11 of part 2 of 
tome 1, the Fundamenla Philosophiae by Henry More, this depends on the only (and 
indirect) reference included in Leibniz's remarks on J. G. Wachter's Elucidarius 
Cubbalislicus. Even if Leibniz was referring to this essay, he might not have read it in 
the Kabbala Denudala, for the same had been published in More's Opera Omnia of 
which Leibniz possessed a copy in 1679. The remarks on Wachter mention the 
"cabbalistic theses of Henry More" which were set out in the Fundumeniu 
Philosophiac (in order to be criticized). The implication is that Leibniz must therefore 
214 Adumbruliu, p. 27. 
2" E. g. pp. 27,56,61,70. 
99 
have read the essay; but a close scrutiny of Wachter's work alongside these remarks 
by Leibniz shows that the words are in fact Wachter's, i. e. Leibniz is merely noting 
down what Wachter says, and is not referring to More's cabbalistic theses himself. 30 
It is therefore Wachter who has read the Fundumenta Philosophiae; and so there is no 
evidence here, or anywhere else, that Leibniz had done so himself. 31 
Though it is of course possible that Leibniz could have read any or even several 
items in the Kabbala Denudatu during his visit to von Rosenroth, there is no evidence 
that he did. The evidence of the journal entry made at this time indicates a superficial 
knowledge of what was in the Kabbala Denuclutu, the only exception being a possible 
reading of the Adumbrutio. The assertions by some scholars that Leibniz was directly 
acquainted with specific items in the Kabbala Denudatu cannot be upheld. 32 
In 1692 in a letter to Simon de la Loubere, Leibniz mentions a magical square: 
The late Mr. Knorr, who gave us the Zohar of the Jews and the Kabbala 
Denudala, and who was perhaps the most knowledgeable man in Europe 
about the most hidden matters of the Jews, showed me a magical square... " 3 
This may well have been one of the magical squares included in the Lexicon of the 
Kabbala Denudala. the magic squares of the Esh Mezaref 
But if the evidence is lacking that Leibniz ever studied the Kabbala Denudate in 
depth, he is almost always full of praise for it, and clearly considers it a work of 
importance. In the same year as his first sight of it in Sulzbach, he writes to Eliob 
Ludolph that: 
B p. 3. 
31 For a discussion of this, see Stuart Brown, "Leibniz and More's Cabbalistic Circle", in Henri' More 
(1614-/687): 7ercen/enaryStudies, ed. by Sarah Hutton (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic publishers, 
1990), 77-95. 
"- For example, Coudert says that Leibniz "specifically says he'read over' the Kabbala Denudaia and 
therefore read this text [the Cabbalistical Dialogue]'. Coudert, Leibniz and the Kahhalah, p. 86. 
33 Ibid., p. 42. 
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He [von Rosenroth] has bought many important manuscripts, some found in 
the East, others elsewhere, from which he digs out the secrets of their 
teachings, which are for the most part metaphysical and examples of which 
appear in the Kabbala Denudala and elsewhere. '4 
In 1696 to Placcius he rates highly the thought von Rosenroth gave to what he found 
in the Kabbalah: "Rosenroth... a man of learning in all respects... meditated 
excellently on the most hidden things of the Jews, which the Cabbala Denudata sets 
forth. " 35 
To Bourguet in 1714 he writes: 
As regards that which is from the Cabbalists, the Cabala Denudata of Mr. 
Knorr, it deserves merit. He was a man of great erudition and one of my 
friends, he wanted to reduce it to a system. 36 
In 1716 to Samuel Masson he says: "I do not have the time to consult this latter work 
[the Kabbala Denudala] and compare its opinions with mine. " ;' But this statement 
may be disingenuous because Leibniz is seeking to distance himself from the 
Kabbalah here in response to an anonymous critic who had compared Leibniz's 
philosophy to that of the Kabbalah, as the letter makes clear. 39 
'a Ibid., p. 38; A, 1, v, 235. 
D, vi, 70. 
'`' GP, iii 563. 
?' AG, pp. 226-27; GP, vi, 625. 
"` The critic was in all probability John Toland. See Antonio Lamarra, "An Anonymous Criticism from 
Berlin to Leibniz's Philosophy: John Toland against Mathematical Abstractions", in Sludiu 
Leihniliuna Sondencefi, 16 (1990), 89-102. 
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2.2.2 Van Helmont's Works 
Alphuheli vere nulurulis 
Leibniz read the Alphaheti in the same year that it was published. 1667. ; ') A later 
note states how when van Helmont 
was a prisoner of the Inquisition in Rome [he] took it into his head, in his 
solitude, to examine the function of the origin in pronouncing letters and 
thought he had found how these characters are formed. 40 
Although there are few references to this book by Leibniz, its contents, on natural 
language theory, are of particular relevance to Leibniz's universal science project. 
This is discussed in chapter 3.1. 
Two Hundred Queries 
Leibniz was sent a copy of the Two Hundred Queries in October 1696 by van 
Helmont. Leibniz's replying letter of the 18 `h makes it clear that he has read the work, 
though what he writes does not constitute a critique. 41 
Purudoxul Discourses 
None of the references Leibniz makes to the Paradoxa! Discourses explicitly states 
that he read the book. However, a letter written in 1691 mentions it with some 
'`' A, 6, I, 283. 
an I p. 632. 
"" Coudert, Leihni_ and the Kahhalah, p. 69; LBr, 389, f. 53. 
102 
publication details, and a personal opinion on Helmontian ideas. 42 It therefore seems 
likely that Leibniz had read the book by this time. In the "report" Leibniz wrote on 
van Helmont in 1696, he notes that "The Paradoxes concerning the Macrocosm and 
the Microcosm of Mr. Helmont were translated from English into German and printed 
in Hamburg. " It continues, discussing ideas also to be found in the Paradoxical 
Discourses, namely: that nature is full of life, that spirits are the only unities, whereas 
bodies are only ever aggregates; that all things proceed to perfection, eventually to be 
re-united in a whole; that everything exists and moves according to the order 
instantiated by God; and that man is a microcosm of the macrocosm. Leibniz presents 
ideas which are van Helmont's and contrasts them with his own views. 43 
The Spirit of *Diseuses 
When Leibniz wrote to Princess Sophie after reading a copy of the Divine Being, 
which she had sent to him in 1694, he stated that "I wished that there had been joined 
there... The Spirit of'Diseases cited in the book by Mr. Buchius about God. " 44 
However, there is a copy of the English edition in the Leibniz archive, and which 
contains underlinings, most probably by Leibniz himself. 45 The evidence, therefore, 
points to Leibniz having read this work after September 1694. 
42 To Daniel Laroque, 21/31-7-169 1, OK i, 266. 
See OK, ii, 911-19, LH, IV, iii, 8c, fols 7-8. 
44 3 September 1694, in Coudert, Leibniz and the Kahhaluh, p. 54; L Br, 389, fol. 9. 
45 1 am grateful to Bernardino Orio de Miguel for supplying me with this information. 
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The Divine Being 
Leibniz was sent a copy of the Divine Being by Sophie and he made a lengthy resume 
of its contents. 46 This shows that the preface, all five chapters, and especially the 
appendix, had been read and had notes made on them. However, it is essentially a 
summary of the ideas in the book, and Leibniz only makes a few critical comments. 
From these notes, Leibniz produced that part of a letter to Sophie dated 3 September 
1694, in which he writes about the ideas expressed in the work, though rather 
generally, and tending to state his own thoughts at the expense of the details of van 
Helmont's. 47 
Seder Olam 
Leibniz had received a copy of the Seder Olam from Princess Sophie. 48 There are 
extant more written notes and critical comments by Leibniz on this work than for any 
other work by the Christian Lurianic kabbalists. 
In a letter from Lorenz Hertel, his secretary, dated 14/24 July 1694, Hertel asks 
Leibniz for his opinion on the Seder Olam. 49 In his reply of two days later, Leibniz 
makes a few brief comments about the work: 
Regarding the new Seder Olam, which comes from the Kabbalah factory of 
Mr Helmont, it is without doubt the most amusing of all chimeras for you and 
me. 50 
4" This is located at LH I, V, 2f, fols 30,31,31r, 32, but has not been published. A transcript of this is 
available in OK, ii, 1065-75. 
47 Coudert, Leibniz und the Kabbalah, pp. 56-57; L Br, 389, fol. 9ff. 
4 A, I, xi, 18ff. 
41' OK, ii, 847-48; A, I, x, 46. 
5" OK, ii, 847-48; A, I, x, 49. 
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It is clear then that between its publication in 1693 and July 1694 Leibniz had read 
the Seder Olam, and that the various undated sets of remarks belong to this period. 
The first of these is a summary written without critical comments and which shows 
that Leibniz had read the book right through. 51 From these study notes Leibniz 
drafted a fair resume in which he included his own opinions. He gave it the title On a 
little book entitled Seder Olam published about 1693 or 1694. 
In an essay sent to Loeflerus dated 13 December 1694, Leibniz makes reference to 
the Seeier 01am when he criticizes the notion that Christ was the middle being 
through whom all other creatures were made. 52 But it is to a summary sent to Hertel 
on 8 January 1695 that further extensive and critical writings on the work are to be 
found. Four versions of this letter exist. Two are reasonably detailed; the other two 
are mere compressions of the first two and offer no new opinions by Leibniz. 
In summary, then, there are three useful critical pieces on the Seder Olam: 
1) One of the long versions of the letter to Hertel (published as "L I" in the Akademie 
edition), which refers to the themes raised in the first twenty six sections of the 
work. 53 
2) The resume (published by Foucher de Careil as On a little book en[i[led Seder 
01am... ), which discusses themes from section 27 on. 54 
3) The other long version of the letter to Hertel ("L2" in the Akademie edition), which 
contains general remarks pertaining to the book as a whole. 55 
51 This MS is located at LH 1, V, d, fols 24-24r and has not been published. A transcript is to be found 
in OK, ii, 1048-50. 
52 D, 1,19. 
s' A. 1, xi, 854-54. 
`a This was published in FoL, pp. 49-54, but it contains omissions and errors. An English translation of 
this exists in Coudert, Leibniz and the Kahbalah, pp. 60-62, but with new errors. A full transcript is 
to be found in OK, pp. 1050-54. 
55 A, I, xi, 855-57. 
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A Rabbinical and Paraphrastical Exposition of'Genesis I 
There is no evidence that Leibniz ever had access to this work (and it was not 
included in the Kabbala Denudala). However, given Leibniz's involvement in 
Thoughts on Genesis, for which the Rabbinical and Paraphrusticul Exposition was a 
prototype, it would be surprising if van Helmont had not furnished Leibniz with a 
copy of it. 
2.2.3 The Principles of the Most Ancient and Modern Philosophy 
Although it is possible that Leibniz might at least have glanced at the Principles in its 
English version in 1679 when he met van Helmont (and he could read English 
reasonably well by this time 
56), the brevity and the circumstances of that occasion 
make it unlikely. But in his 1696 conversations with van Helmont it seems reasonable 
to suppose that Leibniz would have learnt much about Conway's ideas directly. 
Leibniz wrote to van Helmont on 18 October, commenting on the Two Hundred 
Queries, which the latter had sent him. 57 This work is known only to have appeared 
in the Opuscula Philosphica, in which also is contained The Vulgar Philosophy 
Refuted, and Anne Conway's Principles. Since there is a copy of the Opusculu 
Philosophica at the Hannover archive, with some annotations in Leibniz's hand to the 
Principles contained therein, it is to be assumed that it was at this time that Leibniz 
received Conway's work. In the letter above, it is clear that Leibniz had read the Two 
s`' Aiton, p. 66. 
57 Coudert, Leibniz and the Kabbalah, p. 69; L Br, 389, fol. 53. 
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Hundred Queries by 18 October, and so he may even have read the Principles then. 
But the first strong evidence comes in a passage in Leibniz's MS version of Thoughis" 
on Genesis, which he had prepared by the following Spring of 1697. Leibniz has 
written: 
There is life in all things and they go astray who suppose corporeal things are 
composed out of atoms devoid of all life. And concerning this matter, many 
things are usefully suggested by Henry More, perhaps by the author of the 
Cabala Denudata; also by the author of the Vulgar Philosophy refuted, which 
was published with the meditations of the very clever English Countess, in 
which [in quibus] more of the same can be read. 5x 
Note that the relative of the final clause ("in quibus"), because it is in the plural, 
definitely refers to the (plural) "meditations" of Conway, and not the (singular) 
"Vulgar Philosophy Refuted". For Leibniz to refer to Conway in connection to the 
specific philosophical issue he asserts, to pronounce her "very clever"; and to state 
that "much more of the same can be read" in her Principles, strongly suggests that 
Leibniz has read her work by Spring 1697. That he also mentions the Vulgar 
Philosophy Refuted, further corroborates the other evidence that he read Conway's 
work in the Opuscula Philosophica. 
Unfortunately, the annotations written by Leibniz in his copy of the Principles 
(now held at the Hannover archive) refer only to the author being the Countess of 
Conway. However, there are five separate places where Leibniz has underlined 
certain points in the text. In chapter 1 he has underlined the words "In God there is an 
idea which is his image or the word existing within himself' (section 6); and, "For the 
58 LH. I. V. 2g, fol. 56: "In omnibus rebus vita inest, et ajanua aberrant qui res corporeas ex atomis et 
particulis omni vita destitutis conflatas esse arbitrantur. Qua de re multa utiliter sunt admonita ab 
Henrico More, an autore Cabalae Denudatae; item ab autore Philosophiae Vulgaris refutatae, qui 
fuit editus cum meditationibus ingeniosissimae Comtissae Anglae, in quibus plura in eundem 
sensum legi possunt. " 
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same reason there is spirit or will in God" (section 7). In the part of this chapter called 
the "Annotations", which relates to kabbalistic cosmology, Leibniz has underlined 
"This void was not privation or non-being but an actual place of diminished light, 
which was the soul of the Messiah, called Adam Kadmon" (annotation 3); and, 
regarding the production of creatures from the Messiah, "the diminution of his light 
having recently occurred" (annotation 5). In chapter 2, concerning Conway's point 
against there being a finite time in the past when creation occurred, Leibniz has 
underlined the words "they admit that there was time before all times, which is a 
manifest contradiction" (section 2). This is as far as the underlinings go. 5`' It would 
be inappropriate to draw any inferences regarding Leibniz's approval of the words he 
has underlined. However, they do indicate that he read at least the first two chapters. 
Now several of Leibniz's remarks on Conway's philosophy, such as the one quoted 
above, refer to her vitalism, and especially as it opposes what she sees as the dead 
atomism of Henry More. Since this theme does not arise in the first two chapters, it is 
reasonable to suggest he read further. Chapter 3 (section 9) argues against More's 
"indiscerpible points"; chapter 7 argues for a vitalism since "dead matter is 
completely non-being, a vain fiction and chimera" (section 2), and "truly there is no 
body anywhere which does not have motion and consequently life or spirit" (section 
4); and chapters 7 and 8 argue at length for a spirit-body vital continuum. This aside, 
it seems reasonable to suppose that Leibniz would have read most, if not all, of the 
book in order to be correctly apprised of her philosophy, before making remarks in 
publications or to correspondents in which he compares his own philosophy 
favourably to that of Conway's. In May 1697 he writes to Thomas Burnett: 
Becco, pp. 124-25. Bernardino Orio de Miguel has also examined this book in the archive and 
assures me that Becco's report of Leibniz's underlinings is exhaustive. 
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There is something in the opinions of the late Madam the Countess of' 
Connaway which recurs to me, although granted with many restrictions, and 
of a style very different from that usually taken by those who spiritualize. ''" 
And in August, to the same correspondent: 
My own ideas in philosophy approach somewhat those of the late Madam the 
countess of Conway, and hold the mean between Plato and Democritus, since 
I believe that everything happens mechanically as Democritus and Descartes 
wish against the opinion of Mr Moore and his like. And that nevertheless 
everything happens vitally also, and follows final causes, all things being full 
of life and of perceptions against the opinion of the Democriteans. 61 
But Leibniz is probably restraining his approval here, perhaps on account of the 
book's kabbalism. In unpublished remarks, he is more fulsome in his praise. His note 
in the MS version of Thoughts on Genesis quoted above, which was not included in 
the published edition, refers to her as "very clever"; and in his draft version of the 
New Essays he writes: "The Platonic philosophy of the Countess of Conway, 
approved by other English people, is in many respects to my liking". 62 But in the 
published version of this work, she is merely one of the better vitalists: Leibniz's 
philosophy allows him 
to make sense of those who put life and perception into everything, e. g. of 
Cardano, Campanella, and (better than them) of the late Platonist Countess of 
Conway, and our friend the late M. Franciscus Mercurius van Helmont. 13 
GP, iii, 205. 
A, I. XIV, 450. 
A, 6, vi, 47. 
`'' Ibid., 72. 
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Finally, in a letter to Lady Masham of 1703, Leibniz wrote "I have seen an example 
[of "the acuteness of English ladies"] in the work of the late Madam the Countess of 
Conway". 64 
On the evidence here, it seems that Leibniz was not only familiar with Conway's 
philosophy. but thought highly of it. It is not necessary, therefore, to make 
exaggerated claims along the lines that some scholars have engaged in. "` 
2.3 Leibniz's Involvement in Thoughts on Genesis 
Thoughts on Genesis first appeared in Latin in 1697. It was published in Amsterdam 
with the full title Quaedam praemedilalae et eonsiderutue Cogilutiones super 
Quuluor prioru Capita libri primi Moysis Genesis nominati. It also appeared in 
German, in 1697; and an English translation was published in London in 1701. ''`' As 
with most of van Helmont's books this was produced with the aid of another person 
who noted down van Helmont's ideas during conversations with him, then arranged 
these notes into a format suitable for publication. In the case of this last van Ilelmont 
book, this other person was Leibniz himself. 67 Although the preface was actually 
written by van Helmont, in Flemish, even here Leibniz was involved: he translated it 
from van Helmont's native language into Latin, as a letter from the latter to Leibniz, 
`'ý GP, iii, 336-37. 
`'` For example, Marjorie Nicolson's claim that "Anne Conway's name appears again and again in 
Leibniz's letters", cannot be substantiated. The Conway Letters, ed. by Marjorie Nicolson. rev. by 
Sarah Hutton (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), p. 455. 
"" OH, I, 19. 
`'' This was first established by Anne Becco in 1978, see Becco, 126-129. Bernardino Orio de Miguel 
has recently done further conclusive research into this: see OH, I, 23-43. 
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dated 1/11 March 1697, makes clear. 68 That the main part of the work was Leibniz's 
can be established by an examination of a dossier of writings at the Hannover archive. 
This dossier contains one set of papers in Leibniz's hand (at LH, 1, V, 2g, fols 45v- 
80r) which corresponds exactly to that of the published Latin edition; and another set 
of papers, also in Leibniz's hand (at fols 34v-44r and 8l v-82r) and which contains 
notes evidently taken down at great speed, as is evident from the frequently missed- 
out letters, incomplete phrases, insertions and marginalia, along with interspersions in 
German, and a generally unclear hand, indicative of hurried writing. 69 A comparison 
of the two shows quite clearly that the former is an expanded and proper arrangement 
of the notes of the latter. It is therefore beyond reasonable doubt that the latter is the 
draft set of notes Leibniz took down during conversation-dictation with van 1Ielmont; 
and that the former is the MS version which Leibniz later produced from this draft, 
quite probably utilizing also his own notes made on van Helmont's other books. 70 
This conclusion that Thoughts on Genesis originated in a conversation-dictation 
with van Flelmont is corroborated in Leibniz's own words at the beginning of the MS 
version of the preface, where Leibniz writes: "You possess... the discourses desired 
for so long, which our friend F. M. v. H. made by mouth on the first four chapters of 
Genesis. " 
The final piece of evidence that it was Leibniz who wrote Thoughts is contained on 
the page at the beginning of the dossier at the archive, on which Leibniz has written "1 
wanted to express the opinion of my friend... ". 
71 
`'" OK, ii, 1084-87; L Br, 389, fols 81-85. 
" See OH, I, 33-34. 
7(' The whole of the draft version has now been transcribed and published by Orio de Miguel, OH, I, 
82-137. He has also included some facsimiles of the folios. 
71 Gr, I, 98. 
The draft which Leibniz took down in conversation-dictation with van Helmont 
must have been produced when the two were together, and this could only have been 
in the year 1696, when van Helmont was resident in Hannover as the guest of 
Princess Sophie, either during his first visit of that year, a fortnight in March, or 
during the second visit, from early June until his departure on 13 September. 72 
However, in a letter to Hermann von der Hardt, of mid-June, Leibniz, in discussing 
van Helmont, writes: 
And since he does not have sufficient patience and practise to write, I wish 
that some young erudite person would help to write down in some way certain 
of his meditations on the passages of Scripture, and principally the 
commentaries on Genesis. 
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This implies that at this time, mid-June, Leibniz had not yet taken it upon himself to 
do the task. Therefore, the earlier March visit by van Helmont seems not to have been 
the occasion when the draft of Thoughts was made, but rather the second visit. 
Indeed, Leibniz's diary entries for the 10 and 16 August refer to conversations on the 
interpretation of Scripture between the two men: 
10 August. I have speculated with Mr Helmont. His explanations of Holy 
Scripture are frequently admirable; amongst them appear some good ideas 
with which I am in agreement. About these, we have talked almost the whole 
afternoon. On "metempsychosis" I did not get to hear a sufficient proof. 
16 August. I have been in the study of the Duchess. I conversed for some 
hours with Mr Helmont about his ideas, where I met not a few good ones, 
with which I am in agreement; many other ideas seem dubious to me; above 
all some interpretations of Holy Scripture do not please me. His intention and 
sentiments I find good and praiseworthy; also his serenity must be highly 
praised. 74 
'' Leibniz announces the arrival of van Helmont for this second visit in a letter to Johan Chuno of 
2 June 1696: see OK, ii, 898. In his diary entry of 13 September, he notes van Helmont's departure, 
Pe, p. 213. 
71 A, I. xii, 636. 
74 Pe, p. 198. 
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In the entry covering the days from I to 7 September, after a remark about their 
conversations. Leibniz writes that "I have written with him [van Helmont] sonne 
pages" 75 
With the draft version written down by the time of van Helmont's departure on 13 
September, Leibniz had until the following Spring to produce his MS version for 
publication, since in the letter from van Helmont to Leibniz of 1/11 March 1697, 
already referred to, van Helmont asks Leibniz to translate the preface for Thoughts, 
and that he does so within three weeks as he, van Helmont, is intending to go to 
Amsterdam to see the publisher. 
Van Helmont had said of the assistant (George Keith) who had helped him produce 
the Two Hundred Queries, that following his dictation, Keith "afterwards (retaining 
the Sence) put it in another Method, he also adding to it several things of his own". "' 
Buchius writes a similar thing in the preface to the Divine Being concerning the way 
he produced that book from his conversation-dictation with van Helmont. Leibniz 
seems to have been familiar with the parameters acceptable to van Helmont within 
which a co-writer could express van Helmont's utterances. In his letter to von der 
Hardt, in which Leibniz hopes that someone could be found to arrange van Helmont's 
ideas on Genesis, he goes on to say that 
it is not necessary that he who offers to do it, follows the opinions of the man; 
it is enou h that he does not contradict him and expresses the affirmations of 
the man. 
Leibniz himself, when he came to produce the MS version of Thouglht , states that he 
worked according to this licence. Leibniz takes van Helmont's opinions that he 
's Ibid., p. 209. 
"' Puradoxa! Discourses, part 2, p. 159. 
77 A, 1, xi i, 636. 
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recorded in the draft set of notes and expresses them such that they might be more 
acceptable (either to himself or to those readers Leibniz envisages for the hook). As 
he notes on the page at the start of the Thoughts dossier: "Although I wanted to 
express the opinions of my friend, nevertheless I have often taken good care that they 
might admit a tolerable sense. " He goes on in the next sentence to say: "Also I added 
many of my own thoughts <which differ from some> do not differ from some 
opinions of my friend", (where the phrase in brackets was crossed out by Leibniz). '" 
I think it is a moot point whether we should take Leibniz's alteration of this sentence 
at face value or not. If "differ" is taken to mean only difference of expression, such 
that Leibniz's additions do not contradict van Helmont's ideas, then Leibniz might 
have corrected his sentence in the way he has. On the other hand, if "differ" is taken 
to mean difference of idea, such that Leibniz was misrepresenting van Helmont, then 
he might still have altered the sentence, this time in order not to admit what he has 
done. Leibniz does not explicitly state in the MS where he has modified the draft. In 
order to isolate instances where Leibniz has added to the text, or modified van 
Helmont's expressions, it has been necessary to compare carefully the draft and MS 
versions. "I have found no instances where Leibniz has modified van f-lelmont's 
words, or added passages of his own, such that a meaning is given which is contrary 
to what van Helmont believed: a result based both on the thoughts expressed in the 
draft and one's own knowledge of the Helmontian doctrine. Where Leibniz has 
modified van Helmont's expressions by introducing nomenclature or turns of phrases 
characteristic of his own writings; or, especially, where he has added passages whose 
meaning concurs with his own philosophy, then Leibniz can be considered to be 
'R OH, 1,38; LH I. V, 2g, fol. 33. Grua did not include the phrase in brackets which Leibniz had 
crossed out, and he omitted the negation of the final phrase. See Gr, i, 98. 
79 Orio de Miguel notes some important additions made, OH, I. 75-77; and in his transcription of the 
draft, he includes many footnotes where the MS or published versions deviate, OH, 1,82-137. 
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speaking propria voce. These instances will be drawn on in Part 2 where they will be 
used to corroborate specific occasions of convergence in the cosmologies of Leibniz 
and van Helmont, and to draw parallels with the Helmontian symbology. 
Finally, it should be noted that Leibniz sought to conceal his involvement in the 
writing of Thoughts. The year after it was published, Leibniz mentions the book in a 
letter to Andre Morell of 29 September 1698. He implies that he has had nothing 
whatsoever to do with it, other than receiving a copy, and he mentions something 
spurious about its publication, and more generally distances himself from the book: 
He (Helmont) has given me a copy of his book on the beginning of Genesis... 
I remember that he told me that M. Wetstein in Amsterdam printed it in Latin 
from an English version. 80 
Later, in March 1701, Leibniz writes to Daniel Jablonski that 
When he [van Helmont] prepared his Thoughts on the first four chapters of 
Genesis, recently published, while staying here with us, I provided him with 
books and advised him. 81 
But we know that Leibniz did much more than that. 
Gr. I. 140. Leibniz also refers to the work as van Helmont's (alone) in a review written in 170 I, 
Coudert, Leibniz and the Kabhulah, p. 116. 
81 Sandungeiniger Vertrauten Briefe Jablonski an Leibniz, ed. by J. Kappens (Leipzig, 1754), pp. 259- 
60. 
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2.4 Leibniz and Elucidarius C: abalisticus 
There is one further text on kabbalistic cosmology which was read by Leibniz and to 
which he made extensive critical remarks. This was Eluciduriu. s cabali. si c"us" by I. G. 
Wachter. 
Wachter was a philosopher and theologian, versed in the Kabbalah. In 1699 he had 
published a book entitled Der spinozismus im Judenthumb, oder die von dem heuriger 
Judenthumh und dessen geheimen kabbala vergollerle Walt. This translates as 
"Spinozism in Judaism, or contemporary Judaism, or the pantheistic world of 
contemporary Jews and their secret Kabbalah". In this book Wachter attacks Spinoza 
and Kabbalah for their pantheism, as he saw it. Elucidarius" cabalistic-us sea de 
Recondilu Hebraeorum philosophic of 1706 represents a U-turn in this opinion, for, 
as Leibniz himself notes. 
It then appeared to him [Wachter] that he understood the matter better. Now. 
therefore, he defends the Cabbala of the Hebrews and Spinoza; and shows that 
they distinguish God and the world 82 
The book was also intended to be an explication of kabbalistic doctrine, and to show 
how Spinoza's philosophy was indebted to it. 
Elucidurius cuhulisticus contains a preface and five chapters, covering the origin of 
Kabbalah. its propagation, its doctrine, its supposed agreement with Spinoza and 
"' B, pp. 1-2. Leibniz's remarks on Elucidarius cubalislicus were first published in Re/luarion 
inedite de Spinoza par Leibniz, ed. by A. Foucher de Cared (Paris: Librarie philosophique de 
Ladrange, 1854) and which appeared in English in A Re/urution Recent/j, Disco» e red u/: Spino=u htLeihnil., 
trans. by Octavius Freire Owen (Edinburgh: Thomas Constable and Co., 1855. This is 
reproduced in Spinoza: Eighteenth and Nineteenth Century Discussions, ed. by Wayne Boucher, 6 
vols (Bristol: Thoemmes Press, 1999), 1,93-101. At 1,97, however, a fragment is missing, and the 
reader must consult Wn, pp. 489-490. 
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what "should be understood" about it. In the preface, in which Wachter sets out his 
aims, he states that Spinoza follows the "ancient philosophy of the Jews", and 
mentions how he had met Moses Germanus, the Augustine monk who had assisted in 
the production of the Kabbala Denudala. 
Leibniz read the book sometime after 1706.83 As is evident from Leibniz's 
remarks, he read the work right through, making notes on Wachter's claims, on the 
exposition of Kabbalah offered, and on the propositions quoted from Spinoza. Critical 
remarks are mostly reserved for points advanced by Wachter and for the doctrine of 
Spinoza. It is not clear from what Leibniz has written, what are his own remarks and 
what are merely notes on what he has read. However, by carefully examining his 
remarks and comparing them with Wachter's text, I have been able to distinguish 
Leibniz from Wachter. 
Summury 
All the texts which Leibniz read, along with his involvement in Thoughts on Genesis, 
and his numerous discussions with van Helmont and von Rosenroth, would have 
provided him with a sufficient understanding of the cosmology of Christian Lurianic 
Kabbalah. The similarities and differences that will be drawn out in Part 2 between 
the doctrines of Leibniz and the kabbalists will be corroborated by referring to 
Leibniz's own critical remarks (especially those he wrote on the Seder Olam and 
Elucidarius C'ubhulislicus) and to the modifications he made to the draft of Thoughts 
on Genesis. 
s3 g, p. l. 
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This chapter has shown that not only was Leibniz familiar with the writings of 
Christian Lurianic Kabbalah, but that he had had long-standing acquaintanceships 
with its two chief exponents, and, further, that he had collaborated with van I lelmont 
on his last work, Thoughts on Genesis. I have already mentioned in the Introduction, 
anticipating the work of part 2, that the similarities of the cosmological doctrines of 
Leibniz and the kabbalists should not be taken as evidence of (conceptual) influence 
by the latter on the former, since the Leibnizian principles can be discerned in his 
philosophy long before he had had significant knowledge of their ideas. This being 
the case, Leibniz's undoubted interest and involvement in Christian Lurianic 
Kabbalah still stands in need of an explanation. I have proposed that this interest of 
Leibniz in mystical writings should be understood in terms of his over-riding 
programme for using philosophy as a means to effecting social peace by harmonizing 
the religions. Whilst it is clearly beyond the scope of this thesis to treat this aspect at 
length, it is appropriate to deal with it insofar as it pertains to Christian Lurianic 
Kabbalah, in particular, insofar as a similar programme had motivated the kabbalists 
themselves. The religious harmonizing of Christian Lurianic Kabbalah, and Leibniz's 
reaction to it, is, therefore, the subject of the next chapter. 
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Chapter 3 Leibniz and the Religious Harmonizing of Christian Lurianic Kabbalah 
It was in 1649 that Prince Christian August took over the rulership of Sulzbach. Soon 
after he was joined by van Helmont, who was to act as his adviser. ' Both men were 
strongly motivated towards the "public good": to enact policies designed to bring 
about lasting peace. Following the recent horrors of the Thirty Years War, the result 
of religious differences, the drive to establish peace accordingly sought to effect itself 
precisely by overcoming these differences. Under the influence of van Helmont, 
Christian August's policies were determined to a great extent by theological 
principles. The way forward was to show that the religions were only superficially 
different: that fundamentally they were united. If this could be done, it would not 
matter if people belonged to different sects, for they would all share the same basic 
set of beliefs. At the least, they would have no need to fight each other. 
Practical religious harmonizing began in the officially Lutheran court of Christian 
August with the inclusion of Catholics, members of the various Protestant sects, Jew, 
and even kabbalists, mystics and theosophists. It seems that it was van Helmont 
himself who recruited these people from among the various circles he moved in. Von 
Rosenroth was one such recruit, having intially met van Helmont through Mennonite 
and Quaker groups. 
2 
But the religious differences that the court at Sulzbach was striving to overcome, 
soon became an obstacle in themselves in the form of Philip Wilhelm (whose higher 
rule included that of his cousin's, Christian August) and of the Catholic church itself. 
Both were alarmed at the "heretical" and "judaizing" developments taking place in 
1 For a fuller discussion of developments at Sulzbach, see Allison Coudert "The Kabbala Denudata: 
Converting Jews or Seducing Christians? ", in Christian-Jews and Jewish-Christians, ed. R. H. Popkin 
and G. M. Weiner (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1994). 
2 Allison Coudert, The Impact of the Kahhalah, p. 100. 
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Sulzbach. Philip Wilhelm, (correctly) attributing the bad influence to van Helmont, 
worked hard, and finally succeeded, in getting him made a prisoner of the Inquisition 
in 1662.3 Van Helmont was detained in Rome for a year before being released, 
whereon he resumed his activities unabated. 
it was as a prisoner in Rome that van Helmont wrote his first book, the Alphuheii 
vere na! uralis. which utilizes one of the modes by which it was hoped that religious 
differences might be overcome. 
Another way of doing this found its literary apotheosis in the Kabbala Dewudula. 
This was driven for the most part by the zeal of von Rosenroth, who worked on it 
throughout the 1670s and early 1680s. It was during this time that van Helmont was 
at Ragley Hall, where he, as well as Henry More and Anne Conway, collaborated at a 
distance with von Rosenroth on the Kabbala Denudala. 
Although Henry More wrote a number of essays critical of aspects of Kabbalah, 
and which were included in the Kabbala Denudata, he did share some of the hopes of 
van Helmont and von Rosenroth that Kabbalah could be an instrument for bringing 
about religious harmony. He believed that it could be used for converting Jews. 
Indeed, in his own Conjectura Cabbalistica, he thought he had discovered through 
the kabbalistic interpretation of Genesis, proof of the validity of the Christian Trinity. 
In addition, both van Helmont and Conway produced their own publications whose 
methods represented a third way for effecting religious harmony and which was 
distinct from those of the Kabbala Denudata and van Helmont's early Alpha heil. 
I noted in the Introduction that Leibniz was motivated to work on metaphysics by 
his own desire to try to effect social peace by means of harmonizing the religions. 
This same motivation in Christian Lurianic Kabbalah explains one of the attractions it 
Allison Coudert, "The Kabbala Denudaja", p. 77. 
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had for him. Within each of these three ways for effecting religious harmony it will 
be useful to identify i) what was supposed to be the source of truth and 
"epistemological" basis from which "aberrant" and schismatic interpretations could he 
corrected; ii) the method for effecting this correction in a persuasive ecumenical way; 
iii) exemplary texts; and iv) how each relates to Leibniz's own efforts. 
3.1 Natural Language Recovery 
In his first book, the Alphabeti vere naturalis, van Helmont concluded that there had 
once existed an original Hebrew language, by means of which God had originally 
communicated to man. 4 This original language had altered and the modern Hebrew, 
Greek and Latin versions of Scripture contained corruptions of the original meaning. 
These corruptions were the cause of arguments over what the divine message really 
was, which in its turn, had led not only to the three separate religions of Judaism, 
Christianity and Islam, but also to the schisms within each, most notably that of 
Catholicism and Protestantism. If there had been an original language of Scripture 
then religious differences would be surmounted by recovering that original language 
along with its singular and incontrovertible meanings. 
In the Alphabeli, van Helmont presents his theory and method for recovering the 
original Hebrew. It was his belief that the Hebrew language should be pronounced by 
matching the shape of the tongue with that of the letter in its utterance. The Alphuheti 
contains detailed cross-section diagrams of the speaking parts. The sound which 
' The Alphabeii is discussed in Allison Coudert, "Some Theories of a Natural Language", pp. 56-91; 
and in her Impact off [he Kahbalah, pp. 58-75. 
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emerges is used to determine the true meaning of each letter. Van Helmont "recovers" 
the original meanings of all the Hebrew letters in this way. 
Leibniz read the Alphabeti in the same year that it was published, 1667. And he 
surely believed, as do most Christians, that God had directly communicated to some 
of his creatures, for example, Adam and Moses: that the original meanings of 
Scripture had been communicated by a language common both to God and to the men 
to whom they were revealed. This implies tha± man (or some elect few) had once 
possessed this divine or "Adamic" language. If this language could be recovered, then 
not only would the true meaning of the revelation be established, which would solve 
the vicious disputes that had arisen from the various interpretations, but, since the 
divine language is at the same time a perfectly rational one, that once and for all 
established meaning would have to be accepted by all peoples on account of its 
logical rigour: 
Where this language can once be introduced by missionaries, the true religion, 
which is in complete agreement with reason, will be established, and apostasy 
will no more be feared in the future than would an apostasy of men from 
arithmetic or geometry which they have once learned. 5 
But it was not the case that this original language was just a medium by which man 
had received the divine words: rather, it was the language of nature, that is, its words 
express the essences of things, and was the actual language used by God himself. ]'he 
notion of a natural and divine language was mooted by Plato in the ('rutylus, though 
he doubted whether such a thing could ever be constructed by human beings. 
However, neo-Platonists, such as Plotinus and lamblichus did affirm its existence, as 
5 Circa 1679, in L, p. 225. 
122 
did Origen and Philo. It was again revived during the Renaissance, when the magical 
aspects were stressed and combined with kabbalistic ideas, by, for example, Ficino, 
Pico, Reuchlin and Agrippa. 6 
This means, and it is implicit in the Alphabeti, that, since the words of things in a 
true, real and natural language are identical to the essential attributes of things, when 
God utilized his language and spoke, what came forth were not merely sounds 
(sounds representing things) but things themselves: that is, when God speaks he 
creates. 
This natural language theory has the same basis in Platonic epistemology as does 
Leibniz's theory of the universal science. 7I will discuss this in Chapter 4. The above 
circa 1679 quotation from Leibniz, that a natural language would serve the 
programme of religious harmonizing, clearly belongs to the period when Leibniz still 
thought that a universal science was possible. But when this project was abandoned in 
the early 1680s, its underlying cosmological beliefs that the world was rationally 
ordered by God and created by a natural language process, were not abandoned. Like 
cosmology in general, the natural language theory passed into the realm of the 
transcendental: Leibniz continued to assert its existence, yet at the same time deny its 
attainability by the finite mind. The implication is that an Adamic language which is 
unattainable in principle, is not one which can be recovered in the way that van 
Helmont had hoped for, and so could not serve as the epistemological basis from 
which schismatic interpretations of Scripture could be resolved. It seems clear, 
therefore, that while the notion of an Adamic language is an important aspect of 
See Frances Yates, Giordano Bruno and the Hermetic Tradition, chapter I; and Coudert, "Some 
Theories of a Natural Language", pp. 74-91. 
The emergence of universal sciences or general characteristics out of earlier occult systems is 
discussed by Paolo Rossi, CYavis Universalis (Milan, 1960) and Frances Yates, The Art of Memory 
(London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1966). 
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Leibniz's epistemological, cosmological and theological ideas, it has no role to play in 
Leibniz's programme of religious harmonizing after the early 1680s. 
3.2 Prisca Theologia 
For centuries, Jewish kabbalists had held the belief that the Zohar, the central work of 
Kabbalah, was a Prisca Theologia text: that is, like the Hermetica, was thought to 
contain wisdom which had been imparted to Moses on Mount Sinai. and which was 
not written down in the Bible, but was, rather, transmitted down through the ages by 
word of mouth, before being written down as a Prisca text. "Kabbalah" is itself the 
Hebrew word for "tradition". The Christian cabbalists of the Renaissance, for 
example, Pico della Mirandola, Guillaume Postel, Giordano Bruno and Tommasso 
Campanella, had used Kabbalah as "proof" that the original word of God was in fact 
that of the Christian doctrine, since it proved not only that Jesus was the Messiah, but 
also the validity of the Trinity of God as both one and many. Von Rosenroth and van 
Helmont both subscribed to this belief. 
It was by the direct juxtapositioning of the New Testament with kabbalistic texts, 
and by expositions of their conceptual similarities, that the truth of Christianity would 
be made plain. This particular mode of ecumenicalism was most fervently developed 
by von Rosenroth in his Kabbala Denudala: indeed, it was his life's work. In this 
book von Rosenroth makes it clear that he regards the Zohar as a Prisca Theologin 
text: 
It... occurred to me that I should hunt out that same ancient philosophy which 
flourished at the time of Christ and the Apostles and which appears to have 
flowed from the stream of the sacred oracles. As I was about to examine those 
ancient opinions about God and other spiritual and theological matters, I fell 
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upon this most st ancient book of the Jews, which is called the Sohar, or Book of 
Splendour. 
The book contains three texts from the Zohar, the Sifru de Zeni'ula, the Idra Kuhhis 
and the Idra Zuta. They form the "epistemological" basis for the entire project, on 
account of their supposed Prisca Theologia origins. 
In the preface to the second tome von Rosenroth explains that it is by a comparison 
of the concepts and terms in the Zohur with those in the New Testament that the 
essential similarity of the two teachings can be shown: 
I persevered with one aim alone, that I might be of service to you, so that the 
knowledge of Hebrew matters should no longer be concerned with mere ritual, 
still less with grammar, but should reach to the things themselves which 
should then be compared with the phrases and doctrines of the new covenant 
to see if by chance by this means it would be possible to facilitate the 
conversion of the Jewish race to the faith of Jesus Christ. 9 
In the next item, the Mareh Kohen, a synopsis of the Zohar, von Rosenroth inserted 
copiously throughout the text parallels to the New Testament. 
The Kabbala Denudata also contains contributions from other authors who set 
about drawing comparisons between Kabbalah and Christianity. One such item by 
Henry More explores the similarities between Kabbalah, specifically the doctrine of 
the . sefrot, and 
Scripture, as well as Platonism. 10 In particular, the Adumhruiia 
Kabhalae Christiane is an extensive paralleling of Kabbalah, particularly in its 
Lurianic form, with the New Testament. Throughout this work the Adam Kadmon of 
the kabbalists is specifically identified with Christ; and chapter 3 sets out in great 
detail no less than twenty four aspects of Adam Kadmon which it directly relates to 
Coudert, The Impact of the Kabbalah, p. 114; Kabbala Denudaia, 1,2,3-4. See also, for example, 
Kabbala Denudata 1,1,1-30 passim; 1,2,43-44. 
Coudert, The Impact of the Kabbalah, p. 107; Kabbala Denudata, 2,1,18-19. 
ý0 1,2,14-27. 
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Christ. The subtitle of the work makes explicit its ecumenicalist aims: Short 
Application of the Cabbalislic Doctrine of the Hebrews to the teaching of the New 
Testament;. fbr advancing the aim of the conversion of the Jews. 11 
Von Rosenroth had underwritten his entire project with the belief that the Zohar 
was a Prisca Theologia text, which would serve as the (ultimately divine) authority 
for his "transcendental, metaphysical and theological" system. Initially, following his 
meeting with von Rosenroth at Sulzbach in 1688, Leibniz was enthused by what the 
project might achieve: 
[Von Rosenroth] has established many Christian truths. For it appears that the 
traditions of the ancients give proof of the existence of Christ... They observe 
magnificent things about the Messiah as being beyond the measure of a 
human being. 2 
But although Leibniz appeared to believe in a weak Prisca (his undoubting 
acceptance of Plato and Aristotle), he eventually expressed doubts concerning the 
alleged antiquity of Kabbalah. In a letter to Bourguet in 1707, he praises von 
Rosenroth's work, but implies a certain scepticism of his own regarding its supposed 
origins: 
To him [von Rosenroth] the cabala of the Hebrews seemed a type of a certain 
more sublime metaphysics, and what he breathes into that subject should not 
be scorned. And although the doctrine had perhaps not entered at the dawn n/' 
the Hebrews, nonetheless I applaud his extensive and full interpretation. 1; 
The original Latin is: Brevis Applicatio Doctrine Hehraeorum Cabbalisticae ad Dogmata Novi 
Foederis; pro Formunda Hypothesi, ad Conversionem Judueorum Projicua. 
12 To Gerhardt Molanus, 1688, in Coudert, Leibniz and the Kabhalah, p. 48; A, I, V, 109. See also 
letter to Hessen-Rheinfels, 20 January 1688, in ibid., p. 47; A, I, V, 43: "[Von Rosenroth] has found 
some excellent things concerning the Messiah which the modern Jews do not know about or try to 
suppress or turn away from their meaning... Many still make fun of such undertakings, but I think 
otherwise. " 
" 15 December 1707, in G, iii, 546. My italics. 
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However, when Leibniz is not acclaiming von Rosenroth, he is more forthright about 
his doubts concerning Kabbalah as a source of truth: 
The opinions and expressions of these ancient Hebrew Cabalists cannot be 
taken as solid proof, although some people do imagine that they represent the 
traditions of Moses and the ancient sages since in effect cabala signifies 
tradition. 14 
3.3 Rationalizing the Exoteric 
Rather than relying on revealed truth, either as having been illuminated by newly 
discovered Prisca texts, or as having been corrected by language recovery techniques, 
a third strain to effect harmony between religious differences was founded on truth by 
reason. Rational philosophy could be used, not to replace truth by revelation, but to 
bridge the destructive chasms that had opened up between the various interpretations 
of that revelation. This strain of religious harmonizing involves a philosophical 
doctrine, conceived as epistemological basis, and whose concepts must be shown to 
agree with those fundamentally present in religious writings. Any such individual 
treatise may seek to underwrite a plurality of writings from different religions or just 
concentrate on grounding one particular religion. Sometimes the rational doctrine is 
dominant in the presentation, with similarities to the religious doctrine being made 
secondary: this is the case with Anne Conway's Principles. Other treatises, such as 
van Helmont's Thoughts on Genesis and A Paraphruslical Exposition start with the 
14 Coudert, Leibniz and the Kabbalah, p. 59; FoL, p. 47. 
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religious doctrine, here the Book of Genesis, and draw comparisons with an 
underlying philosophy. Either way, the methodology of religious harmonizing rests 
on the distinction between what I have termed the esoteric mode (rational 
philosophical) and the exoteric mode (revelation religion). 
The Principles of the Most Ancient and Modern Philosophy is predominantly given 
over to an exposition of Anne Conway's Platonic vitalist philosophy. The overall 
aims of religious harmonizing in this work are made plain in the pre-amble to the first 
chapter, where Conway states how her metaphysical exposition of the nature of God 
and his attributes will 
Show how the Trinity could be conceived in God according to Scripture so 
that Jews, Turks, or other peoples would not be offended, if these words, 
"three distinct persons", which are not in Scripture and have no reasonable 
sense, are omitted. 15 
The editor, either van Helmont or von Rosenroth, has supplied references in 
Conway's text i) to the Adumbralio Kabbalae Christiunae, which effectively relates 
her philosophy to the syncretism of Christianity and Kabbalah; and ii) to the Porta 
C'oelorum and the Druschim, also in the Kabbala Denudala, which relates her 
doctrine specifically to Lurianic Kabbalah. 
The Principles discusses the nature of God and his role in creation, and deals with 
the concept of time, the freedom of God's will, and the necessity of a creative ens 
medium, which she argues does not imply pantheism. She writes that the nature of the 
relationship of spirit and body is not that of the doctrine of Descartes (nor that of 
15 Principles, p. 9. See Coudert's introduction, pp. xvii-xviii: "The entire point of Lady Conway's 
critique of Descartes, and indeed of any philosophy she deemed materialistic, was to provide a 
secure foundation for an ecumenical religion uniting Christian, Jew, Moslem, and pagan in loving 
worship of a merciful and benevolent God. Her treatise provides an excellent example of how 
difficult it was to build the foundation for such a universal and tolerant religion on Christian 
foundations. " 
128 
Henry More) but rather that spirit and body exist on a single spirit continuum. There 
is a section at the end of the first chapter, entitled "Annotations", in which her 
philosophical account is compared to Lurianic creation theory, including the Christian 
kabbalistic equation of Adam Kadmon with Christ. References to New and Old 
Testaments are given throughout. 
Of particular interest is Conway's argument for the existence of an ens medium 
between God and his creatures. 16 Conway argues that this ens medium is Christ; is to 
be equated to Adam Kadmon of the kabbalists; and is a key concept in the programme 
of religious harmonizing: 
In addition to the two extremes there is also a certain mediator which partakes 
of both, and this is Jesus Christ, whom the wiser among the Jews recognize, 
no less than some among the so-called Gentiles, maintaining that there is such 
a mediator, which they call by different names such as Logos, Son of God, 
first-born Son of God, Wisdom, the Celestial Adam, etc. And, thus, they also 
call him the eternal mediator. 
If these matters are correctly considered, they will contribute greatly to the 
propagation of the true faith and Christian religion among Jews and Turks and 
other infidel nations; if, namely, it is agreed that there are equally strong 
reasons by which we can prove that there is a mediator between God and 
human beings, indeed, between God and all creatures, as there are for proving 
that there is a God and creation. Therefore, those who acknowledge such a 
mediator and believe in him can be said truly to believe in Jesus Christ, even 
though they do not yet know it and are not convinced that he has already come 
in the flesh. But if they first grant that there is a mediator, they will 
indubitably come to acknowledge also, even if they are unwilling, that Christ 
is that mediator. 17 
The evidence strongly suggests that Leibniz had read Conway's work by Spring 1697; 
but he has left no comments regarding the references in her text that make parallels 
with the theologies of Kabbalah and Christianity. 
This will be an especially important issue in my comparison of Leibniz's cosmology with that of 
Christian Lurianic Kabbalah. 
17 Principles, pp. 31-32. 
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In van Helmont's draft of Thoughts on Genesis we find a philosophical doctrine 
that is a distillation of all his previous works, and which may be described as 
Hermetico-alchemico-kabbalistico-theosophical. The structure of Thoughts is simple. 
Working through the verses of the first four chapters of Genesis, van Belmont 
unfolds an interpretation according to his doctrine, which is presented, 1'or the most 
part, as an (esoteric) commentary inserted between the biblical words or sentences. At 
times, the meanings of individual letters are derived by the same technique of 
linguistic analysis pioneered in the Alphubeti. A much briefer biblical exposition had 
been done in van Helmont's A Paruphrustical Exposilion of 1682. This, however, 
covered only the first chapter and the beginning of the second, and was done without 
any linguistic analysis. 
By carrying out the editing and modifying of van Helmont's draft for Thoughts on 
Genesis, as well as adding ideas from his own philosophy, Leibniz was himself 
engaged in this third strain of religious harmonizing. Moreover, as I have already 
proposed, the grounding of theological writings in philosophical doctrine is precisely 
that mode of religious harmonizing which Leibniz pursued himself. In a highly 
significant passage which Leibniz added himself to van Helmont's draft, but later 
omitted from the version to be published, he makes it abundantly clear that he regards 
the account in Genesis as a merely exoteric one. 18 This is because "in such a work 
[Genesis] there is nothing of reason or wisdom that can be understood". To interpret 
Genesis literally would be childish: 
[Moses's] interpreters, having been submerged in crass images, understood 
nothing more of the sublime than boys who contemplate a coloured picture of 
creation and paradise, where various animals run across the plains; and a man 
Orio de Miguel notes that, unlike the rest of the draft which was taken down hurriedly "by mouth" 
from van Helmont, the handwriting of this passage is carefully written and has not been corrected. It 
also appears on its own leaf separate from the rest of the draft. OH, I, 82. 
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is in a certain well-watered garden with his wife standing under a fruitful 
tree.. . Nor 
do they think better, who understand the six days as restricted to 
twenty four hour [periods]. 
Therefore: 
When Moses, at the start of his work, relates the genesis or origin of things, 
one or the other is necessary: either it says false and empty things, or it 
contains great mysteries. 
The "mysteries" are the truths enshrined in an esoteric philosophy in which there is 
something "of reason and wisdom that can be understood", and which lies under the 
exoteric words of Scripture. Hence, Leibniz finishes the passage with the words: "For 
long, therefore, wise men decided to hide many other things under this covering of 
words. " 19 
George MacDonald Ross has noted that Leibniz's involvement in Thoughis on 
Genesis indicates the extent to which he was prepared to treat Scripture as mere 
metaphor: 
It is hard to credit that Leibniz would have had anything to do with such an 
enterprise, however anonymously, unless he believed that it was legitimate to 
treat the creation story as myth --that is, as literally being false, but conveying 
a deeper truth to the initiated. 20 
19 The passage in its entirety reads thus: "When Moses, at the start of his work, relates the genesis or 
origin of things, one or the other is necessary: either it says false and empty things, or it contains 
great mysteries. However, many of his interpreters, having been submerged in crass images, 
understood nothing more of the sublime than boys who contemplate a coloured picture of creation 
and paradise, where various animals run across the plains; and a man is in a certain well-watered 
garden with his wife standing under a fruitful tree, of which a serpent occasionally encircles its trunk 
and harangues the wife. Nor do they think better, who understand the six days as restricted to twenty 
four hour [periods], and suppose the first to be light, the second earth, the third plants, the fourth sun 
and moon, the fifth aquatic things, the sixth terrestrial animals with the emerging of man, not 
observing that in such a work there is nothing of reason or wisdom that can be understood. For long, 
therefore, wise men decided to hide many other things under this covering of words. " OH, 1,82: LH, 
I, V, 2g, fol. 34. 
20 "Leibniz and the Origin of Things", in M. Dascal and E. Yakira (eds. ), Leibniz und Adam (Tel Aviv: 
University Publishing Projects Ltd., 1993) pp. 241-257 (p. 242). 
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Summary 
In this chapter attention has been paid to the programme of religious harmonizing that 
drove the Christian Lurianic kabbalists, a programme that was also shared by Leibniz. 
Two of the methods for effecting this that can be discerned amongst their writings, 
that of natural language recovery and Prisca Theologie, were rejected by Leibniz. 
However, the third method of grounding exoteric texts such as Scripture or Kabbalah 
in a common philosophical doctrine, was the method employed by Leibniz himself. 
This accounts for his willingness to be involved in Thoughts on Genesis given that, as 
shall become evident in part 2, the content of that work (the ideas of van Helmont) 
was not a source of conceptual inspiration in itself. 
The work of Christian Lurianic Kabbalah to try to connect together two religious 
doctrines, that of Christianity and Jewish Kaboalah, is what initially attracted Leibniz 
to learn more about it. But, precisely because he did not find there any novel ideas of 
a fundamental kind, his interest was rather sustained by a curiosity to see to what 
extent those writings might be founded on his own metaphysical principles. Hence 
Leibniz's general interest in Christian Lurianic Kabbalah, and his particular 
involvement in Thoughts on Genesis, concerned both their programme of religious 
harmonizing and the content of their ideas insofar as they might relate to his own.. 
The extent to which Leibniz's ideas on cosmology are proximate to those of 
Christian Lurianic Kabbalah will be examined in part 2; a process which will, at the 
same time, serve to illuminate aspects of his own cosmology. 
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PART 2 LEIBNIZ'S COSMOLOGY AND ITS PARALLELS WITH MYSTICAL 
KABBALAH 
Chapter 4 The Rational Foundations of Cosmology 
For Leibniz, a proposition is true when it is incontrovertible, or, that what it asserts 
cannot be otherwise. But it is not enough to simply insist that what a proposition 
asserts is necessarily the way it is and could not have been otherwise, as if it were its 
own guarantor of indubitability and therefore of truth: "brute" facts or statements are 
not admissible. Rather, for any proposition, the question "Why? " must be asked of it. 
For whatever answers are proposed for the key cosmological questions (the whats and 
the hows of the nature and origin of the universe) each must be asked the question 
"Why? ". Why is the nature of the universe as it is and not otherwise? Why even does 
it exist at all? Why is there a beginning to it (if it has one)? Why does it change (if it 
does)? And why as it does? When all these questions have been answered, then the 
truths about the ultimate nature of the universe shall have been revealed. For the 
answer to a "why" is a demonstration of the truth of a proposition, it is the guarantee 
that what it asserts is necessarily the way it is, and consequently is incontrovertible: it 
is what Leibniz calls the sufficient reason: "We consider that we can find no true or 
existent fact, no true assertion, without there being a sufficient reason why it is thus 
and not otherwise". 
Having set out the conditions for true propositions, in terms of whys and sufficient 
reasons, it must now be stated in what way these latter serve as demonstrations of 
truth. For Leibniz, a proposition is demonstrated as true when it is shown that it is 
Monadolof y, section 32, in AG, p. 217. See also principles of Nature and Grace, section 7, in AG, 
p. 210: "Nothing takes place without a sufficient reason... Assuming this principle, the first question 
we have the right to ask will be, why is there something rather than nothing?... Furthermore, 
assuming that things must exist, we must be able to give a reason for why Ih4ýy must it to this war, 
and not otherwise. 
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necessarily derived from an idea whose truth is self-evident, what he calls simple 
ideas. The method for establishing necessary connections to these fundamental truths 
is effected by analysing the concepts included in the propositions, in the same way 
that theorems are reduced to definitions and axioms in mathematics. This process, 
referred to at other times by Leibniz as the geometrical method, is the Scholastic 
principle of ` predicalum inest subieclo": that in every true proposition the notion of 
the predicate is included in that of the subject. 
The simple ideas, to which analysis seeks to reduce propositions, are identities, e. g. 
A=A, and they are self evidently true, or without need of further proof, by virtue of 
Leibniz's principle of contradiction, which essentially defines propositions of identity 
as true ones, and propositions of contradiction, e. g. A#A, as false ones. And this 
principle must be accepted, since if contradictory propositions were called true, and 
identical ones false, there would be no convention for the meaning of truth, and so the 
utility of propositions as truth-bearing would be destroyed, allowing anyone to say 
whatever he liked, yet in vain, i. e. without any authority of "truth". If the rational 
approach to the understanding of the world is to be pursued then propositions must be 
supplied with sufficient reasons, or answers as to why they must necessarily be so. In 
the case of simple notions this is provided by the principle of contradiction, which 
simply defines them as true; in the case of complex notions, it is provided by showing 
how they are derived from simples, a derivation consisting of steps, each of which is 
necessarily connected to the prior one, or, each step has the sufficient reason for its 
truth located in the antecedent one. This is effected by the substitution of identical 
terms (Leibniz's Law) until the self-evident simple notions are reached. For example, 
the proposition A=C has the sufficient reason for its truth located in the simple 
definition A=B, B=C, by substituting accordingly. 
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When a truth is necessary, its reason can be found by analysis, resolving it 
into simpler ideas and simpler truths until we reach the primitives... which 
cannot be proved and which need no proof. And these are identical 
propositions, whose opposite contains an explicit contradiction. ` 
The nature of rational understanding as I have so far described it, relates to what 
Leibniz calls propositions of reasoning, that is, abstract entities of a mathematical or 
geometrical kind. Now, cosmology is concerned with facts of existence for an 
understanding of the world; and since Leibniz demands that understanding be 
rational, he is forced to apply the principle of sufficient reason to propositions applied 
to the world. Whereas the sufficient reason for an abstract mathematical proposition 
provides a demonstration of the necessary truth of that proposition. in the case of 
propositions about existent things or states, the sufficient reason provides a 
demonstration of the necessary reality or actuality of the thing proposed, i. e. shows 
indubitably why a thing exists rather than not, and why it exists as it does and not 
otherwise. The provision of such a sufficient reason means in effect that a proposition 
about the world must be reducible, in necessarily connected steps, to those primitive 
entities which stand in need of no further proof. Since these primitives underwrite the 
reality of their derivative complex propositions, what stands in need of no further 
proof with these is their reality. This is an extension of the predicatum inev suhiecto 
principle beyond its traditional restriction to mere abstracts, now applied to the actual 
world. 3 
In 1686 to Antoine Arnauld, Leibniz says: 
2 Monudolokl, sections 33,35, in AG, p. 217. 
A discussion of Leibniz's early search for certainty is to be found in Brown, Leibniz, pp. 54-61. 
See also Rescher, Leibniz:. 4n Introduction to his Philosophy (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1979), 
pp. 21-25. An extended investigation of Leibniz's epistemology is in Hilde Ishiguro, Leihniz , 
Philosophy of Logic and Language (London: Duckworth, 1972). 
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In every true affirmative proposition, whether necessary or contingent, 
universal or particular, the notion of the predicate is in some way included in 
that of the subject. 4 
Now the truths of contingent propositions are delivered by the sufficient reasons as to 
why a thing is as it is, or why it exists at all. These come in two sorts: the efficient 
cause and the final cause. Efficient causes explain why something is as it is in terms 
of the shapes and the motions of the things external to it: they are the order of 
physical causation of mechanical philosophy. Final causes, on the other hand, explain 
in terms of the inclinations and dispositions internal to the thing: they are the order of 
mental causation of animistic philosophy. But when a thing is conceived as a body it 
has not one or a few assignable efficient causes, but is as it is as a result of all the 
knock-on effects it has sustained throughout its history; and as each originating body 
of those myriad efficient causes acted as it did as a result of all the knock-on effects it 
had sustained, it soons becomes clear that reduction of contingent propositions to 
self-evident principles, by efficient causes, cannot be attained due to the vast size of 
the series of causes involved. The same problem pertains when things are conceived 
as minds, for the Leibnizian appetition is as it is not by virtue of one final cause, but 
is the apex, so to speak, of a myriad of petites perception:, each of which has a 
myriad of final causes itself, and so on infinitely. Consequently, final as well as 
efficient causes cannot be used (by finite minds at least) to demonstrate the necessary 
truths of contingent propositions. And if they cannot provide the sufficient reason for 
why a single thing is as it is, how much less so for the universe as the totality of all 
things. 
Leibniz has been termed, along with Descartes and Spinoza, as a rationalist: as one 
who believes that certain knowledge about the world is obtainable through logical 
To Arnauld, 14 July 1686, in L, p. 337. 
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deduction based on indubitable truths of reason. In the late 1670s Leibniz had been 
engaged in such a rationalist enterprise: his project of a universal science, exemplified 
by his essay On the General Characteristic. Leibniz hoped this would establish, by 
the arithmetical method of analytical reduction of concepts, self-evident metaphysical 
principles, such as that for being. 5 But whereas the process of analytic reduction of 
propositions into simples by logically deductive steps could be effected for abstract 
propositions, it became clear in time to Leibniz that this could not be done for 
contingent propositions since there was not just one step to be demonstrated as a 
necessary antecedent reason, but an infinity of them. Though the deductive method 
was sound, any attempt to apply it to the purpose of discovering indubitable primitive 
metaphysical concepts was doomed because such a task would literally be endless. In 
the early 1680s Leibniz abandoned his dream of an attainable rationalism. As 
Nicholas Rescher observes, Leibniz's 
Traditional ranking as a "Rationalist" is highly problematical. In his emphasis 
on the dependence of factual knowledge upon observation, his concerns for 
experimental design, and his views on the nature of hypotheses and the 
principles for their assignment, Leibniz is a rigorous empiricist. 6 
The fact is that Leibniz replaced his belief in an attainable rationalism with the belief 
that the only knowledge of the world attainable by human beings was that which was 
acquired empirically: and which was merely probabilistic. And yet, he did not 
abandon his belief in the principle of sufficient reason that nihil est sine rutione. 
Rather, it was the working out by the human mind of the sufficient reasons for a fact's 
being so and not otherwise that was abandoned: it was the possibility of certain 
5 See Coudert, "Some Theories of a Natural Language", pp. 106-113, and Anna Tymieniecka, Leihei: ' 
('osrno10KicaI Synthesis (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1964), pp. 21-37. 
`' Rescher, p. 130. 
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knowledge of the world by the human mind that was abandoned. From then on. this 
was to be restricted to that mind alone which was capable of'such ratiocination: the 
infinite mind of God. Leibniz subsequently asserts a dual epistemology. On the one 
hand there is the probabilistic knowledge of human epistemology through empirical 
science, and on the other, there is the certain knowledge of divine epistemology 
through rationalism, which, sub specie mentis hominis, is a transcendental 
rationalism. Leibniz does not become a full-blown sceptic in that, as a true disciple of' 
Plato, he asserts that, though true knowledge is not actually attainable by man, it still 
exists -transcendentally, and that he can advance towards it. This serves for Leibniz 
as a "containment of scepticism". The epistemology he settles down to after the 
abandonment of universal science, is that of modern empirical science. 'T'hough a 
proposition can have no demonstrable ultimate truth value, nevertheless human 
theorizing can move towards the true knowledge which is assumed to exist 
transcendentally. This is seen to happen when the power of explanation or 
understanding of an hypothesis increases: what Leibniz calls an increase in 
distinctness. Such progress towards truth bestows "moral certainty", "probability" 
and "justification" on a belief. This type of pursuit of knowledge insists that the 
universe is still, in essence, thoroughly rational; for despite the admission that true 
knowledge can never actually be attained, it refuses to jettison, in principle, the 
notion that sufficient reasons exist in cosmology. And Leibniz is compelled to do this 
as long as he needs to believe that truth exists, even if it does so only as a humanly 
unrealizable goal, for it is presupposed by his notion of progress in understanding, 
and thus his desired containment of full-blown scepticism. That is, though progress 
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towards knowledge can only be carried out in the mode of empirical science, the 
notion of this progress itself presupposes the metaphysical. 7 
Cosmology, insofar as it is concerned with the ultimate nature and origin of the 
world, must, if it is to say anything at all, set forth certain knowledge about, f'or 
example, substance, force, matter, space, time, causality, etc. The evidence suggests 
that the principles of Leibniz's cosmology were in place by the early 1670s. But when 
certain knowledge became restricted to the divine realm after the early 1680s, it took 
cosmology with it. In contradistinction to modern empirical cosmology, the 
cosmology of Leibniz is an exercise in transcendental rationalism. This 
transcendental nature adds further to the esoteric or abstract rational quality of 
Leibniz's cosmology, and suggests a reason as to why explicit accounts of 
cosmological processes and events are few and far between in the corpus. 
After the abandonment of universal science the discussion of things such as 
primitive existents and sufficient reasons for contingent propositions takes place in 
the spectral light of the transcendental, for these are things which are both admitted to 
be unknowable and yet also to be unavoidably pre-supposed, since the notion of 
progress in physics presupposes a truth theory, which in Leibniz is founded on the 
primitive existents, which must be presupposed to exist at the end of the reductive 
analysis of contingent propositions. Accordingly Leibniz describes these primitive 
metaphysical entities in terms of the principle of predicalum inesl suhieclo: in the 
same way that in true abstract propositions, predicates are contained in subjects, 
which are eventually reducible to the single ultimate subject of one identical 
proposition, so in true contingent propositions properties are reducible to a single 
See Brown, Leibniz, pp. 4-5,46. 
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ultimate subject, which is metaphysical substance. As Leibniz explains in the 
Discourse on Metaphysics: 
It is indeed true that when several predicates are attributed to a single subject 
and this subject is attributed to no other, it is called an individual substance... 
All true predication has some basis in the nature of things and that, when a 
proposition is not an identity, that is, when the predicate is not explicitly 
contained in the subject, it must be contained in it virtually. 8 
And in the same way that a primitive concept or axiom in mathematics is said to 
contain all the predicates that can be (logically) deduced from it, so the primitive 
existent or substance in Leibniz's metaphysics is said to contain all the predicates that 
can be deduced from it. In this sense the axiom or substance is referred to as the 
complete concept. 
We can say that the notion of an individual substance or of a complete being 
is to have a notion so complete that it is sufficient to contain and to allow us to 
deduce from it all the predicates of the subject to which this notion is 
attributed. 9 
And so it is seen that Leibniz's theory of substance is consequent on his theory of 
truth, since it is the supposition that there is an underlying truth to the world that 
allows progress towards knowledge (true propositions about the world) to he 
possible, which truth resides in primitive existents, or simple substances. 
The explanation or reason as to why an existent has the attributes it has, is given in 
terms of its complete concept, its substance. But this explanation of things remains a 
partial one, for one might ask, as one must do if the rational process of explanation is 
not to be irrationally truncated, terminating in a brute fact: Why is this particular 
" Section 8, in AG, pp. 40-41. 
Ibid. On Leibniz's use of the messe principle in the Discourse on Metaphysics, see Brown, Leihni:, 
pp. 107-111. 
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complete concept as it is? Why, even, does it exist at all? And for the universe as the 
totality of all complete concepts: Why is this collection as it is (when infinitely other 
arrangements are logically possible)? Why, even, does any complete concept of an 
individual substance exist? Only when there are no further whys to be asked will a 
full cosmology have been demonstrated. Yet, if it is irrational to terminate a series of' 
sufficient reasons in a brute fact, it is no less irrational to allow the series to have no 
beginning or foundation. Leibniz's solution to this paradox is the notion of the 
ultimate sufficient reason. That is, the idea of a sufficient reason which explains every 
why concerning the universe, and which, at the same time, explains itself, or is its 
own sufficient reason. 
When something has its sufficient reason located in another being which is 
logically prior to it, then that is precisely what is meant by being contingent: it is to 
depend on some other thing for its essence and existence. And when a being does nul 
have its sufficient reason located in some other, then that is what is meant by 
necessary being: its existence and essence is independent (of any other being). This is 
the primary distinction between the universe and the ultimate sufficient reason. 
Now, if simple substances, which are the fundamental and irreducible beings of the 
world, still stand in need of sufficient reasons themselves, then the universe of those 
substances and the things they constitute, cannot be that in which the determining 
reasons can be found. In short, 
if the universe is contingent, as it is, then the sufficient 
reason for it must lie in that whose nature is not contingent, that is, in that which is 
necessary; and it is in this sense that the ultimate sufficient reason is transcendent to 
the world. 
And so, the ultimate reason for the reality of both essences and existences lies 
in one thing, which must of necessity be greater than the world, higher than 
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the world, and must have existed before the world did, since through it not 
only existing things, which make up the world, but also possibles have their 
reality. 10 
The transcendency here is not a spatial one in which the ultimate sufficient reason is 
located outside or above the universe; nor is it an ontological one in the sense of' the 
ultimate sufficient reason being substantially other to the universe as some super- 
aetherealized mind. Though what these concepts mean in cosmological terms will he 
examined later, it must be emphasized that the transcendency here is the logical one 
of the distinction between the contingent and the necessary, or between that, the 
proposition of which requires sufficient reasons (the world), and that, the proposition 
of which does not (the ultimate sufficient reason). 
Thus the su4ficienl reason, which needs no other reason, must be outside this 
series of contingent things, and must be found in a substance which is its 
cause, and which is a necessary being, carrying the reason of its existence 
with itself. Otherwise, we would not yet have a sufficient reason where one 
could end the series. And this ultimate reason for things is called God. 
Comparison 
A religious Plalonism is at the bottom of the cosmology of Christian Lurianic 
Kabbalah. I have already mentioned in Chapter 1 that neo-Platonism was the 
intellectual injection into Jewish mysticism that produced the kabbalistic schools of 
the twelfth century. Kabbalah, in its Lurianic form, was the principal source of the 
religious Platonism of Christian Lurianic Kabbalah, though the rational Platonic 
1O On the Ultimate Origination of Things, in AG, p. 152. 
principles of Nature and Grace, section 8, in AG, p. 210. 
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dimension was by now all but obscured. However, a few words concerning the notion 
of truth are to be found, and which clearly show the underlying presence of the 
Platonic system. In Anne Conway's Principles we are told that knowledge depends on 
the existence of real beings, which in its turn, depends on the existence of essential 
immutable natures: 
If the essential nature of individuals could change one into another, it would 
follow that creatures would not have a true being inasmuch as we could not be 
certain of anything nor could we have true knowledge or understanding of 
anything... For all true science or certainty of knowledge depends on the truth 
of objects, which we commonly call objective truths. If these objective truths 
were interchangeable, then the truth of any statement made about the object 
would also change. Therefore no statement could be invariably true. 12 
Since God is the substance on whom all essences ultimately depend, for he is the 
necessary substance, it follows that truth is grounded in him: "If [a being] shares 
nothing of the communicable attributes of God, it will not be true or good and, 
consequently, will be an utter fiction. " 
" And because it is God who is the ultimate 
ground of this rational world-system, the "word of God" flows from him in the same 
way as attributes, true by their rational entailment, flow from him. Thus, in a neo- 
Platonism of this sort, theology (the utterances of God) and philosophy (reason) are 
not antagonistic to each other, but, rather, they coincide, each having the same source. 
In the preface to The Divine Being the author criticizes the differences that some 
people perceive "these days" between theology and philosophy, in particular that they 
"affirm the one to be built upon quite other Grounds than the other". He argues 
instead that "upon my enquiry into the original of both Theology and Philosophy, I 
found them both to flow from one and the same spring, to wit, from the Divine 
12 Principles, p. 29. 
13 Ibid., p. 46. 
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Being": God is "the Author both of his Holy Word and of Reason, and all Natural 
things". 
The notion of God as the self-existing ground of being is a feature of both doctrines 
of Leibniz and Christian Lurianic Kabbalah. Since both are grounded in Platonism it 
is not surprising to see Leibniz approving the preface to The Divine Being, when he 
remarks on the book in a letter to Sophie: "I was delighted to see that the preface took 
up those things that separate theology from philosophy". 14 That Leibniz genuinely 
agreed that theology and philosophy should go hand in hand is confirmed by his 
remarks on Elucidarius cahalisticus: "The more reason agrees with religion, the 
better are all things known... Philosophy and theology are two truths agreeing 
amongst each other. " 
15 Moreover, the intimate connection that is asserted to exist 
between religious matters and reason, in The Divine Being, is cited by Leibniz as 
proof that van Helmont is not a fanatic who would disregard reason when it suits him. 
He says of the discussion that it 
sufficiently justifies Mr. Van Helmont against those who accuse him of 
Enthusiasm because Enthusiasts 
ýhave 
this in common with Libertines, they 
both say things against reason. 
The idea that the predicalum inest subiecto principle could be applied to worldly 
things was the basis for Leibniz's project of a universal science. If propositions about 
the world could be analytically reduced into primitive concepts (which at the same 
time are primitive existents) then it would be possible to compile an encyclopaedia of 
such primitives. By assigning characters to primitives, as well as to the logical 
operations by which they could 
be combined, it would be possible to synthesize 
14 Coudert, Leibniz und the Kubbuluh, p. 56; L Br 389, f. 9ff. 
i5B, p. 14. 
11 Coudert, Leibniz and the Kabhuluh, p. 56; L Br 389, f. 9ff. 
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primitives into complex propositions with mathematical rigour and clarity: "With the 
aid of signs we will easily have the most distinct notions, for we will have at hand a 
mechanical thread of meditation as it were. " 17 An ideal language would represent 
those simple ideas or beings which depend on, or flow from, God. At the same time, 
such a language must also have been the Word of God: the language by which his 
thoughts of the possible creatures and the possible universes might be represented and 
which, in their actualization, would be a language of creation. When Leibniz 
abandoned his universal science project in the early 1680s, the concept of the rational 
order of nature was maintained. The unfolding of complete concepts, the Word of 
God, his natural language, still existed transcendentally: they still "flowed from one 
and the same spring, to wit, from the Divine Being". These Platonic and Christian 
epistemological presuppositions are common both to Leibniz and Christian Lurianic 
Kabbalah, and are the basis for their agreement that philosophy and theology are not 
antithetical to each other but are, rather, associates. However, whereas for Leibniz 
certain knowledge of the actual structure and genesis of the cosmos was not 
accessible to human minds, Christian Lurianic Kabbalah adopted the highly elaborate 
kabbalistic account of cosmology. 
If Leibniz had sought an exoteric garb for his cosmology, to make it accessible to 
the mass of people, it certainly was not going to come from his transcendental 
rationalism. For that he would have to look elsewhere: for an account which utilized 
graspable imagery and which yet, in its fundamental concepts, did not conflict with 
those of the Leibnizian system. 
17 Coudert. "Some Theories of a Natural Language", p. 108; A, 2, I, 413. 
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Chapter 5 The Fundamental Nature of the Cosmos 
5.1 Space, Matter, Time and Motion 
I have argued that in Leibniz's metaphysics his theory of substance follows from his 
rationalism. The subjects of true propositions are formed by a perceiving subject itself 
out of a spatio-temporal nexus of perceptions. What is called a "material object" is 
nothing more than a nexus of "sense"-perceptions. This is why Leibniz can say that 
the objects of dreams do not differ from the objects of wakefulness by an absolute 
reality which pertains only to the latter but not the former, but only differ with respect 
to the degree of the ordering of the constituent perceptions. Though this degree tends 
to be sharply defined in our experience (although we have no way to make a real 
comparison, except by the memory of the prior other state) it is ultimately a question 
of the experienced degree of clarity of the nexus of perceptions which provides the 
seeming reality of an object. The reality of things derived only of the a posteriori 
therefore has no more than moral (probable) certainty for Leibniz: if there is to be an 
absolute reality, it has to be found through the a priori, the abstract. 
This I who thinks and is called mind or soul, is incomparably more certain 
than the existence of sensible things, and thus, that it would not be impossible, 
speaking with metaphysical rigour, that, at bottom, there should only be these 
intelligible substances, and that sensible things should only be appearances. 
However, our lack of attention lets us take sensible things for the only true 
things. It is also worth observing that, if in dreaming I should discover some 
demonstrative truth, mathematical or otherwise (as, in fact, can be done), it 
would be as certain as if I had been awake. This allows us to see the extent to 
which intelligible truth is independent of the truth or the existence of sensible 
and material things outside of us. 
' To Sophie Charlotte. 1702, in AG, p. 189. 
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I have shown that for Leibniz reality is that whose existence cannot be doubted: is 
that subject of a proposition which can be shown that it must be as it is and not 
otherwise by demonstrating that the proposition is reducible to self-evident first 
principles. However, I have also shown that Leibniz came to reject that such ultimate 
analysis was humanly possible, since a finite mind cannot embrace the infinite 
number of eternal truths (true ideas of all particulars, possible and actual) required for 
demonstrating the truth of any one particular actual proposition. It follows too that 
this is also a rejection that the ultimate nature of the world could ever be known by 
human beings. Yet, since Leibniz clings to the principle of sufficient reason and to the 
existence of an ultimate sufficient reason, as the metaphysical foundation of a 
rationally ordered world, or God, of whom all the eternal truths are ideas or 
perceptions in his mind; and since he holds that every true idea in that particular set of 
ideas selected for "actualization" by God's will precisely is an absolutely real existent, 
or substance, Leibniz says that a plurality of substances does exist, as the set of 
necessary true propositions in the omniscient mind, and which constitutes what is 
called the world. Consequently, the "ultimate nature of the cosmos" does not refer to 
a non-existent fantasy but rather to something that is merely unknowable: man cannot 
know it, but God can and does. 
Leibniz defines space as "the order of co-existing phenomena". 2 That is, space is a 
mode of relating perceptions to each other, specifically by predicates of distance 
relation, and which are abstract in nature, being but functions of mind. This explains 
his opposition to the Newtonian concept of space as being not an abstract mental 
entity of relation, but a real thing in itself, an entity existing independently of the 
mental, as a sort of objective vessel, within which minds may or may not come to 
' To des Bosses, 16 June 1712, in L, p. 604. 
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inhabit. This means that for Leibniz space only pertains to the perceptions of'the 
individual mind, the individual substance. Space is the abstract and general matrix by 
which perceptions are arranged into the nexuses which are commonly called objects, 
and which are separated by relational predicates of distance. In the case of the 
substance called God, his perceptions or ideas of the world are not only known by 
him to be true and therefore to exist (to be substances, rather than mere objects of 
moral certainty), but the mutual relations between these ideas, including their spatial 
ones, are known to him with certainty. Therefore, within God's mind, there exists a 
plurality of substances separated by absolute relations of distance, meaning that the 
general matrix of his ideas (space) is objective: or, a world of plural independent 
substances does exist. The mind which knows that its perceptions are necessarily true, 
and knows that the spatial predicates between these perceptions are necessarily true, 
knows that there is a world of plural substances. But such knowledge cannot be 
attained by human beings, for the perceptions of finite minds can only ever be 
ordered into nexuses of things with mere moral certainty. Thus are the limits of the 
human mind. Without the full-demonstration of the certainty of phenomena, neither 
substances, nor their co-existence, can be known to be true; as can neither the 
existence of a real plurality of substances, with real spatial relations between them. In 
short, the existence of the world external to man, is undemonstrable. The spatial 
matrix of perception for man is eternally limited to the private and subjective. 
I consider the explanation of all phenomena solely through the perceptions of 
monads... In this way of explaining things, space is the order of co-existing 




Insofar as, for Leibniz, man cannot prove via a posteriori perception that an objective 
space populated with substances exists, he is in agreement with Berkeley. Berkeley 
concluded from this that other substances, indeed the very notion of the external 
world itself, could have no basis in reality. However, Leibniz insists that they and it 
can and do. 
When Leibniz conceded that certain knowledge of the world was impossible for the 
finite mind, he did not abandon rationalism but restricted it to the transcendental. It is 
there that his cosmology is located. Cosmological notions, such as body, though not 
demonstrable as realities by empirical means, are asserted to have an existence in the 
transcendental realm. In this regard, Leibniz is in agreement with Kant. 4 It is via the 
proof of the existence of an omniscient mind that the existence of the external world 
is (indirectly) demonstrated. This answers Russell's criticism that Leibniz's 
cosmology could not support a plurality of substances because there was no objective 
spatial matrix of real distance relations. 
5 Russell's argument applies sub specie men/is 
hominis, but Leibniz's cosmology is transcendental and founded sub specie men/is 
dei. 
If the ultimate nature of the cosmos is founded on the objective spatial matrix of 
God's ideas, then further investigation must be directed towards this matrix. Now, 
space is a relationship between substances: it is not a thing itself but an abstract 
numerical entity. This means that substances are not separated by an actual space, as 
if by some intervening other reality, but may take any logically possible assignable 
' Leibniz and Berkeley are compared in Adams, pp. 224-228. He also believes that "Leibniz's 
phenomenalism is a 
forerunner of the phenomenalism of Kant". See ibid., p. 219. Peter Loptson 
writes that "Kant's 'agnostic realism', 
for example- his belief that there are things-in-themselves 
whose natures are wholly opaque to us- seems clearly an intellectual descendant of Leibniz's doctrine 
of the reality of external substances, together with the windowlessness of soul monads". See Peter 
Loptson, "Was Leibniz an Idealist? ", Philosophy 74 (1999), 361-385, (p. 371). 
5 See Bertrand Russell, The Philosophy of'Leibniz (London: Routledge, 1992). Chapter X, section 68. 
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numerical value for their distance predicates. Since the nature of these distance ratios 
is purely numerical, and since, logically, numerical entities can be divided ad 
infinitum, as well as summed ad infinitum, so the assignable distances between 
substances can proceed towards the infinitely small and the infinitely large. In short, 
space, like number, is a continuum: it can be sub-divided infinitely, with the 
consequence that there can be no smallest indivisible elements of space: indeed there 
can be no ultimate atomic constituents at all; and the notion of real constitution is 
shown to be an erroneous one. In the "resolution of the ideal" one always proceeds 
from a whole to the parts, not the other way (from parts to a whole). Thus Leibniz's 
meditations on the "labyrinth of the continuum" led him to reject the concept of the 
atom (as indivisible element) as rationally absurd. At the same time the corollary 
notion of vacua is also rejected. What we are left with, in the spatial matrix of God's 
mind, are distance relations between substances which, logically, can take smaller and 
smaller values ad infinitum. And in the omniscient mind, which is the matrix of'alI 
possible relations, combinations of eternal truths into true propositions must he 
possible in ever-diminishing relations of distance-separation. Consequently, the 
plurality of subjects of true propositions, in God's mind, is infinite: or, the ultimate 
nature of the universe is a (spatial) plenum, an infinity of substances. 
In this conception, matter, or that whose essence is spatial extension, can never be 
a substance but only ever many substances. For any area or volume of the plenum 
consists not of a "bit of space", since space is not a thing a la Newton, nor does it 
consist of a plurality of atoms (and vacua), since spatial extension is divisible 
infinitely, and the atom is impossible. The notion that the division of matter could 
suddenly end with the indivisible, would be a contradiction of Leibniz's principle of 
continuity. Furthermore, the notion that the elements of matter could be unextended 
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(i. e. "mathematical points"), would mean that they could never act as the constituents 
of matter, since any number of things absolutely without spatial extension will never 
accumulate into anything with extension. In any case, since true atoms have no parts, 
they could never vary amongst themselves, and so any compounds formed ol'them 
would also be without variety; indeed the universe as a whole would be 
homogeneous. In addition, since entities without parts would be infinitely hard, 
interaction between atoms through collision would be impossible. 
But if spatial extension cannot be the essence of substance, then the many 
substances (indeed the infinitely many) that exist within any particular volume of the 
plenum, must be without extension themselves. Such unextended substances, Leibniz 
calls monads. 6 
Now the spatial arrangement of perceptions into objects is not the only type of' 
ordering to be met with, for Leibniz declares that a variety, and by implication 
succession, of perceptions is an indubitable truth of fact. 
Not only is it immediately evident to me that 1 think, but it is just as evident 
that I think various thoughts: at one time 1 think about A and at another about 
B and so on. Thus the Cartesian principle is sound, but it is not the only one of 7 
its kind. 
That perceptions vary or change means the same as to say that perceptions succeed 
each other. Though I may question my recollection of a now-ceased perception, it is 
held as indubitable by Leibniz that at least a change has occurred, in the same way 
that though I may question the certainty of a present perception, nevertheless I hold it 
6 Leibniz's conception of the nature of space and matter, along with its proposed evolution, is discussed 
in Glenn Hartz and J. A. Cover, "Space and Time in the Leibnizian Metaphysic", Nous 22 (1988). 
493-519. See also Hartz, "Leibniz's Phenomenal isms", The Philosophical Review 101 (July 1992), 
511-549. 
7 RB, section 367. 
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as indubitable that I am at least having a perception. Consequently, it is a truth of fact 
for Leibniz that perceptions do succeed each other, however untrustworthily. And the 
mode by which perceptions are related to each other is called time: 
I consider the explanation of all phenomena solely through the perceptions of 
monads... In8this way of explaining things... time is the order of'successive 
phenomena. 
Accordingly, and like space, time is abstract in nature, being only a function of 
mental substance, i. e. a mode of ordering perceptions. Whereas spatial ordering 
predicates separation by relating co-existent phenomena, temporal ordering 
predicates separation by relating changed phenomena. In other words, what we call a 
period of time or lapse of time is nothing else than an abstract that exists in a mind, 
and which relates two perceptual states according to an assignable change between 
them. What we call motion equates to the change of spatial separation between 
(temporally) successive phenomena, and so motion too, as nothing more than a 
function of space and time predicates, is itself an abstract mental entity: "if we 
consider only what motion contains precisely and formally, that is, change of place, 
motion is not something entirely real. " 
9 
The ideas or perceptions in the mind of God, because of his omniscience, are 
known to be real (i. e. a plurality of monads exists, which are the objects of his 
perception). His omniscience provides him with true knowledge of the real 
differences between (co-existent) substances, and which therefore serves to provide 
certain relations of separation amongst them (an objective spatial matrix). This 
s To des Bosses, 16 June 1712, in L, p. 604. 
Discourse on Metaphysics, section 18, in AG, p. 51. 
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omniscience further provides true knowledge of the real changes and rates of change 
amongst monads, and therefore the certain relations of succession amongst them. The 
spatio-temporal matrix of ideas in God is therefore objective: this omniscient mind 
embraces with true certainty all monads and all their changes, and so when he 
perceives motion, it is real motion. Thus objective space, time and motion exist in the 
mind of God. However, it should be carefully pointed out that this objectiveness of 
space and time is not what Leibniz calls absoluteness. By this latter he refers to the 
(Newtonian) notion of space or time considered as something real and existent in 
itself, beyond the realm of perceptions, and which acts as an absolute frame that 
provides absolute positions and boundaries for space, and absolute beginnings and 
ends for time. What Leibniz is denying when he rejects the absoluteness of space is a 
correspondence theory of truth; whereas what he asserts in the realm of God's 
perceptions, is the objectiveness of spatial relations, effectively a coherence theory of 
truth. 
If anyone were to imagine the world to have been created sooner, he would 
find that it had not been made any sooner, since there is no absolute time, and 
time is nothing but the order of successive things. In the same way, if anyone 
were to imagine the whole universe to be moved from its place without 
changing the mutual distances of things with respect to one another, nothing 
will have happened, since absolute space is something imaginary, and there is 
nothing 
Ireal 
in it but the distances of bodies. In a word, they are orders, not 
things. 
The minds of human beings and all finite creatures, on the other hand, do not and 
cannot embrace the whole universe of 
infinite ideas; consequently what perceptions 
they have possess only moral certainty. Since they cannot isolate monads in their 
minds, they cannot spatially resolve things objectively; from which it follows that 
10 To des Bosses, 29 May 1716, in AG, p. 201. 
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they cannot temporally resolve things objectively either. Space, time and motion can 
only ever be subjective and relative for finite minds. 
Russell had criticized Leibniz's assertion that a plurality of monads existed, on the 
grounds that to know a real plurality, presupposes knowledge of a real co-existence of' 
substances, which, qua temporal notion, presupposes knowledge of objective time. 
But, again, his criticism applies sub specie mends hominis, whereas Leibniz's 
metaphysics is based on God's mind. 
Now, time is an abstract numerical relation of change, and so, like space, is an 
ideal continuum, each and any quantum of change or "period of time" is divisible ad 
infinitum. No matter how many times we narrow down the quanta of'change, we will 
always find intervening quanta: changes within changes, motion within motion, 
successions of phenomena within successions of phenomena. So there can be no 
ultimate elements of time, no discrete jumps of change or motion, and correlatively, 
no stasis or absolute immobility. Conversely, there can be no greatest time period, no 
ultimate over-arching age to nature: the world can therefore have neither a beginning 
nor end in time. Neither can there be a greatest rate of change or maximum speed: 
There cannot be a most rapid motion or a greatest number. For number is 
something discrete, where the whole is not prior to its parts, but conversely. 
There cannot be a most rapid motion, because motion is a modification, and is 
the transference of a certain thing in a certain time. 12 
In God's mind, everything is in perpetual motion, the plurality of change, succession 
of phenomena, is infinite, or, the ultimate nature of the cosmos is a temporal, as well 
as a spatial, plenum. However, it is the case that monads (and these are the existential 
" See Russell, chapter IV, section 22. 
12 Pk, section 520. 
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elements of the plenum) endure through time, for monads are not dependent on other 
worldly monads, and so can neither be destroyed nor created while the world exists. 
If, then, time, change and motion are in perpetual flux, then such must refer to some 
kind of entity constructed out of monads, since each monad in itself is not in flux. 
Indeed it has been seen that, because space is a continuum, any thing of perception is 
fundamentally a volume of the plenum: that is, it embraces an infinite collection of' 
monads, which, by virtue of the continuity of time, must be a collection in perpetual 
flux. 
Comparison 
I have pointed out that according to Leibniz the concept of space is "the order of co- 
existing phenomena", 
13 and that this order is an abstract relation applied by thinking 
beings to two phenomena perceived as separate. In that this relation is essentially 
numerical, Leibniz applies the same operations and laws of arithmetic to it. Hence 
space (i. e. any extended part of it), like number, can be divided and summed, and 
these without end, entailing that there can be no indivisible smallest elements, and no 
inaugmentable largest whole. If there are no elements of extended being (atoms) there 
can be no (spatial) constitution, therefore matter is not what it is commonly conceived 
to be. True perceptions (as known only to God's mind) are substances; but these are 
without extension: they are monads, and as unextended entities, exist in an infinite 
number, or, together, are the spatial plenum. Matter, therefore, as an (extended) 
" To des Bosses, 1712, in L, p. 604. 
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volume of this plenum, is not a single being, but a collection of (an infinity of) 
monads. 
The Christian Lurianic kabbalists also considered space to be a mere mode of 
substance ("three-fold Dimension or Locality, is onely an Accident and not an 
Essential Property of Bodies" 14), and received the same numerical treatment by them 
as by Leibniz (Thus Conway writes that "there can be no actual division in matter 
which cannot always be further divided... without end" 1) 
Thus, in rejecting atoms as a logical fallacy, the Christian Lurianic kabbalists 
conclude that "there is an infinity of creatures, each of which contains an infinity in 
itself, and so on to infinity". 16 This is the plenum: what van Helmont refers to as the 
watery body of nature, of which body is but a certain spatial delimitation, and not a 
single substance "matter", but, rather, is an (infinite) aggregate of spirit (non-material) 
substances, or monads. Leibniz had noted in his resume of The Divine Being that "All 
Creatures are composed of infinite parts... There are infinite seeds in a single 
body". 17 In a letter to Sophie he remarks on this that: 
Most of all I approve of his opinion about the infinity of things. and I have 
already said in the Journal des Savants that each part having parts to infinity, 
there is no little portion of matter that does not contain an actual infinity of 
creatures (and apparently living creatures). " 
In Thoughts on Genesis, to his paraphrasing of van Helmont's comments, Leibniz 
adds: 
14 The Spirit of Diseases, section 45. 
15 Principles, p. 20. 
[bid., p. 17. 
"OK, ii, 1073. 
'g 3 September 1694, in Coudert, Leibniz and the Kabbalah, p. 57: L Br, 389, fols 9 if. 
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Indeed there is a life in all things; and they shoot very wide of the mark who 
deem that bodily things are put together of atoms and particles, void of all 
life. 19 
And in the manuscript of Thoughts, not published in the edition, Leibniz added a 
further remark on this theme: 
Concerning this matter, many things are usefully suggested by Henry More, 
perhaps by the author of the Cabala Denudata; also by the author of the 
Vulgar Philosophy refuted, which was published with the meditations of the 
very clever English Countess, in which more of the same can be read. 20 
The notion that space is an ideal relation between phenomena implies the plenum; but 
there are further important considerations concerning the truth status of predicates of 
space, which are crucial for establishing that the universe is a plurality of substances. 
Without real spatial relations between substances there can be no real separation, thus 
no real plurality of substances. Leibniz, as has been seen, distinguishes between 
divine and human epistemology. God knows a priori both the truth of his ideas about 
things and the truth of their attributes of spatial relations: thus he knows substances in 
real relations of separation, and thus their real plurality. Man, on the other hand, has 
no a priori knowledge of such things: his a posteriori experience alone cannot rescue 
him from his solipsism, and the existence of the external world can only be known 
indirectly via the proof of the existence of God. But the Christian Lurianic kabbalists 
do not address this deeper issue. 
Passing on to the treatment of the concepts of time and motion, the same 
agreements and omissions of analysis are to be found between Leibniz and the 
kabbalists as were met with concerning space and matter. Leibniz considers time, like 
19 p. 60. Compare draft notes at 
OH, 1,94-96; LH, 1, V, 2g, fol. 37, where no such explicit rejection of 
the atom is made by van Helmont. 
20 LH, 1, V, 2g, fol. 56. 
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space, to be an ideal relation. Inasmuch as motion precisely is the change or 
succession of phenomena, he writes that "motion is not something entirely real", 21 
i. e. it is ideal. And because time and motion are essentially numerical quanta, time 
periods and speeds can be divided or augmented without end, with the consequences 
that there can be no indivisible or smallest time periods: therefore no jumps across 
space between fundamental elements of succession; and no indivisible or smallest 
speeds: no absolute stasis. In this temporal plenum, every time period contains an 
infinity of smaller time periods, and nature is fundamentally in flux. Conversely, 
there can be no greatest time period, no ultimate over-arching age to nature: the world 
can therefore have neither a beginning nor end in time; and there can be no maximum 
speed. 
The same equation of motion to change of states to time is put forward by Conway 
("time is nothing but the motion or change of creatures from one condition or state to 
another " 
22). And she, like Leibniz, derives the same conclusion that time is a 
continuum. 
Now, Leibniz distinguishes between divine and human knowledge. Since human 
knowledge of the world can only ever be a partial picture, endowed only with the 
moral certainty of a posteriori experience, predicates of change of positions between 
things is restricted to the merely relative. On the other hand, God's knowing is the a 
priori knowledge of the true spatio-temporal relations between substances, therelore 
he alone knows true absolute time and motion. But, though the Christian Lurianic 
kabbalists do not address the issue as to whether or not there can be any true 
knowledge about these ideals, their analysis of the concepts of space, matter, time and 
21 Discourse on Metaphysics, section 18, in AG, p. 51. 
22 Principles, p. 5 1. 
158 
motion, as ideals, entirely coincides with that of Leibniz. 
5.2 The Nature and Relationship of Soul and Body 
Leibniz's transcendental rationalism extends the predicatum Inesl suhieclo principle 
to existents: a true proposition about the world includes a set of predicates 
(properties) and a subject, which is a monad, a sufficient reason for why it is as it is. 
Thus, since any proposition concerning the world is a statement about a volume of the 
spatio-temporal plenum, the real thing referred to includes both a single monad (as 
subject and sufficient reason) and a collection of monads (since every thing of the 
world extends some minimal amount across the plenum). These real things 
constructed out of the plenum of monads are called corporeal substances by Leibniz. 
In general, simple substances or monads are the (rational) elements of the plenum and 
which exist everywhere. From out of these, two types of collections occur. 
1) Collections of the elemental monads bound together by virtue of a particular single 
monad, which acts as a uniting principle for the many: the composite or corporeal 
substances. 2) Collections of simple substances, or even of composite corporeal 
substances, which, despite embracing real monads themselves, do not have a common 
unifying principle, so therefore are not substantial wholes: they are not real corporeal 
substances, but mere aggregates. For example, a heap of stones is only an aggregate 
of simple substances or monads, and an army or a flock of sheep is only an aggregate 
of composite or corporeal substances. 
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What in the corporeal substance is the collection of monads, is what we commonly 
call "body"; and what is the single unifying monad is what we call "mind" or "soul". 
Substances are either simple or composite. Simple substances or monads are 
either intelligent or without reason... Composite substances are those which 
constitute a per se unity, composed of a soul and an organic body, which is a 
machine of nature resulting from monads. 23 
The body is the aspect of a thing referred to by a proposition that extends across the 
plenum and thus is a collection of monads. But, referral to a real thing requires a 
single monad as subject of the predicates of the proposition, as substance of the 
body's properties. That is, the material chunk of the universe referred to, with its 
various properties, must have a soul or mind in order to make the composite real, or 
to make the corporeal substance. The predicalum inest subiecto principle demands 
that the mode of a real thing or corporeal substance, which is its bodily collection of 
properties, belongs to, inheres in, is united to, a substance, which is its mind or soul. 
In this sense, it is the soul of the corporeal substance which gives it its reality: 
It also seems that what constitutes the essence of a being by aggregation is only a 
mode of the things of which it is composed. For example, what constitutes the 
essence of an army is only a mode of the men who compose it. This mode 
therefore presupposes a substance whose essence is not a mode of a substance... 
To put it briefly, I hold this identical proposition, differentiated only by the 
emphasis, to be an axiom, namely, that what is not truly one being is not truly 
2g 
either. It has always been thought that one and being are reciprocal one bein 
things. 
D Notes for Leibniz to des Bosses, 5 February 1712, in AG, p. 200. See also Principles q/Nature and 
Grace, section 1, in AG, p. 207: "A simple substance is that which has no parts. A composite 
substance is a collection of simple substances, or monads. Monas is a Greek word signifying unity, 
or what is one. Composites or 
bodies are multitudes; and simple substances --lives, souls and 
minds-- are unities. " 
24 To Arnauld, 30 April 1687, in AG, p. 86. 
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It can now be seen that in the difference between the mind as a single monad and the 
body as a multiplicity of monads lies the common ontological schism between the 
corporeal body and the incorporeal mind. The mind or soul is thus not composed of 
other souls; it is the body, rather, that is a collection of (inferior) souls. 
Although a soul can have a body made up of parts animated by other souls, the 
soul or form of the whole is not, as a consequence, composed of the souls or 
forms of its parts. 25 
Rather, the soul stands in relation to its body as the unitary principle: 
Each distinct simple substance or monad, which makes up the centre of a 
composite substance (an animal, for example) and is the principle of its unity, is 
surrounded by a mass composed of an infinity of other monads, which constitute 
the body belonging to this central monad, through whose properties the monad 
represents the things outside it, similarly to the way a centre does. 2" 
Monads depend on having some properties. In the same way as the notion of the 
subject of a proposition depends on the notion of predicates, so the monad, the single 
unitive substantial principle, is understood as that to which the predicates belong, or 
inhere in. Indeed, monads without any properties would be indistinguishable from 
each other: this is Leibniz's principle of the identity of indiscernibles: "Monads must 
have some qualities, otherwise they would not even be beings. " 27 And as every thing 
of the world extends at least some way across the plenum, so every monad in a 
corporeal substance must have at least some properties, which considered in tofu is 
precisely what we conceive of as the spatially extended, or the body. A mind always 
has a body, and even when there appears not to be one, on account of size or 
25 Ibid., in AG, p. 88. 
2b Principles of Nature and Grace, section 3, in AG, p. 207. 
27 MonadologY, section 8, in AG, p. 214. 
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aethereality, the very notion of mind, in respect of the beings of this world, of this 
plenum, demands an associated body. Thus "every finite soul is embodied, even the 
angels are not excepted". 28 
Now, the plenum is continuous in time as well as in space; and so the body aspect 
of a corporeal substance is a collection of monads in constant motion: the spatial and 
temporal predicates are continuously changing. This is not problematic since the body 
aspect considered alone is a mere aggregate and not a monad (an enduring substance). 
On the other hand, the mind aspect is a monad (a single monad, not a collection) and 
therefore it must have all those essential properties characteristic of substance. It has 
been seen that uniqueness (expressed as the principle of the identity of indiscernibles) 
must be an essential attribute of a monad, as must its characteristic of being the 
spatial unity of the body it is associated with. A further characteristic essential to 
substance is that of autonomy or non-involvement in change: monads cannot be 
affected by other substances. Therefore, the mind of a corporeal substance is a 
temporal as well as a spatial unity: it endures through the changing of its (bodily) 
properties, while retaining its own identity through time. 
We must not imagine, as some who have misunderstood my thought do, that each 
soul has a mass or portion of matter of its own, always proper to or alloted by it, 
and that it consequently possesses other lower living beings, forever destined to 
serve it. For all bodies are in a perpetual flux, like rivers, and parts enter into 
them and depart from them continually. 29 
Even in cases where a body manifestly ceases to be associated with a soul because it 
ceases to display any mode of action from which a soul, as uniting principle, can be 
inferred, in short, what we call death, it follows that since souls endure as long as the 
28 Wn, p. 65. 
' Monadology, section 71, in AG, p. 222. 
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universe does, the soul of the now dead body must still exist in the corpse, and 
moreover, since souls are always accompanied with at least some bodily counterpart, 
there must still exist a living body around the extant soul. At death, the spatial extent 
of the soul's body rapidly shrinks away, but, no matter that this new-sized body 
cannot be seen: its existence follows from the doctrine of corporeal substance and the 
indestructibility of monads. 
There is only one reasonable view to take-- namely, the conservation not only of 
the soul, but also of the animal itself and its organic machine, even though the 
destruction n of its larger parts reduces it to a smallness which escapes our 
senses. 
Consequently, metempsychosis is impossible, for this precisely means the complete 
detachment of soul from body while it passes from the one to the next. 
There is often metamorphosis in animals, but there is never metempsychosis nor 
transmigration of souls; there are also no completely separated souls, nor spirits 
without bodies. 
31 
Now, souls co-exist with the universe and so, as well as extending beyond death, they 
also extend before birth. That is to say, they did not come into existence at the 
moment of conception, or at the detectable animation of a bodily portion of matter, 
but rather had pre-existed from all time. 
Every mind is of endless duration. Every mind is indissolubly implanted in 
matter; this matter is of a certain magnitude... There are innumerable minds 
everywhere; there are minds in the ovum even before conception, nor do they 
perish, even if conception never follows. 
32 
10 New System, in AG, p. 141. 
Monadol0RY, section 72, in AG, p. 222. 
32 Pk, sections 476-77. 
163 
The soul of the corporeal substance, as a single monad, has, of course, no spatial 
extension: it is "incorporeal", consequently not a thing to be discovered by the senses. 
Its associated body is the multiplicity of monads, or is the extension of corporeal 
substance in space. But this space is a continuum, and so the body of a mind could 
continue shrinking indefinitely, with the consequence that there can be no absolute 
limiting smallest size to which the body of the soul might retract to, for example, after 
"death". Thus "we do not need to imagine, with the Jews, that there is a little bone of 
insurmountable hardness in which the soul takes refuge. " 33 
That every monad has a bodily collection of monads implies something very 
important about the nature of the cosmos. Since the monads which are embraced by 
the body of a corporeal substance, each and individually, also embrace by definition 
their own collection of monads, for which they are the spatio-temporal uniting 
principles, so they make up smaller corporeal substances in their own right. 
Thus we see that each living body has a dominant entelechy, which in the 
animal is the soul; but the limbs of this living body are full of other living 
beings, plants, animals, each of which also has its entelechy, or its dominant 
Soul. 
34 
And since each of these embraces yet further collections of monads, it becomes clear 
that, because of the infinite divisibility of the plenum, this dissectioning of nature 
proceeds without end: "There is an infinite number of creatures in the smallest 
particle of matter, because of the actual division of the continuum to infinity. " ;s 
Hence, there can be no ultimate monads which could serve as the elemental 
building blocks of nature. And if these do not exist, then corporeal substances, really 
To Arnauld, 30 April 1687. in AG, p. 88. 
i4 Monadology, section 70, in AG, p. 222. 
 H, section 195. 
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united beings, cannot be constituted by the multiplicity of monads which is their 
"corporeal" aspect: rather, their status as real beings is supplied by something 
"incorporeal": by a single principle which is without parts. 
The ultimate nature of the cosmos is the co-existent plurality of monads, or the 
totality of all the subjects of true propositions, which exists only in the mind of God 
because only his omniscient mind sees all things in all their true relations. In short, all 
God's perceptions or ideas are true propositions; and, since a true proposition 
precisely equates to a corporeal substance in idealistic rationalism, so the endless 
dissecting of corporeal substances into further ones, applies equally to the ideas, 
perceptions or true propositions in God's mind. The idea of a true proposition in his 
mind includes a single idea to which a multiplicity of ideas may be associated by 
virtue of the "geometrical method" that all predicates are contained in the subject. As 
each of these predicate ideas (or properties of the body of a corporeal substance) are 
true ideas in God's mind, they too can be treated as individual true propositions in 
themselves, or as single subject ideas, each of which spawns, by the geometrical 
method, a further sub-grouping of predicate ideas; and this process, because of the 
infinite divisibility of space and time, has no end. Real beings, unities, corporeal 
substances, true propositions, are seen, therefore, to emerge not from "below", not by 
constitution or the coming together of the underlying many to form the one, but rather 
from "above": by dissemination, or the distribution of an over-arching oneness into 
the many, which process, as has been seen, continues ad infinitum. 
When Leibniz refers to matter he means the bodily aggregation (of simple or 
composite substances) considered alone (apart from the soul). The ultimate nature of 
matter concerns its status as aggregate, as multiplicity. Since this, by definition, is not 
a unity, a singularity, it is not a real substance. Though, as collections, they cannot be 
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substances, that they are, however, collections of'substances, leads Leibniz to deny 
that matter is a nothing: rather, he calls it "well-founded". Collections without 
substantial unity, such as collections of simple substances (e. g. a heap of stones), or 
of composite substances (e. g. an army), or even of substances with a substantial unity 
(i. e. the corporeal substance) when considered alone from its uniting soul, is well- 
founded matter. But it remains that particular and actual being is only to be found in 
the imposition of unity on the many, of the simple substance on the aggregate: the 
partnership of soul and body, such as is corporeal substance. 
I am also far from saying that matter is a shadow and even a nothing. These 
expressions go too far. Matter is an aggregate, not a substance but a 
substanliatum as would be an army or a flock; and, insofar as it is considered 
as making up one thing, it is a phenomenon, very real, in fact, but a thing 
whose unity is constructed by our conception. 36 
In view of this, should Leibniz be classified as an idealist? If i) idealism is defined as 
the belief that no thing can be wholly independent of mind, then most philosophers 
would be idealists. If ii) the term is restricted to the belief that there are only minds, 
then Berkeley would be an idealist, but Leibniz would not, for, as I will set out, the 
Leibnizian system necessitates that every mind has its associated body. This is the 
concept of the corporeal substance, and these exist everywhere throughout the 
plenum. Body, as a notion distinct from mind, is essential to Leibniz's cosmology. 
If iii) idealism is the belief that there is no other substance than mind, specifically 
that there is nothing called matter that exists independently of mind, then Leibniz is 
an idealist. Because no body can be conceived to exist anywhere in the Leibnizian 
36 To Samuel Masson, 1716, in AG, p. 227. See also Letter to Remond, II Februrary, 1715, in 
L, p. 659: "Matter itself is nothing but a phenomenon --though well-founded-- which results 
from the monads. " This issue is discussed at some length in Pauline Phemister, "Leibniz and the 
Elements of Compound Bodies", British Journal for the History g1'Philosophy 7 (I) (1999), 57-7g. 
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universe without a mind, and that "body", in any case, is itself (a collection) of minds, 
there is no concept of anything existing independently of mind. Body is as 
indispensible to Leibniz's cosmology as is mind; but on no account is it to be 
conceived as a substance separate to and independent from mind. It is with this 
definition that Leibniz could be called an idealist. 
What, then, is the fundamental nature of the relationship between monads, i. e. 
between a single monad (mind of a corporeal substance) and a plurality of other 
monads (the body of a corporeal substance as the aggregate associated with its mind)'? 
It is known that a corporeal substance is a single substance with a set of properties. 
which is in fact a true proposition that exists in God's mind: a true proposition that 
includes the idea of a single subject (as spatio-temporal unity) and a set of ideas 
called predicates (which are "extended in space" and in temporal flux). These two 
strata of idea, the subject and the predicate, are related according to the order of 
logical dependence that exists between them, which order, in the omniscient mind, is 
absolute. The idea of the subject is logically anterior to, is the sufficient reason for, 
the predicate ideas. That the subject contains the predicates translates, in worldly 
terms, to the substance containing the properties. And this rational ordering, this 
notion of containment, makes the changing of predicates something to be explained in 
terms of their dependence on their mutual subject, which is now conceived as the 
agent. Thus the relationship is a causal one. But how does the subject cause its 
predicates? Or the substance cause its properties? Not by efficient cause, in the 
philosophy of Leibniz. The non-elasticity of physical atoms makes change through 
impact impossible; but the concept of the atom has always been rejected on rational 
grounds. Occult efficient cause, or action at a distance, is also rejected: such is 
contrary to what the very meaning of "efficient cause" is; and to allow a definition of' 
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this kind, would result in any relation between two things to be a possible cause. In 
fact, as I have indicated, the conception of substance, as that which is essentially 
independent and autonomous, permits of no real influence at all from another being, 
or from what is external to it. Rather, the cause of predicates and their perpetual 
changings, have to be located in the substance itself to which they belong. "It follows 
from what we have just said that the monad's natural changes come from an internal 
principle, since no external cause can influence it internally. " 37 
Now, any particular concept in the mind of God can have the predicates 
attributable to it at any instant deduced purely from the thorough understanding of it. 
Only God can do this because only his mind knows all the relations that exist between 
all the infinite ideas. So not only can he have knowledge of all the true predicates that 
a subject has at any moment, but he knows all its future states too, since he can 
deduce how each state, or set of predicates, logically entails the next. And since he 
sees all ideas and has an infallibly rational mind, so the sequence of predicates 
develops ineluctably from the initial conception. It is this certain entailment that is 
called the flowing of predicates from the subject. Since what is true in God's mind 
precisely is the ultimate nature of the cosmos, it can be seen that the flowing of ideas 
of predicates from ideas of subjects in the divine mind, equates to the flowing of 
properties from substances: "The present is big with the future, and that he who sees 
all sees in that which is that which shall be. " 
38 The flowing of properties out of 
substances, or conversely, substances as the causal source of properties, can now be 
seen to be a reversal of the process of analytical reduction of concepts employed in 
the Leibnizian method of rational explanation. Insofar as universal analysis seeks to 
37 Monadology, section 11, in AG, p. 214. 
39 H, section 360. 
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reduce all propositions about states of the world to ultimate sufficient reasons, or 
primitive substances, the temporal development of the world, in terms of properties 
flowing out of substances, is a reversal of this process, a sort of "top-down" 
metaphysics. Importantly for cosmology, this process is referred to by Leibniz as 
emanation: "A mode... since it does not subsist through itself, will always emanate 
out of a substance. " 
39 In the sense that the subject or substance is the cause of, is 
logically anterior to, the predicates or properties, the effects, or what are logically 
posterior, so the subject or substance is called the active principle, and the predicates 
or properties, the passive principle. In emanation, the active is the emanator, the 
passive is the emanated. 
Since substance endures throughout the unceasing changing of its properties, the 
active principle must correspondingly be distinguished from the passive as being 
permanent to the passive's successiveness. Leibniz finds this expressed in the 
difference between force and motion. Because motion is nothing but a function of the 
changing predicates of space with respect to time, at an instant, when the time period 
is zero, motion itself is zero: it ceases to be at that moment, thus is not an enduring 
thing. In contradistinction, the notion of force is conceived to still exist at an instant, 
since otherwise, if it too vanished there would be nothing to move things on to the 
next state. In other words, the cause of change is not motion: this is just another word 
for change. Rather, the cause of change is something which endures: what we call 
force. 
If there is nothing in motion but this relative change, it follows that there is no 
reason in nature for ascribing motion to one thing rather than another. The 
consequence of which will be, that there is no real motion. Thus in order to 
say that anything moves, we require not only that it should change its situation 
19 To des Bosses, 1 September 1706, in GP, ii, 313. 
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relatively to other things, but also that it should contain the cause of change, 
the force or action. 40 
Substance is an enduring active force, a "first entelechy", "primitive force", "original 
activity", "appetition"; and since it does not cease to exist when it manifests no 
action, it is also the notion of unrealized force: it is "effort", "potency", "urge of 
acting". 41 Active principles are called substances when applied to the world, and 
concepts when applied to the mind of God. Thus it is seen that the force of a 
substance is the force of reason in the order of ideas in God's mind. And as the 
rational implication, or force, of an idea does not cease merely because the ideas it 
implies have not been thought through, so the force of a substance does not cease 
because its properties have not been manifested. 
One creature is more perfect than another insofar as one finds in it that which 
provides an a priori reason for what happens in the other; and this is why we 
say that it acts on the other. " 42 
Furthermore, when any true concept, as active principle, has the ideas logically 
implied by it thought out, this active principle remains unchanged: it continues to 
possess the same force of reason as before; none of its original meaning has been 
altered by the development of the ideas that logically flow from it; indeed, the source 
concept, as logical foundation of the subsequent chain of ideas, must endure in its 
exact original way in order to rationally sustain those ideas dependent on it. This 
40 Animadversions in partem generalem Principiorum Cartesianorum, undated, in GP, iv, 369. 
See also on Nature Itself, section 9, in AG, p. 160: "For there can be no action without a force for 
acting, and, conversely, a power which can never be exercised is empty... Action and power are 
different things, the former successive, the latter persisting... Not only is it the case that everything 
that acts is an individual substance, but also that every individual substance acts without 
interruption. " 
41 See New System, in AG, p. 139; On Nature Itself, section 12, in AG, pp. 162-63; H, section 87. 
42 MonadologY, section 50, in AG, p. 219. 
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notion of an emerging series of ideas from one original generating concept is 
Leibniz's analogy with calculus. Likewise when the active principle is conceived as 
worldly substance, as source of the properties which flow from it, it must remain 
unchanged. That the active principle remains unaltered whilst the passive (constantly) 
develops out of it, is the reason why Leibniz found emanation a suitable term; for in 
that doctrine the emanator is an enduring unchanging active principle to the emanated 
transitory and flux passive principle. But before Leibniz had fully worked out his 
doctrine as I have set it forth, he could not see how change could be effected by 
emanation, because causal relations, he thought, surely involved a change in the 
active principle. At this time he did not conceive cause in terms of the order of 
reasons amongst a pre-established harmony of substances, but rather still, in some 
way, along the lines of cause by real influence. Thus in the Foreword to a Universal 
Characteristic of 1672 (? ) he writes: "(Cause through emanation) is efficient cause 
without change of itself. " And in the margin: "Therefore cause is not by 
 43 emanation. 
In notes he made to a letter from Arnold Eckhard in 1677, he is 
not sure whether, properly speaking, [emanation] is action where qualities 
flow out of form, or properties out of essence, for everything which we 
commonly call action involves at least a change in the enduring thing. 44 
But to Henri Basnage de Beauval in 1696 it seems conceivable that action (of a 
substance on another) can be by emanation: 
I do not at all deny the action of a substance on another. But I believe that the 
effort which it makes is only in itself, and that the change which happens in 
the other, only happens itself as a consequence of the pre-established 
43 A, 6, ii, 490. 
44 May 1677, in Gr, i, 239-40. 
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harmony. And it is impossible to explain otherwise the action emanating in 
the natural order of things. 45 
Comparison 
In the Leibnizian metaphysics, the substances or fundamental existential elements of 
the universe lack spatial extension: they are not atoms but monads: they are the 
worldly substantial equivalents of the subjects of the true propositions in God's mind. 
As such, they must endure as long as the whole universe does, for substances are 
independent of other substances, and can only be altered or annihilated by the 
ultimate substance on which they depend, i. e. God. These eternal monads, because 
they are unextended and exist in an infinite number, constitute a spatial plenum, out 
of which the things of the world are formed. Every thing has some spatial extension 
or body, which embraces an infinity of monads of the plenum, and which collection 
of monads must be in constant flux, on account of the temporal continuum. When 
such a collection of monads, or simple substances, has a unifying or ruling principle, 
Leibniz calls it a corporeal substance (or composite substance). Such is a living 
organic creature: the unifying principle is its soul, which is a single monad (subject of 
a true proposition); and the collected monads are its body. Whereas the body is a 
collection of monads in flux, the soul, as a single substance, is not, but endures the 
changes of its body. 
The same analysis of creatures into soul and body, grounded in a plenum of 
monads, exists in Christian Lurianic kabbalism. Matter, or that bodily spatially- 
extended aspect of a creature, "is made by a Coalition or Clinging together of... 
45 Januar, 1696, in GP, iii, 122. 
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Monades or single Beings", 46 and is not a static collection ("the unity of the greater 
number of ministering spirits [the monads of the body]... may be dissolved"). 47 A 
living creature is not any kind of collection of monads, but specifically one in which 
the monad spirits are united in, and ruled by, one principal spirit. Conway writes that 
"the spirit of man or brute is also a countless multitude of spirits united in [a] body... 
such that one is the principal ruler". 
48 Thus, the soul and body of a creature do not 
differ ontologically --they are both based on monads-- rather, they differ by the 
numerical abstraction of the one (of the soul) and the many (of the body), and the 
(modal) relationship that holds between them: "the distinction between spirit and 
body is only modal and incremental, not essential and substantial", 49 and "the soul 
must consist of the same principles, whence the body takes its original". 50 
As a single substance the soul is consequently indestructible (except by God, if he 
were to annihilate the whole universe). In The Divine Being it says "the soul, with 
respect to her essence, is unchangeable and immortal, so neither can she be 
annihilated'. 
51 Remarking on this, Leibniz says: "I also agree that all substances 
always remain and do not perish, which I hold true not only in regard to human souls 
but also in regard to those of other animals". 
52 
Leibniz's principle of the identity of indiscernibles necessitates that a substance, in 
order to be discernible and thereby individuated, must have attributes. In the same 
way, the soul of a creature, as its substance, must have a body or set of attributes that 
(spatially) surrounds it. Moreover, this soul is the ruling principle which is 
4" Cabbalistical Dialogue, p. 9. 
47 Principles, p. 55. 
48 Ibid., p. 39. 
1 Ibid., p. 40. 
S0 The Divine Being, section 90. 
s' Ibid., section 85. 
52 To Sophie, 3 September 1694, in Coudert, Leibniz and the Kabbalah, p. 56; L Br, 389, fols 9ff. 
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indispensible for the organic creature. The Christian Lurianic kabbalists also define 
the soul and body of living creatures in terms of each other. In his remarks on The 
Divine Being, Leibniz adds that "the [soul of an] animal is... always united to an 
organic body". 53 
That souls are immortal and are always accompanied with a body implies some 
important things according to Leibniz. There can be no true metempsychosis: The 
notion that a soul can pass from one body of its own to another new one of its own, 
necessitates that for at least an instant of its transition, the soul exists absolutely 
devoid of, separate from, any body at all. Since the concept of the soul is inextricably 
defined in terms of the body, such a detachment is prohibited, and therefore the strict 
definition of re-incarnation must be rejected: "There is never metempsychosis nor 
transmigration of souls; there are also no completely separated souls". 54 The death of 
a creature cannot involve the cessation of the soul (since it is immortal), but neither 
can it involve the separation of the soul from the body. Death, rather, is conceived by 
Leibniz to be a sudden shrinking away of the "organic machine", or the extended 
aspect of the creature over which it rules, and which is reduced "to a smallness which 
escapes our senses". 
55 
I have shown that the same conclusions about metempsychosis, death and birth 
were arrived at by the kabbalists, since they held the same tenets concerning the soul: 
that it is immortal and never without a body. Hence, "when common people perceive 
no motion in bodies, they call them from ignorance dead bodies without spirit and 
" 56 life. 
13 Ibid. 
54 Monadolool, section 72, in AG, p. 222. 
ss New System, in AG, p. 141. 
s6 Principles, p. 51. 
174 
If it is ignorant to imagine that a body can cease to have any life in it at all, and 
thereby to conclude that its soul has entirely departed from it, then it is also ignorant 
to imagine, conversely, that, at birth, a soul, at once, either arrives from outside, or 
pops into existence immediately in, the body it will occupy. Rather, as The Divine 
Being explains: "Souls are... brought forth to outward manifestation in distinct bodies 
and times". 57 The soul of a creature is an eternal soul, which has always had some 
minimum body, and which at "birth" or at its first signs of life, has merely developed 
its body, such that its mass and motion is now, for the first time, detectable to an 
outside observer. Leibniz, in his remarks on The Divine Being, having agreed that 
souls never perish, proceeds to add his own thoughts, which agree with those of the 
doctrine of Christian Lurianic Kabbalah, that souls expand and contract, or develop a 
body and are enveloped by one through time, and which is responsible for the 
phenomena of birth and death: 
It is not that I believe in the transmigration of souls; but I believe in the 
transformation of the same animal [the same soul with a body], which is at 
one time large and at another small and assumes diverse forms, as we see in 
the case of silkworms when they become butterflies. This conforms more to 
the order of things than transmigration. There is then the likelihood that there 
is strictly neither generation nor death but that the animal is only enveloped or 
developed, remaining always united to an organic body, although this body 
can become incomparably more subtle than the objects of our senses. 58 
The doctrine of the revolution of souls, which is central to the kabbalists conception 
of the evolution of the universe of creatures, cannot therefore be interpreted in terms 
of strict metempsychosis, but rather in terms of metamorphosis, in which bodies that 
are severally inhabited during a soul's revolutions, are but those massive or gross 
corporeal developments visible to the senses. At "death" the domain ruled over by the 
s' Section 88. 
58LBr, 389, fols9ff. 
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soul contracts rapidly: its true body shrinks away to an indiscernible size, leaving 
behind the old domain, the gross body (which persists until broken down by 
"external" forces). The indiscernible or subtle body is now free to pass out from its 
old kingdom, and at some future time expand again, extending its rulership until it 
manifests or is "born", is re-incarnated, in another visible gross body. 
In the Seder Olam, in the discussion of the origin of the world of Assiyah, we are 
told that: 
It evidentally appears, that human souls did pre-exist before they came into 
these gross and Earthly Bodies... therefore the Soul had not its original or first 
existence in this visible World. 59 
Leibniz's remarks on this book discuss the relationship of the soul to gross and subtle 
bodies, and the relationship between the latter. Whereas souls intimately penetrate all 
bodies, whether gross or subtle (for souls are metaphysical principles of unity and 
rulership), bodies do not penetrate each other in this way. Rather, they enter or exit 
each other in a purely spatial way, as, for example, when an opening in the larger is 
great enough for the smaller to pass in or out of it: 
It is true that subtle bodies pass through gross ones, but they only penetrate 
through pores, while both subtle and gross bodies are equally penetrated by 
the souls and entelechies that are intimately connected to them. 60 
In section 28 of the Seder Olam, van Helmont states the inextricability of soul from 
body: "Spirit and Body are not contrary Essences... for every created Spirit is 
corporeal". Leibniz, in his remarks on this paragraph, agrees, and further adds the 
distinction of the gross body, from which the soul can be separated: "Souls will never 
39 Section 46. 
60 FoL, p. 54. 
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be separated from all body, only gross bodies. If this is the opinion of the author [van 
Helmont], it is in no way blameworthy. " 61 This is the opinion of van Helmont. His 
revolution of souls is not by the strict metempsychosis of the separation of the soul 
from all body but only from the gross body. 
It is therefore clear that, since Leibniz's conceptions of birth as that of the soul with 
its subtle body developing a gross one, and death as the contraction of the soul with 
its subtle body within the gross one, a revolution of souls in the way envisioned by 
the kabbalists, is also possible in terms of the Leibnizian analysis. 
The general relationship between the soul and the body in the Leibnizian corporeal 
substance is that of the soul as a spatio-temporal unity to that of the body as that 
which is extended (spatially) and in flux (temporally): it is that of the single substance 
to which a set of properties inheres. In Leibniz's transcendental rationalism, this soul 
substance is the subject of a true proposition in God's mind: it is what is logically 
anterior to its predicates in the rational order of nature. And as the subject contains its 
predicates, so the soul substance is said to be the agent of its properties. This notion 
of causation, I have argued, seems to be what Leibniz has in mind when he speaks of 
"emanation". One should therefore interpret all his expressions of the force and 
activity of the soul, such as "first entelechy", "primitive force", "appetition", 
"potency", "urge", according to this emanation of properties in this (transcendental 
and rational) ordering of things. 
I have also argued that this same conception of causation is asserted by the 
Christian Lurianic kabbalists. It is not the "external" or mechanical motion of 
efficient cause, but an "internal" or vital motion, and which "proceeds from its inner 
61 FoL, p. 50. 
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being". 62 This metaphysical power of the soul is "intimately present" in its associated 
body; and its "emanative" (i. e. non-mechanical, idealistic-rational) nature is likened 
by the kabbalists to light or heat. In Thoughts on Genesis, Leibniz collects a number 
of natural terms which van Helmont ascribes at different times to the soul and body. 
Discussing van Helmont's kabbalistic deconstruction of "Schamajim", the Hebrew 
word for Heaven, he writes: 
The Hebrew word is compounded of two words, signifying "fire and water", 
that is, of Esch, "fire", and Majim, "water", which intimates thus much to us 
that the power of activity and passiveness, of heat and cold, of male and 
female, of soul and body, are contained in the heavens. 63 
It is clear that van Helmont's natural terms are drawn from alchemy, but the extent to 
which any particular one should be regarded as purely allegorical, or having also a 
basis in nature, is at times confused. Whereas light and dark, heat and cold, may 
reasonably be regarded as both symbolic of, and as actual state of, the active soul and 
passive body, and likewise for the Sun as supreme agent of light and heat, the 
suggestion that the Moon is the corresponding agent which positively cools, does not 
have a basis in nature. Indeed, referring to the assertion in The Divine Being that "fire 
warms, and the water cools", 
64 where van Helmont has taken two symbols for the 
passive principle (water, coolness) and made one the agent for the other, Leibniz 
remarks: "I doubt [this] about water". 
65 
There are many occasions throughout the Helmontian corpus where fire and water 
are referred to the soul and body. Leibniz, despite his awareness of van Helmont's 
occasional confounding of the symbolic and the natural, rightly remarks: 
62 Principles, p. 69. 
63 Thoughts on Genesis, p. 16. 
b` Section 104. 
65 OK, ii, 1070. 
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When he [van Helmont] composes everything of fire and water and takes 
these for spiritual principles, I believe that he understands these allegorically, 
and that he wished to signify by this an active and a passive principle. 66 
Leibniz and the Christian Lurianic kabbalists shared the same analysis of what soul 
and body fundamentally are, and that their relationship should be understood in terms 
of emanative causation. 67 I have already suggested that Leibniz's cosmology is based 
on Neo-Platonic principles; and I have mentioned a number of possible sources for 
these as put forward by different scholars. Naturally, these same sources are also 
where we should look for influences on Leibniz's thought with specific regard to the 
doctrine of emanation. Christia Mercer points out the emanationism in the writings of 
Leibniz's teachers, Adam Scherzer and Jakob Thomasius; and she identifies the 
presence of the doctrine in texts written by Leibniz in the years 1668-1671.68 Daniel 
Fouke argues that Aquinas was a possible source, whom Leibniz knew as early as 
1670. He notes that although emanation was all pervasive in the seventeenth century, 
Aquinas's form of the doctrine had already been Christianized: in particular, that the 
necessity of the emanative creation of the world had been obviated. 69 
The emanationism of Kabbalah also made its way into the Christianized Lurianic 
version. Allison Coudert has argued that the emanationism that Leibniz met with in 
Christian Lurianic Kabbalah, in van Helmont in particular, decisively influenced 
Leibniz's conception of creation and the nature of matter, and that this took place in 
61 Coudert, Leibniz and the Kabbalah, p. 57; L Br, 389, fols 9 if. 
67 Christia Mercer offers one of the most thorough discussions of emanationism in Leibniz, in chapter 
six of her Leibniz's Metaphysics. See also Fouke. Robert Adams notes that "there is ample evidence 
that, in traditional theological terms, Leibniz saw God as 'immanent' as well as 'transcendent' in 
relation to the world... The Discourse on Metaphysics suggests a substantial connection between 
God and finite things, describing creation as a kind of emanation... A similar account is given in the 
Monadology, although 'fulguration' replaces 'emanation"'. See Adams, pp. 131-132. 
68 Mercer, pp. 200-202,208-216. 
69 Fouke, pp. 177-179,182. 
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the 1690s. 70 I have already stated my objections to this thesis. It is my contention, 
rather, that Leibniz was interested in the Helmontian doctrine for its exoteric parallels 
to his own rational metaphysical one. The alchemico-kabbalistical imagery used by 
van Helmont to describe the emanative relationship between soul and body can be 
regarded as a symbolic parallel to what Leibniz has to say on this issue, since, as I 
have shown, their analysis of the nature and relationship of soul and body is the same. 
In chapter 3.3, I proposed that van Helmont in Thoughts on Genesis was engaged 
in a mode of religious harmonizing that involved treating Scripture as symbolic and 
showing its parallels in rational philosophy. As I have recorded above, Leibniz 
himself suggests that "when [van Helmont] composes everything of fire and water" 
he means this "allegorically". These terms are used "to signify... an active and a 
passive principle", which define the fundamental relationship of soul and body in 
emanative causation. 
5.3 On the Transformation of the Same Animal 
I have argued that since both Leibniz and the Christian Lurianic kabbalists assert that 
every created soul inextricably has a body, an absolutely separate soul is impossible, 
as is, by implication, strict metempsychosis. That souls are indestructible, but their 
bodies are mutable collections of monads, is what is meant by the "transformation of 
the same animal". An immortal soul, inextricable from body, implies that death is 
neither an absolute cessation or extinction of the soul, nor is it a departure of the soul 
from the "dead" body, as in metempsychosis, but rather is a transformation: a spatial 
70 Coudert, Leibniz and the Kabbalah, pp. 84-89. 
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and vital diminution of the bodily organic machine, which the soul rules. Conversely, 
birth is not an absolute commencement or creation of the soul, nor an arrival of the 
soul into the "born" body as in metempsychosis, but rather is a transformation: a 
spatial and vital augmentation of the organic machine. Thus transformation explains 
birth and death without recourse to the absolute separation of souls from bodies. 
Since, for Leibniz, nature is a plenum, it seems to me that a soul (with its invisible 
body) before its visible birth, or after its death, must be a member of a larger 
collection of souls, be contained in some larger body, for example, in the mother's 
body before birth, or in the corpse after death. But since it is only a matter of time 
before the corpse decomposes, eventually the soul will find itself outside its old gross 
body, if it has not already passed out of it, and inside some other new body. It is clear 
then that Leibniz's doctrine of transformation implies that the migration of souls from 
gross body to gross body is at the very least a possibility and, indeed, an inevitability, 
despite there being no explicit assertion of this by him in his writings. 
This doctrine of transformation was not developed in Leibniz's mind as a result of 
his kabbalistic interests. I have already argued that it follows from his most 
fundamental ideas on nature; and writings prior to the 1690s show the doctrine 
already firmly established. As early as 1671 Leibniz mentions the idea of the subtle 
body: 
This seminal principle is so subtle, that it remains even in the ashes of the 
substance when consumed by fire, and has the power, as it were, of collecting 
itself in an invisible centre. 
In 1675 he wrote that "there are minds in the ovum even before conception. " 72 To 
71 A, 2,1,118f. 
72 Pk, section 477. 
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Arnauld in 1687 he writes that: 
since generation is apparently only a change consisting in growth, so death 
will only be a change consisting in diminution, which causes this animal to 
reenter the recesses of a world of minute creatures where perceptions are more 
limited, until the order comes, perhaps calling them to return to the stage. The 
ancients were mistaken in introducing the transmigration of souls instead of 
the transformations of the same animal. 73 
The notion that a soul (with its minute body) might at some future time grow again 
and commandeer a new visible and gross body, is already hinted at here with the 
phrase "return to the stage". And the same is put more strongly, with an example, in 
the New System of 1695: 
No one can specify the true time of death, which for a long time may pass for 
a simple suspension of noticeable actions, and is basically never anything else 
in simple animals --witness the resuscitations of drowned flies. 74 
In 1699 to John Bernoulli, resuscitation, or visible re-incarnation, is stated to be a 
possibility, but no more: 
In this theatre it is possible for the same animal to be produced more than 
once, yet I believe that the contrary is also possible. Reason does not 
determine this question easily, therefore, and I hold it for a deeper 
investigation. 
Yet three years later in Reflections on the Doctrine of a Single Universal Spirit 
Leibniz writes that "the order of nature requires that everything be developed again 
sometime and return to a noticeable state". 
76 (My italics. ) 
7s AG, p. 88. 
74 Ibid., p. 141. 
'S L, p. 514. 
76 Ibid., pp. 557-58. 
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Van Helmont's name was often mentioned by Leibniz in association with the topic 
of the migration of souls after the period 1694-96. But, as I have just shown, the 
concept of transformation, which underwrites the possibility of the transmigration of 
souls from visible body to visible body, was established long before the mid-1690s. 
However, a case could be made that Leibniz's considerations of Helmontian writings, 
in particular the Seder Olam, might have led to a certain clarification on his part by 
means of the distinguishing terms of subtle and gross body. I have reported Leibniz's 
remarks on the Seder Olam where he describes how such a revolution could occur 
when the diminished body of a soul at death can pass out of its former gross body (the 
domain of the larger soul which it once ruled) and enter another new gross and visible 
body: all this without strict metempsychosis, or absolute separation of a soul from 
body. Leibniz also utilizes this argument in the New Essays, where it is specifically 
mentioned in association with van Helmont: 
If transmigration is not taken strictly, i. e. if anyone thought that souls remain 
in the same rarefied bodies and only change their coarse bodies, that would be 
possible, even to the extent of the same soul's passing into a body of another 
species in the Brahmin or Pythagorean manner. 77 
The Brahmins and Pythagoreans had asserted the transmigration of souls; and, as 
Leibniz mentions here, he can see how such could be possible by utilizing the 
distinction of subtle and gross bodies, and the doctrine of transformation. But this 
distinction was not always made: In a letter to Simon Foucher, dated 1687/8 (? ), 
" RB, section 233. See also ibid., section 240: "The late M. van Helmont the 
younger went further, as 
I have just said, and believed in the transmigration of souls... For all I 
know he may, clever man though he was, have believed himself to be one of the ancients. I have 
explained earlier a way in which the migration of souls is possible (though it does not appear likely) 
namely that souls might, while retaining rarefied bodies, pass suddenly into other coarse bodies. " 
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Leibniz fails to reconcile the transmigration of souls of the Pythagoreans to his 
transformation of the same animal: 
The Pythagoreans obscured the truth with their metempsychosis; instead of 
thinking of the transformation of the same animal, they believed, or at least 
proclaimed, the passage of the soul of one animal into another, which is not to 
say anything. 78 
It is interesting to note that in words added by Leibniz to Thoughts on Genesis he 
goes out of his way to effect this reconciliation, writing that the doctrine 
which the Pythagoreans are said to have held; and at this day is attributed to 
the Brachmans or Bramines... probably are not so to be understood, as if they 
held [strict metempsychosis: ] that a man might be changed into a beast, but 
rather, that the humane soul might for a time be confined to the prison of a 
bestial body. 9 
At the end of the letter to Foucher, just quoted, in which Leibniz asserts his 
transformation of the same animal, he writes: "these sorts of consideration are not 
suitable to be seen by everyone". The uneasiness expressed here concerns the 
possibility that transformation might also apply to human souls, implying their 
heterodox revolution or re-incarnation. In the letter to Arnauld of 1687 quoted above, 
Leibniz states outright that "minds are not subject to these revolutions", and goes on 
to say that "God creates them when it is time and detaches them from the body (at 
least the coarse body} by death". 
8° What is especially remarkable about this, is the 
extent to which Leibniz flies 
in the face of several of his most fundamental 
metaphysical and epistemological principles. Created substances are supposed to have 
78 Leibniz's New System', ed. by Roger Woolhouse and R. Francks (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997) p. 
55; GP, i, 390. 
79 pp. 61-62. 
" AG, P. 88. 
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all been produced at once; the soul is essentially inextricable from body (only God is 
pure spirit); and the appeal to miracles, to special operations of God, should be 
avoided where reason can hope to provide explanation. A reasonable account is 
available, indeed demanded if Leibniz's metaphysics of substance is to be coherent - 
that is, that human souls, like all simple substances, should be revolved. Moreover, 
since God cannot do anything that involves logical contradiction, he cannot separate 
souls from bodies, for the notion of an active principle without a passive one is such a 
logical impossibility. In this quotation, the phrase in curly brackets, "at least the 
coarse body", was not in the copy of the letter that Arnauld received, for the subtle- 
gross body distinction is precisely that idea which permits transformation of the same 
animal and points to the revolution of human souls. 
Whereas Leibniz was prepared to invoke the (impossible) special operation of God 
and reject reason for orthodoxy's sake, the Christian Lurianic kabbalists had no such 
qualms, and embraced the (Lurianic) revolution of human souls wholeheartedly. 
Discussing this problem in his remarks on The Divine Being, Leibniz accordingly 
rejects the revolution of human souls, stating that he is "persuaded" that their rules of 
operation are "special laws", i. e. miraculous, and not comprehensible through reason: 
I do not wish to extend this doctrine to man nor to the human soul, being 
persuaded that because the soul contains the image of God within himself, it is 
governed by special laws, the details of which can only be learned by 
revelation. And since it appears that Scripture did not wish to explain this 
matter as much as we might wish, I doubt that we can hope to find in this life 
as much detail concerning the next life as Mr. Van Helmont seems to give 
US. 
81 
$I Coudert, Leibniz and the Kabbalah, p. 56. 
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In the New System, Leibniz repeats his assertion that "minds have particular laws, 
which place them above the revolutions in matter"; but a reason is now given for this: 
that "minds being like little gods... made in the image of God, [have] in them some 
ray of the light of divinity". 
82 But, as I will show later, all monads in Leibniz's 
cosmology have some degree of the immanence of God in them. 
Words added by Leibniz himself in Thoughts on Genesis, quoted above, that the 
Pythagoreans or Brahmins probably should be understood as if "the humane soul 
might for a time be confined to the prison of a bestial body" is a point he repeats in 
the New Essays, where he speculates that such is possible "if while in the body of the 
beast [a human soul] had the thoughts of a man, and even of the man whom it had 
animated before the change". 
83 Whilst there are no obvious indications that Leibniz's 
kabbalistic interests had a specific effect on the evolution of his handling of this 
problem, the prominence of the doctrine in what he read and in his discussions with 
van Helmont, not to mention his work on Thoughts, must have impinged on this 
fraught and conflict-ridden issue in Leibniz's mind. In his Reflections on the Doctrine 
of a Single Universal Spirit of 1702, the theological status of the human soul forces 
Leibniz to make exceptions for it concerning both its origin and destiny. He advances 
a reasoned explication as to the origin of particular souls, in order to avoid the 
doctrine that there is but one only universal animating spirit. This explanation is the 
general one that birth is but the augmentation of pre-existing souls, and that death is 
the diminution of the soul along with its subtle body. But this essentially rational 
explication is expected to stand alongside the (miraculous) theological special case 
concerning human souls. Leibniz "does not deny God the right to create new souls... 
82 GP, iv, 480. 
83 RB, section 234. 
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or to give a higher degree of perfection to those already in nature. " This is because of 
"God's particular economy with respect to human souls, which may be privileged. " 84 
(My italics. ) 
Concerning death, Leibniz is also prepared to allow the possibility of precisely the 
opposite of what he asserts: 
As for the complete separation of soul and body, I can say nothing about the 
laws of grace, and about the ordinances of God in regard to human souls in 
particular, beyond what the Holy Scriptures say, since these are things which 
cannot be known by reason, being dependent on the revelation of God 
himself. Nevertheless, I see no reason, either religious or philosophical, which 
compels me to abandon the doctrine of the parallelism of soul and body and to 
admit a perfect separation. 
85 
Even in the Theodicy he still vacillates as to whether miraculous operations are to be 
involved in the existence of human souls. Concerning the elevation of a soul to that of 
a rational mind, Leibniz describes "a kind of transcreation", in which "God may have 
given reason to this soul through some special operation", which "is easier to admit" 
than if "there be a natural means of raising a sentient soul to the degree of a reasoning 
soul", which is "a thing I find it difficult to imagine", since "revelation teaches much 
about other forms of immediate operations by God upon our souls. " Moreover "this 
explanation appears to remove the obstacles that beset this matter in philosophy or 
theology. " 86 (My italics. ) If the language this is couched in is as shaky as anything 
Leibniz wrote, later on in the book, stating that "I considered also that one might 
attribute this elevation of the sentient soul... to the extraordinary operation of God", 
in a further display of his dilemma, he contradicts what he had said earlier by saying 




that "nevertheless it will be well to add that I would dispense with miracles in the 
generating of man". 
87 
Finally, in works such as The Principles of Nature and Grace, where Leibniz 
discusses transformation and metempsychosis, he remains silent as to how this might 
affect human souls. 
5.4 The General Continuum 
Beings of the world, corporeal substances, consist of a mind and a body, and the 
relationship between these two is the causal one of emanation. The mind, as a single 
substance, is the enduring active force, which is the logically anterior sufficient 
reason for, the emanator of, the body, which itself, as a set of properties, is the 
transitory passive principle, the logically posterior effect, that which is emanated by 
the mind. The body of the corporeal substance contains a multiplicity of (sub-) 
monads. Since a monad is an active principle, every body is therefore said to contain 
an aggregate of active principles. Now, each of the active principles in this aggregate 
has its own corresponding passive principle, or body, which together constitute (sub-) 
corporeal substances. Each of the bodies of these (sub-) corporeal substances contains 
its own multiplicity of (sub-sub-) monads, each of which is an active principle itself, 
and so on. Since the divisibility of space is endless, this process itself is endless. 
Thus it is that the body of a corporeal substance has both a passive and an active 
aspect. It is passive when conceived as a whole thing, as a set of properties extended 
over a single spatial domain, 
in relation to its (active) mind from which it has been 
97 Section 397. 
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emanated. And it is active when conceived as a multiplicity, as a collection of 
individual monads, each of which is active in relation to its respective (passive) body, 
which each emanates. But, since individual monads in the body of a corporeal 
substance, as monads, are their own sufficient reasons or emanators of their own 
respective bodies, the mind of the corporeal substance to which they collectively 
belong, cannot itself be the sufficient reason for those individual monads of the body. 
For the monads of the body, as monads, are active principles, emanators, themselves: 
they are not determined by another, but are the sources of their own properties. Active 
principles are related only to passive principles in emanation. The mind of a corporeal 
substance, as active principle, cannot be the emanative cause of the active principles 
embedded in its associated body. Rather, the mind is the emanating cause of its body 
considered only in its passive aspect, i. e. the aggregate body conceived as one whole 
thing. A mind emanates an aggregate body of monads from out of the plenum of 
monads, by virtue of its being the spatio-temporal unity of that multiplicity, and 
which constituent monads are logically subsumed by the mind as their sufficient 
reason. An analogy will serve to make this clear. Imagine a choir. The choirmaster is 
responsible for the way the choristers perform as a whole, is responsible for the 
collective voice of the whole choir; but each individual chorister is responsible for his 
own individual voice, and follows his own score. The mind is the choirmaster; the 
body in its passive aspect is the choir as one whole aggregate sound; and the body in 
its active aspect is the multiplicity of individual choristers producing their individual 
sounds. 
88 The subsumption of active principles into one whole passive principle 
S8 See Leibniz to Arnauld, 30 April 1687, in AG, p. 84-85. 
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under the dominion of a single active principle, is what Leibniz calls concomitance 
and which is usually known as the doctrine of pre-established harmony. 89 
It has been seen that bodies have both passive and active aspects because of the 
divisibility of space. But, conversely, because of the aggregability of space, minds too 
have passive as well as active aspects. They are active in relation to their bodies, but 
insofar as they can be included in an aggregate consisting of other (active) minds, 
which as a whole form the body of some "higher" corporeal substance, they are 
passive. So if a plurality of people, say, can be grouped together according to some 
common characteristic of behaviour, it can be said of them that not only is each 
person his own active principle, but as one amongst a body of people, each stands in a 
passive relation to some more higher dominant mind. What sort of mind this might be 
is not clear, and this is not developed by Leibniz, but it would seem to fall into the 
category of the supernatural, and the idea of such super-human agency is not absent 
from human thinking, e. g. a group of people displaying a common behaviour 
repugnant to another, might well be accused of being "ruled by the devil"; whilst the 
accusers themselves may attribute their own behaviour to the "influence of God". 
It should now be evident that the beings of the world exist in a chain and because 
space is both infinitely divisible and infinitely aggregable, the chain of being extends 
for ever towards the infinitely small and the infinitely large. The search towards the 
small, of corporeal substances within corporeal substances, of ever-more 
subordinated monads, will never end in a monad which does not yet embrace a 
further aggregate of monads: a monad which is not an active principle cannot 
rationally exist. Therefore there can be no purely passive entity, there can be no prime 
89 As Christia Mercer notes, "it is important to recognize that Preestablished Harmony is a version of 
Emanative Harmony". See Mercer, p. 301. The "interaction" of monads according to this doctrine is 
explored at length by her at pp. 300-322. See also Tymieniecka, pp. 116-123. 
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matter: there must be corporeal substances everywhere endowed with a dominant 
active principle and a passive principle which is not a body of pure passive primary 
matter, but a body of secondary matter or which contains active subordinate monads. 
In actuality, matter exists, but it is not a substance, since it is an aggregate or 
repeating of substances: I say this of secondary matter... But that which we... 
call primary matter, is something incomplete, since it is pure potential... 
Extension, or if you like, primary matter, is not other than a certain 
indefinite repetition of things... Matter merely passive... consists only of the 
incomplete, or of the abstract. 90 
Conversely, the search towards the large, towards ever higher minds, ever more 
dominating monads, will never end in a monad which is itself not yet embraced by a 
further dominant monad: a monad which is not also a passive principle is not 
possible: there can be no purely active (created) entity: every being of the world must 
stand in a passive relation to some higher entity. 
In summarizing the ultimate nature of the cosmos we may say that at bottom it 
consists of a plenum of monads, which have absolute relations among themselves 
according to the order of reason. That which is logically anterior in the order to a 
group of others is the dominant monad of a group of subordinate monads, or the 
active mind of the passive body. There is an infinity of ever more dominant and ever 
more subordinated monads. And all real beings of the universe (the corporeal 
substances) have the nature of this monadic relationship. 
But this objective view of the universe belongs only to the infinite mind of God, 
because only he is the subject of all the (true) ideas there are. Any subject which 
embraces less than the infinity of all ideas, has a mind which is merely finite, and has 
what we call a subjective view of the universe. It will be necessary then to complete 
90 B, P. 6. 
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this account of the world according to Leibniz by explaining how he understands the 
ultimate nature of the finite mind and the processes involved it it. 
The monad is a particular idea in God's mind: God's ideas are true, and what is true 
is a real thing or substance. The ego or soul is a substance, because the self-conscious 
"I" is an idea whose truth cannot be doubted. (This is one of only a few truths that a 
finite mind can possess, and Leibniz was in complete agreement with Descartes about 
this. ) And since substances are true ideas in the mind of God, it follows that my soul 
is an idea in God's mind. Accordingly the description of the ultimate nature of my 
being, or any worldly finite being, must be based on that of monadology, or the 
relationships holding between the ideas in God's mind. And so, inasmuch as my soul 
is a concept in the mind of God, the emanation of my perceptions from my soul, 
precisely is the emanation of predicates from concepts in God's mind, or the 
emanation of properties from substances in the objective universe. Because my soul is 
only one idea amongst the infinity that exist in God, the perceptions that I have, that 
flow from this single infinitesimal idea, are accordingly limited. Since the mind 
which does not comprehend all things cannot know whether any one thing of 
perception is true (since to demonstrate truth is to show how something must be as it 
is and not otherwise, which involves knowledge of all logically possible things), it 
follows that the perceptions of finite minds are not equivalent to, do not correspond 
to, real substances; or, the experiences of worldly beings can only be subjective: the 
things of my perception have only moral certainty. 
It has been seen that absolute force in the Leibnizian metaphysic reduces to 
emanative power, a sort of force of logic in the absolute order of reason as it exists 
between an active dominant monad and its related passive set of subordinated 
monads. Since only God knows monads and the absolute relations of rational 
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dependency between them, only he knows absolute force, and, therefore, only he 
knows absolute motion. It is the case that for finite minds, though the things of their 
perceptions are related by the same principle of active-passive, because of the mere 
moral certainty of their perceptual objects and their respective relations, the ordering 
of things by rational dependency is not absolute, but rather an ordering by the 
(merely) apparent clarity of assignable reason. Thus we may say the sea is the active 
principle that tosses the passive boat, not by virtue of our possessing an a priori 
reason based on the absolute order of logical dependency between sea and boat, for 
finite minds cannot calculate a priori reasons for worldly events. Rather, we say the 
sea is the active principle only by virtue of the a posteriori: the ordering by 
empirically assignable reason, or what more easily or clearly appears to be the 
sufficient reason for the other. Thus, amongst the perceptions of finite minds, the 
causal relation of active-passive reduces to one of distinctness-confusion (of the 
assignability of sufficient reason). But because of the mere moral certainty of these 
perceptions, assignability by distinctness has no basis in truth, thus in the finite mind, 
force has no absolute reality, and motion is only relative. 
That of which the expression is more distinct, is judged to act; that whose 
expression is more confused, is judged to suffer... And that thing of which the 
reason of the changes of the state is most easily assigned, is judged to be the 
cause... And causes are taken to be not from a real influx but from an 
assignable reason. 
91 
That the perceptions of finite beings fail to deliver not only certainty to the relations 
amongst their objects, but even certainty as to their very existence, means that the 
finite being cannot strictly know that a plurality of substances even exists, i. e. cannot 
9' Specimen /nventorum, 1697 (? ), in GP, vii, 312. 
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know for certain that there is an external world. Hence a mind of the world finds itself 
in an empirical solipsism, in a "world apart". And reason, built only on sense- 
perception, can yield us only the truth and the existence of nothing but one's own soul 
and God. 
Each substance is like a world apart, independent of all other things, except 
for God; thus all our phenomena, that is, all the things that can ever happen to 
us, are only consequences of our being... 
Nothing can happen to us except thoughts and perceptions... even if 
everything outside of me were destroyed, provided there remained only God 
and me. 9 
But that reason demonstrates the existence and nature of God, and his omniscience, 
thus providing for a true knowledge in the things of his perception, and thereby the 
certain existence of a plurality of substances, is why Leibniz asserts that a finite mind 
can know that an ultimate nature of the cosmos does exist, in God, and yet cannot 
know the details of this ultimate nature itself. The rational mind of man knows by a 
priori reason that there is a real world outside the substance which is his soul, and 
within which he is located; but he cannot know this by a posteriori experience. 
Consequently, Leibniz's metaphysics of the microcosm is conducted following the 
pattern of monadology laid down by a priori reason concerning the ultimate nature of 
the macrocosm, which is known perceptually to God, but only theoretically to man. 
This ultimate nature consists in monads and their mutual relations, the fundamental 
nature of which is the subsuming of a multiplicity of monads by a single one, by 
virtue of the single being the sufficient reason for the many. Referring to my previous 
account of corporeal substances then, I may say that my soul is an enduring active 
force, what is commonly called desire or appetite, and which emanates a transitory 
92 Discourse on Metaphysics, section 14, in AG, p. 47. 
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passive principle, or perceptual state. Now, emanation is that relation which exists 
between monads, according to which the one is called the dominant monad or active 
principle to a collection of subordinate monads or a passive principle, in the sense 
that the dominant is anterior to the subordinate in the logical order of reason. Monads 
or substances are true ideas or perceptions in God's mind, and inasmuch as true ideas 
emanate other ideas from them, so the emanating idea is a dominant monad and the 
emanated ideas are collections of subordinated monads. As the dominant monad 
(idea) emanates the subordinate monads (ideas), or, in the objective view of the 
universe, substances emanate properties, so I, as a dominant monad substance, as a 
true idea in God's mind, emanate collections of subordinate monads or perceptions in 
my subjective view. That my perceptions simply flow from my soul, from all the 
logical ramifications included in the concept which is my soul as it exists in the mind 
of God, implies that "I" do not select or create my perceptions, but rather that "I" am 
merely their unwilling source. And as far as my experience is concerned, perceptions 
simply present themselves as they are emanated, emerging with apparent spontaneity. 
We do not form our ideas because we will to do so, they forms themselves 
within us, they form themselves through us, not in consequence of our will, 
but in accordance with our nature. 93 
This emanating power, this force of logic, which connects the concept of my soul to 
the ideas necessarily implied by it, is that which I experience in my subjective world 
as desire or appetite. "The action of the internal principle which brings about the 
change or passage from one perception to another can be called appetition. " 94 
The passive principle of every corporeal substance is a body or aggregate of 
93 H, section 403. 
94 Monadology, section 15, in AG, p. 215. 
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subordinate monads emanated by its active principle. In my corporeal substance this 
is the perceptual state emanated by my soul, the aggregate of subordinated monads, 
which, since monads are ideas, is itself a collection of smaller perceptions. Leibniz 
calls them minute perceptions or petites perceptions. As an aggregate whole they 
constitute the actual perceptions which the (sentient) soul has; but, individually, as 
smaller or weaker elements, though constitutive of the aggregate, which is clear and 
sensible to the soul, they are in fact confused and insensible in themselves. 
These minute perceptions, then, are more effective in their results than has 
been recognized. They constitute that je ne sais quoi, those flavours, those 
images of sensible qualities, vivid in the aggregate but confused as to the 
parts... 
They are also the insensible parts of our sensible perceptions. 9s 
Now, what is passive in relation to the active in a corporeal substance, also has an 
active aspect too. Thus, in the sense that my present perception is emanated by my 
soul, it is passive; but in the sense that each of the petites perceptions in the sensible 
aggregate are monads themselves, so they too are each active principles with their 
own associated collections of monads subordinate to them. Thus, the petites 
perceptions, individually, are dominant monads with their own active emanative force 
or appetition. This means that, in the same way as my conscious perception is actually 
constituted of a collection of insensible perceptions, so my conscious desire is 
constituted of unconscious ones. Here lies a psychological doctrine of hidden drives, 
later to become central to the work of Sigmund Freud. 
The soul does many things without knowing how it does them, when it acts by 
means of confused perceptions and insensible inclinations or appetitions, of 
95 RB, sections 55-56. 
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which there is always so very great a number that it is impossible for the soul 
to be conscious of them or to separate them distinctly. 96 
But the assertion of the existence of entities beyond what can be known empirically 
by the finite mind is implicit in Leibniz's explication of the subjective in terms of a 
rationally established objective universe. Thus: 
Insensible perceptions are as important to pneumatology as insensible 
corpuscles are to natural science, and it is just as unreasonable to reject the 
one as the other on the pretext that they are beyond the reach of our senses. 97 
The rational order of emanation of perceptions or properties happens whether or not it 
is apprehended by the substances involved in it: "Must a drop of oil or fat understand 
geometry in order to become round on the surface of water? " 98 
According to the established objective nature of the cosmos, monads combine to 
form corporeal substances, both towards the infinitely small and the infinitely large. 
That is, monads subordinate other monads, which themselves subordinate further 
monads, ad infinitum; and, conversely, monads are dominated by other monads, 
which themselves are dominated by further monads, ad infinitum. This, translated to 
the subjective view of the particular corporeal substance, means that my perception is 
not only constituted by the immediate set of petites perceptions, or body of monads 
subordinate to my soul, but that each of these petites perceptions do themselves 
subordinate further petites perceptions, and so on, without end. Conversely, my 
perception, the extent to which it embraces truth (a function of the extent to which it 
embraces all possible concepts), is itself a constituent in some aggregate of 
96 Extrait du Dictionnaire de M. Bayle article Roraius p. 2599 sqq. de 1'Edition de Pan 1702 avec mes 
remarques, in GP, iv, 550. 
97 RB, section 56. 
99 H, section 403. 
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perceptions, which, as a whole, provides the soul of that aggregate with a perception 
of greater extent than mine. Or, at least, this is possible, for theoretically the objective 
universe is that infinite series of corporeal substances, of monads that ever subsume 
more monads ad infinitum, and of monads that are ever subsumed by more monads, 
ad infinitum. Thus, though ultimately in the objective view of the universe, the 
particular soul exists somewhere within an open-ended chain of being, itself 
subsuming an infinity of monads in one direction, and being subsumed by another 
infinity in the other direction, because it is a finite being, the extent to which it unites 
other monads into a sensible clear perception, is limited: it has a merely subjective or 
bounded view of the actual objective and unbounded universe. In other words, the 
objective nature of the universe is that it extends towards the infinitely large and the 
infinitely small; and the apparent limits to both these are actually merely the limits of 
discernibility of the particular soul. So the physical point is merely what appears to be 
a limit in the direction of smallness; and the microscope, by separating the unaided- 
eye image of what seems to be a smallest thing, actually reveals it to be an aggregate 
of images. Conversely, the boundaries of the universe are merely the limits of 
discernibility in the direction of the large: for the telescope, by gathering individually 
imperceptible and confused traces of light into a unity, produces a new and larger 
image. 
All monads in the objective view of the cosmos are ideas in God's mind, and in as 
much as he is the subject of each of these perceptions, he sees or knows or represents 
all monads with unlimited clarity. But the finite mind, or individual monad, is the 
subject of only those perceptions which flow from its single and particular concept: 
what it sees, knows, represents, is of limited clarity. Leibniz defines three categories 
of monad based on the degree to which a monad represents others, which in the 
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subjective view of that particular monad, is the degree of clarity of its perception or 
degree of consciousness. Since the true nature of the relationship between monads is 
an open-ended continuum of subsuming and being subsumed, there can be no 
absolute measure of representation, therefore the Leibnizian categories of perception 
are ultimately arbitrary, and arranged relative to the human position on this 
continuum. 
It is just as reasonable that there should be substances capable of perception 
below us as above us, so that our soul, far from being the lowest of all, finds 
itself in the middle, from which one may rise or sink. 99 
The "soul" monad is that whose clarity of perception is "conscious", and which is 
effected by what we call memory. When the soul's memory is impaired, or when the 
senses are disrupted (e. g. in dizziness), or when we dream, then perception is 
confused relative to normal clarity; and in a dreamless sleep, or where memory is 
entirely absent, it sinks to the level of confusion we call "unconscious". This 
reduction of clarity in the subjective view is correlative to the number of monads that 
a dominant monad subordinates or represents of the objective view; but since, in this 
objective view, subordination of monads continues ad infinitum, and in ever reducing 
numbers, it is the case that subjective perception ever diminishes in clarity, but there 
is no ultimate perception of absolute confusion. On the other hand, when a soul with 
conscious perception, has, in addition to memory, the faculty of abstraction, then it 
acquires "knowledge of the eternal truths" (the first of which is that there is an "I"). 
This soul is then "self-conscious". "Thus, in thinking of ourselves, we think of being, 
of substance, of the simple and of the composite, of the immaterial and of God 
99 Considerations on Vital Principles and Plastic Natures, 1705, in L, p. 588. 
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himself. " 10° With metaphysical ideas the perception of a soul increases in clarity to 
the category of rational mind. But there is no upper limit to the clarity of the 
subjective view, for monads can increase the number of monads they subsume ad 
infinitum. 
Comparison 
In Leibniz's corporeal substance a soul has, in addition to its active aspect as 
sufficient reason for its body, a passive aspect. This is its relationship to a higher 
antecedent reason of which it is but one only of a collection or body of subordinate 
monads. And because an infinity of monads is a literally endless supply of active 
principles, no matter how far up the chain of sufficient reason, or souls, one proceeds, 
there will never be reached (in the cosmos) a single soul monad, which is not yet 
further subsumed, does not stand in need of a sufficient reason, that is, does not yet 
have a passive aspect. In other words, there is no created soul which is pure activity 
or pure spirit. Conversely, the body of a corporeal substance, whilst passive in 
relation to its soul of immediate association, is a collection of monads, each of which 
is a sufficient reason or soul or active principle for its own body or sub-collection of 
monads. Again, by virtue of the endless supply of monads, there can be no body or 
collection of monads which does not yet have an active aspect in relation to some 
further subordinated monads; and there can be no purely passive being, no prime 
matter. 
100 Monadology, section 30, in AG, p. 217. 
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I have shown that the Christian Lurianic kabbalists reached the same conclusions 
because they had based their conceptions of the soul and body on the same notions as 
did Leibniz, viz. that the soul is an active spirit to a passive bodily collection of 
spirits, and that spirits exist in an infinite number or plenum. Leibniz, clarifying the 
notes he took from van Helmont, writes in Thoughts on Genesis: 
Every part of the World hath its own Expansion, as well as something above 
the same, by which it is governed and assisted; yet is the whole Expansion 
altogether Infinite: And tho' there be a present limited Sphere to every 
Expansion, yet have theyo a power of stretching or spreading themselves more 
and more, without end. 
Hence, this is not an expression of pure amanuensis alone, but is also a concord of the 
thoughts of the kabbalist with Leibniz. 
In the other direction of the continuum there can be no purely passive or wholly 
material body. In the Seder Olam there are the words: 
As every Spirit or Soul in the whole creatural system is a Body... so every 
Body is in some degree or measure Animal and Spiritual, i. e. hath Life, Sense 
and Knowledge. 
102 
Leibniz notes of this that: 
It appears also probable enough that there is no corporeal substance in nature 
that is not endowed with some kind of life, soul, or perception, or at least with 
some entelechy or force of acting. 103 
101 pp. 49-50. 
102 Section 30. 
103 Coudert, Leibniz and the Kabbalah, p. 60; FoL, p. 50. 
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Whether this "probable enough" indicates that this concept is not yet established in 
Leibniz's mind, or is a mere reticence to appear too much in agreement with van 
Helmont, I shall examine below. 
The hierarchy of rulership, as it cascades from soul to body, from the souls 
collected in that body to their own sub-bodies, and so on, is likened by van Helmont 
and Conway to the command structure of an army, which is transmitted down the 
strata of ranks, each rank being responsible for a smaller and smaller group of men 
below it. This analogy seems to have been one already fixed in Leibniz's mind when 
he read The Divine Being, for in his resume of it, referring to paragraph 94 where it 
states "that the body hath its own proper life, over and above its being governed by 
the soul or its principal spirit", Leibniz adds that "The soul of man directs as a general 
his army". 104 This expression is not used in the paragraph of the text. 
Now, this cascade of rulership down the chain of being in the passive direction of 
the continuum is endless. I have indicated (p. 76) that in the biblical phrase "darkness 
was upon the face of the deep", "darkness" is interpreted by van Helmont as that 
passivity which characterizes the "deep", or abyss, that is the endless, bottomless, 
continuum of the "faces" or spirit beings of nature. When Leibniz puts van Helmont's 
thoughts together, he adds his own words to elucidate what these "faces" are, and 
which clearly coincide with his own conception of the monad: 
Faces are substances, or individual singular things, subsisting by themselves, 
even spirits or souls, and, as it were, persons, for the Greek word PROSOPON 
signifies a person as well as a face; and that because every person, or rather 
every subject, or suppositum, hath a kind of face whereby it is known and 
distinguished. 105 
104 OK, ii, 1069. 
105 Thoughts on Genesis, pp. 23-24. 
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Continuing, Leibniz explains that: 
An abyss is a deep, whose fund [foundation], ground, or bottom is far off, that 
is, at a very great distance, or rather that hath none at all... Wherefore by 
abyss here we are to understand infinity, which is without any bottom or end. 
Moreover, this abyss or infiniteness is everywhere, and that not only in God, 
but also in the creatures, for not the light only is infinite, but the darkness 
106 also. 
This is a symbolic account of Leibniz's own conception of the continuum. 
It appears that Leibniz's ideas on the continuum were not significantly influenced 
by his kabbalistic interests. As early as 1668-9, in the Survey of Catholic 
Demonstrations, Leibniz had written: 
The continuum is divisible into infinity... The end limit is not given, and 
beatitude does not consist in the ceasing of appetite, but in an unimpeded 
progression to ends always beyond it. 107 
In On the True Theologia Mystica of 1690 (? ) Leibniz explains the doctrine in 
theological terms. The plenum of created substances is essentially an infinity of 
finitudes, in relationships of activity and passivity, or being and non-being, or God 
and nothingness. Since every monad has some activity and some passivity in it 
(subordinates, and is subordinated by, other monads), Leibniz writes: "All creatures 
derive from God and from nothingness. Their self-being is of God, their non-being is 
of nothing. " And however much a creature may expand and increase its active 
vitality, it cannot escape having some element of passivity or non-being: "No creature 
can be without non-being; otherwise it would be God. " 
108 
'°6 Ibid., p. 24. 
107 A, 6,1,499. 
108 L, p. 368. 
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The doctrine of the continuum implies not only that there is no maximum 
expansion, no purely active monad, but also that there is no minimum: no smallest 
corporeal substance: no soul which is not yet a sufficient reason for some others, and 
does not have some domain over which it is the ruling principle. In other words, there 
is no created soul which is pure passivity: souls with ever less vitality and perception 
must exist without end. This conclusion concerning the continuum was also reached 
by the Christian Lurianic kabbalists. In the Seder Olam it says that "every Body is in 
some degree or measure Animal and Spiritual, i. e. hath Life, Sense and 
Knowledge", 109 and I have indicated above that Leibniz describes this assertion, that 
every creature must have some minimum life and perception, as "probable enough". 
The reservation pertaining to this comment seems somewhat disingenuous, for the 
doctrine of the continuum had been established in Leibniz's mind for a long time. 110 
The reason for any such holding back would have come from Leibniz's needing not to 
appear too much in agreement with a publication that was causing controversy 
amongst some clerics. 
Though the Seder Olam was not a source for Leibniz of the concept that there is no 
absolutely passive substance, it might be that this kabbalistic encounter marked the 
start of some deeper considerations on the nature of the diminishing direction of the 
continuum. In the following year, 1695, in his Dialogue on Human Freedom, Leibniz 
sets out the nature of created things in terms of both their similarity and difference 
from God. As in On the True Theologia Mystica he distinguishes two principles: 
being, which ultimately flows from God, and non-being, or nothingness. These are 
also the principles of activity and passivity, for which God is unlimited or pure 
109 Section 30. 
See also On the Elements of Natural Science of 1682-4, where Leibniz writes that there is no 
minimum or zero vitality and perception, but rather that "all bodies are able to have some 
perception according to the measure of their perfection". L, p. 279. 
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infinite activity; and creature, as what by definition is limited, is defective or finite 
activity. The extent to which a creature is limited determines the extent to which 
passivity, non-being or nothingness "enters into" it; or, the extent to which the vitality 
it has, is a privation or negation or lack of perfection of, the attributes of God. 
Discussing this issue in the Dialogue on Human Freedom in relation to good and evil, 
Leibniz writes: 
The Platonists and Saint Augustine himself have already shown us that the 
cause of good is positive, but that evil is a defect, that is, a privation or 
negation, and consequently, it arises from nothingness or nonbeing. 111 
The same is asserted in De homine, notes taken down by Leibniz based on 
conversations with van Helmont: "Nothing is evil and evil is nothing. God makes all 
things, so he makes no evil. Evil comes from privation, which creatures have in 
themselves. " 
What is of particular interest to me now is that Leibniz asserts in the Dialogue that 
the positive or active force which is infinite in God, is matched by the infinity of its 
privation or negation. Leibniz is speaker B: 
A- How did sin come into the world, since God, the creator of the world, is 
infinitely good and infinitely powerful? To account for sin there must be 
another infinite cause capable of counterbalancing the influence of divine 
goodness. 
B- I can name you such a thing. 
A- You would therefore be a Manichean, since you admit two principles, one 
of good and the other of evil. 
B- You yourself will acquit me of this charge of Manicheanism when I 
name this other principle. 
A- Then please name it now, sir. 
B- It is nothingness. 
A- Nothingness? But is nothingness infinite? 
B- No doubt it is; it is infinite, it is eternal, and it has many attributes in 
i. i AG, p. 114. 
112 OK, ii, 1057-58 (not in Grua). 
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common with God. It includes an infinity of things, for all things that do 
not exist are included in nothingness, and all things that are no longer 
have returned into nothingness. 113 
In other words, all force has its origin in God. The closer a creature is to God, the 
more active and good it is; and the further from God it is, the more passive and evil it 
is. And since this privation is infinite, there must be an unending series of creatures 
ever further from God, and ever more passive. 
This conception in Leibniz's mind met its symbolic counterpart in the ideas 
expressed by van Helmont for Thoughts on Genesis. In the notes Leibniz took down 
from van Helmont, the latter uses light as a metaphor for activity, and dark for 
passivity. To the extent that the being, the activity, of a creature flows originally from 
God, it partakes of light; to the extent that it is limited, it partakes of passivity or 
darkness: Every creature "was a heaven, or a light, though dark was included in it. " 
God, as unlimited being, is therefore pure activity, or "only in Jehova is there light 
without dark. " 
1 14 Leibniz includes this in the edition, and adds his own emphasis 
concerning the distinction of creature from God, viz. that the creature is by definition 
limited and so is always with some passivity or dark: 
Darkness... remains, as being necessary in a creature state, because otherwise 
the creatures would not be distinguished from God, or Jehovah, who is light 
without darkness... Darkness... is never taken away from the creature. 
Light and dark are also correlated to good and evil in the draft notes and which 
Leibniz describes more clearly in the edition: "Light, good, and love are one and the 
same; and so, on the other hand, darkness, evil, and hatred". 116 
13AG, p. 113. 
14 ON, 1,86; LH, I, V, 2g, fol. 35r: "Horum quilibet coelum erat, vel lux, etsi tenebrae in ipso essent 
inclussae... In solo enim Jehova lux est sine tenebris". 
is Thoughts on Genesis, pp. 22-23. 
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It can now be seen how the two principles of being, activity and goodness, and 
non-being, passivity and evil, as conceived in the Dialogue on Human Freedom, 
found a correspondence in the metaphorical principles of light and dark of Thoughts 
on Genesis. 
In the same essay Leibniz had written of nothingness that "it is infinite, it is 
eternal... It includes an infinity of things... " This conclusion that as well as the 
infinity of God there is a passive direction of the continuum which is also infinite, 
finds a metaphorical correlate in van Helmont's darkness: "There must be infinite 
darkness... From where the abyss or that which has no bottom is attributed. " There is 
,, the infinite light and the infinite dark. " 117 
As for the "infinity of things" in the abyss, van Helmont had said that: 
Light conquers dark, and still being of the infinite it works out infinite 
things... As many as there are creatures in the abyss, so there are faces of 
darkness, namely an infinity. 
Leibniz writes, using the Helmontian metaphors, how it is darkness, or limitation by 
differentiation, that produces multiplicity out of the light of the one divine being: 
If light had nothing to resist or oppose it, there could be no reflection or 
refraction. Wherefore darkness is upon the faces of the abyss, or infinite 
deep... 
Darkness was upon the innumerable faces that lay hid in the abyss. 1 19 
16 Ibid., p. 22. Van Helmont's corresponding thoughts were noted down by Leibniz at OH, 1,87-91; 
LH, I, V, 2g, fol. 36. 
"' OH, I, 88; LH, I, V, 2g, fol. 36: "Tenebrae infinitae esse debent... Unde tenebris tribuitur abyssus 
seu quoll non habet fundum... infinita lux ut tenebrae infinitae". 
"g OH, 1,88-89; LH, 1, V, 2g, fol. 36: "Lux tenebras vicit, et infinitae adhuc infinitis laborabit... Quot 
creaturae in abysso tot 
facies tenebrarum, nempe infinitae. ". 
119 Thoughts on Genesis, p. 23. 
207 
The basic conception of the continuum, with the infinite God at its head, whose 
essence (light) is differentiated into the infinite abyss, had already been expressed in 
the On the True Theologia Mystica of 1690, and in the Dialogue on Human Freedom 
of 25 January 1695. Furthermore, as the draft notes of Thoughts make clear (and 
which were taken down in August of 1696), van Helmont too had the same 
conception, dressed up in symbolic kabbalistical garb. Therefore, the edition which 
Leibniz produced is a literal convergence of the philosopher's doctrine and the 
kabbalist's doctrine, on this particular issue. 
In the Discourse on Metaphysics of ten years earlier, Leibniz had described God's 
omniscient perception of all things in all possible universes as "the altitudinem 
divilarum, the depth and abyss of divine wisdom". 120 But the metaphors are taken 
further and applied to the created world in Thoughts on Genesis, an echo of which can 
be seen in On the Ultimate Origination of Things of the following year, where 
Leibniz writes that "because of the infinite divisibility of the continuum, there are 
always parts asleep in the abyss of things. " 121 
5.5 On the Categorization of Simple Substances 
On the continuum, the body of any particular creature can never be absolutely 
passive, nor can its soul be absolutely active: rather, these two are merely relative 
poles, situated on the open-ended cosmic continuum of monads, not to be absolutely 
distinguished. This is why the terms corresponded to the soul and the body, by the 
Christian Lurianic kabbalists, can be described in terms of each other. 
120 Section 30, in AG, p. 61. 
121 AG, p. 155. 
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In Leibniz, the soul, as a single monad, is both the substance which its bodily set of 
properties inheres in, and is the sufficient reason or cause of those properties. Since, 
in his transcendental rationalism, a substance is the idea or perception of a true 
subject (in God's mind), so the bodily properties of a soul are a set of ideas, or 
perceptions, which are emanated by the soul. Moreover, the body itself is a multitude 
of monads, each of which both possesses a further bodily subset of properties or 
perceptions. Leibniz calls these petites perceptions, and the emanator of these, a 
petite appetition. Since nature is an "abyss", this emanation of ever smaller 
perceptions, or subordination of ever less vital monads, continues wthout end. 
Conversely, moving up from the abyss, every soul monad is one idea amongst a 
collection of ideas emanated by souls with ever greater perceptions, or are 
subordinated by ever more vital monads, ad infinitum. Within this continuum Leibniz 
describes three categories of monads based on three ranges of degrees for which a 
monad is the unitary principle, or "represents to itself', or has the perception of, a 
group of other monads. The greater the degree of representation, the greater the 
clarity of the monad's perception. The middle category contains "soul" monads, 
whose clarity of perception is what we call "conscious", or has reason. The highest 
category contains those monads called "rational", that is, those whose clarity has 
advanced to grasping a priori truths. Since the perception of the "I" is the first of 
these truths, according to Leibniz, "self-consciousness" is a cardinal characteristic of 
this category. The lowest category contains "bare" monads, what we call 
"unconsciousness"; and on account of their lack of memory, their perception is 
confused. On account of the continuum it has to be assumed that the upper and lower 
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categories extend indefinitely with neither absolute clarity nor absolute confusion 
ever being reached. 
I have shown that the Christian Lurianic kabbalists took over the three worlds of 
the Jewish kabbalists, Beri'ah, Yezirah and Assiyah, and that these effectively 
represent three strata of the spirit continuum. The Neshamah spirits of Ben 'ah are the 
active principles of the bodies, or collections of ru'ah spirits, in Yezirah. These ru'ah 
spirits, as well as forming the passive principle or body of a neshamah spirit, are 
each, also the active principles of the bodies, or collections of nefesh spirits, in 
Assiyah. Each strata of spirits is related to the one above or below it, according to the 
logical order of nature: that emanative relationship of active-passive as it applies in 
general to the soul-body relationship. Accordingly, a particular world of spirits, or 
stratum of the continuum, will be less vital and more dense or gross than the one 
above it, and, as passive principle, will be its vehicle. The spirit above, as active 
principle, emanates, radiates, the lower. As Leibniz notes in his own words from the 
Seder Olam: 
The most gross [of these spirits] is the vehicle for the others, thus nephesh for 
ruah, ruah for neshama, and... on the other hand, the most subtle penetrates 
and illuminates the other by its rays. 122 
In the world of Assiyah, which is our visible world, Leibniz notes that this is "where a 
stupidity or kind of death overcomes the souls". But this world is not a place of 
bodies uniformly without any vitality at all, for, as Leibniz further notes, "this 
[stupidity or death] should however only be understood comparatively, because there 
is life and corporeity everywhere". 123 
122 FoL, p. 51. 
123 FoL, p. 50. 
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I have mentioned that in Thoughts on Genesis van Helmont does not refer to 
kabbalistic worlds, but we do find another nomenclature for the tripartite 
categorization of the continuum, in the form of the division of the waters, which is 
based on verses 6 and 7 of chapter 1 of Genesis. Leibniz, in summarizing van 
Helmont's thoughts, describes three types of waters, or bands of the continuum, and 
which are distinguished by the extent to which active and divine governance, or the 
light, is dominant: 
This division [is] of the Super-Celestial, Celestial and Inferiour Waters, or the 
Light Triumphant, the Light prevailing, but still fighting, and the Light 
overcome and subdued. 124 
But concerning these "inferiour Waters", or the world of Assiyah, he writes: "The 
Waters below the Heaven, which afforded matter to the Earth, or dry Land, were 
those, in which, upon the Fall, Confusion and Darkness did prevail". 125 And this 
fallen stratum is discussed elsewhere in Thoughts on Genesis, where it is referred to 
as Adamah. When Leibniz produced his version of this Adamah he added several 
colourful phrases to the basic conception that van Helmont had discussed with him. 
The stratum of Adamah is that of the de-vitalized spirits of nefesh which collectively 
make material bodies: The "body of Adam was made out of the dust of Adamah, 
which is the matter of the world, as yet dark, and the flesh or blood of things. " 126 It 
"forms the corruptible body of all things, the flesh garment, the dark bark or shell". 127 
But since the spirits of this realm are also active principles which subordinate other 
spirits, so too creatures exist even here: "Every least dust, of this dust [Adamah], is a 
124 Thoughts on Genesis, p. 50. 
125 Ibid., p. 49. 
'26 Ibid., p. 109. 
127 Ibid., p. 103. 
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creature hidden as yet. " 128 Following van Helmont's use of "worms" as the lowest 
discernible form of life, Leibniz writes that "Adamah... is, the slime, or imperfect 
blood of the Earth, but yet living, and consisting of a confluence or swarm of 
innumerable worms" 129 and "which do swarm in the depth or bottom of all earthly 
matter, and from whence all other bodies are formed. " 130 That the stratum of Adamah 
is not that of spirits absolutely devoid of life, but rather of a comparative death only, 
is further illustrated by Leibniz's play on words of opposing meaning: "Adamah is... 
a living death, and animated corruption... the life of death, and the death of life. " 131 
This Adamah then, along with the kabbalistic worlds, represents categories of the 
continuum of nature, at least within the metaphysics of Christian Lurianic kabbalism. 
I have argued that Christian Lurianic Kabbalah is an idealistic rationalism: that the 
spirit continuum, as well as being one of degrees of vitality, of relative activity- 
passivity, is also one of degrees of knowledge. Accordingly, the nefesh spirits of 
Assiyah, or Adamah, are those less active spirits of material body, the animal vitality; 
the ru'ah spirits of Yezirah are the active principles of visible bodies, or are souls; and 
the neshamah spirits of Beri'ah are those rational minds which rule mere ru'ah souls. 
It is to be concluded that, since these categories are imposed on an open-ended 
continuum, the upper and lower ones, like Leibniz's rational mind monads and bare 
monads, extend indefinitely. Thus the rational neshamah minds can be increased in 
clarity without end, which is the approach to the neo-Platonic apprehension of God, 
though one not ever attainable; and the nefesh animal spirits can be decreased in 
clarity also without end. 
128 Ibid., p. 109. 
129 Ibid., p. 84. 
130 Ibid., p. 86. 
13' Ibid., p. 103. 
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It should be clear now that this tripartite division of the spirit continuum exactly 
parallels that which Leibniz applies to his monadic continuum: 
Neshamah spirits in Beri'ah = rational monads. 
Ru'ah spirits in Yezirah = soul monads. 
Nefesh spirits in Assiyah or Adamah = bare monads. 
In kabbalism, the three worlds come together in a single human being. That is, a man 
has a material body (Assiyah), a soul which is its active principle (Yezirah) and a 
mind whose rationality bears something of a trace of God. This scheme is outlined in 
The Divine Being, where the author seeks to corroborate it by biblical word, rather 
than by kabbalism: 
He that shall read the Holy Scriptures with attention, will find that they speak 
of three beings in man: to wit, of the image or spirit of God; of the soul, and 
of the body. 132 
In his resume of this book, Leibniz notes: "Light is spirit; force is soul; mass is 
body". 133 Light is the natural light of reason as possessed by the mind monad; force 
is the activity of a mere (non-rational) soul monad; and mass is the bodily collection 
of bare monads. But it is in his resume of the Seder O1am that Leibniz comments 
extensively on the worlds of the kabbalists. 
The collections of spirits in the world of Assiyah make bodies which appear visible 
to us, because their constituent spirits are lacking in vitality and coalesce into visible 
matter. On the other hand spirits higher up the continuum of vitality, for example, in 
132 Section 38. 
133 OK, ii, 1067. 
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Yezirah, form bodies that are too subtle to be discerned, and remain invisible. This 
same analysis of the visibility of matter is what had led Leibniz to say that angels had 
bodies too subtle to be seen; and so, commenting on the Seder Olam, he writes: 
The difference between visible and invisible bodies corresponds to our way of 
thinking but does not in any way mean there is a change of kind. Thus if ruah 
is nothing else but a subtle body, one should not distinguish it from other 
bodies, except as specks of dust which flit about in the rays of the sun are 
distinguished from pebbles. 134 
I have said that the Helmontian tripartite division of the continuum is paralleled in 
Leibniz's own division of the continuum into three categories of monads. In the same 
set of remarks Leibniz approves the distinction of spirits into intelligences (rational 
minds) and (ordinary) souls, though he is cautious about the third distinction 
concerning the least vital spirits. But he goes on to warn: 
But all that [the three differentiations of spirit] only makes up one world 
which continues and contains all these different entities endowed with 
organized bodies according to their abilities. 135 
Leibniz is making the point that these three distinctions of spirit do not represent 
ontologically separate types, for which they might constitute three absolutely separate 
realms of being, or three worlds. Rather, there is but one world, consisting of one type 
of being, the monad or spirit substance, and this world is a continuum in which 
creatures variously exist, positioned according to their activity or clarity of 
perception. Leibniz here fashions his criticism against the kabbalistic worlds as 
literally separate realms of being. And so, further on in his commentary, he writes: 
134 FoL, pp. 51-52. 
135 Ibid. 
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Following reason, if the different degrees of creatures formed different 
worlds, there would be nothing that obliged us to stop at the three worlds of 
the author... Thus, it is more reasonable to recognize an infinity of degrees in 
the perfections of the creation in the same world than to make different 
worlds, which only serves to astonish people with the novelty of the 
opinion. 
136 
But, as I have shown, the kabbalistic "worlds", as least in Christian Lurianic 
Kabbalah, should really represent bands of degrees of perfection in the same one 
spirit world; and Leibniz himself similarly divided this one world up. Whilst the 
kabbalists use of the term "worlds" is an unfortunate one, the Seder Olam, at the same 
time, does assert the doctrine of the continuum. This is evident also in the remarks by 
Leibniz quoted above that the difference between visible and invisible bodies "does 
not in any way mean there is a change of kind" (i. e. the difference between ru'ah 
spirits or soul monads, and nefesh spirits or bare monads, is not one of ontological 
kind but only of degree of perception on a spirit continuum). There is also the further 
remark that the vitality of nefesh spirits "should however only be understood 
comparatively, because there is life and corporeity everywhere". 
The description by the kabbalists that souls descend from superior to inferior 
worlds is a metaphorical parallel to Leibniz's thoughts on this issue. Leibniz writes 
that the description of a soul travelling from one world into another "is to use 
metaphorical expressions": it cannot be literally true "since revelation does not 
explain anything about this". However, insofar as "a soul may change its condition 
and increase or decrease in perfection" the description concurs with the Leibnizian 
doctrine and therefore is "truthful". 137 
When Leibniz encounters the tripartite division of substances in the Seder Olam, he 
136 FoL, pp. 53-54. 
137 FoL, pp. 53. 
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agrees that there is a difference between rational spirits and ordinary (non-rational) 
souls, but is cautious about the further differentiation that van Helmont makes 
between these two and a third lower grade: 
It is however true that there is some difference between spirits or intelligences 
and between souls and that one could perhaps join to them souls or 
entelechies inferior to them. 
138 
The reluctance expressed here seems to be genuine, for before this time Leibniz only 
ever makes a clear distinction of substances in terms of the rational and non-rational. 
I am not suggesting that Leibniz would deny that there are simple substances inferior 
(in perception, vitality, perfection) to the souls of animals: indeed such is implicit in 
his doctrine of the continuum. I merely point out that, as far as I know, before the late 
1690s, Leibniz does not explicity mention three types of simple substances. 
Leibniz read of these three kabbalistic categories of the Seder Olarn in 1694. In 
1696 in Thoughts on Genesis he is involved in describing this tripartite division of 
nature according to van Helmont, and the specific features which pertain to the third 
and lowest category of spirits, which set it apart from the other two. This lowest 
category is the "inferior waters" or "light overcome", and is that which after the Fall 
produced matter, confusion and darkness, and which, inasmuch as it corresponds to 
the lowest kabbalistic world of Assiyah, is constituted of those nefesh spirits, whose 
vitality is of that grade inferior to those of ru'ah souls. Van Helmont also refers to this 
material category as Adamah, and is noted as having said that "In the dust of Adamah 
there are as many dust particles as creatures or as worms". 
139 Bodies are formed of 
the dust of Adamah, for which each particle of dust is a living creature itself. Leibniz 
138 FoL, p. 51. My italics. 
139 OH, 1,100; LH, I, V, 2g, fol. 38r: "In pulvere Adamha tot pulvisculi quot creaturae sive quot 
vermes. ". 
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engaged with this particular description of the Adamah, writing in the published 
edition that the: "Adamah... consist[s] of an innumerable host of little animals, even 
as many as it hath smallest particales of dust. " 140 Leibniz's notion that every particle 
of matter contains innumerable creatures converges here with van Helmont's ideas, 
where it finds metaphorical expression in van Helmont's clearly expressed third and 
lowest division of the continuum, the Adamah, or the world of Assiyah. 
The "worms", as the exemplars of the invisible animals in the stratum below 
ordinary souls, would not have been purely metaphorical to Leibniz and van Helmont, 
but had a basis in nature as the lowest (discernible) forms of life, as the microscopists 
had revealed. Leibniz had written about this as early as 1669 in a letter to Jacob 
Thomasius, where he says that "since we know that putrefaction consists in little 
worms invisible to the naked eye, any putrid infection is an alteration of man, a 
generation of the worm. " 
141 Leibniz frequently refers to the microscopists and 
certainly didn't discover in van Helmont the idea of worms as a form of life inferior to 
that of ordinary souls. But it will be interesting to see the extent to which, if at all, a 
third category of living substances comes to be established in Leibniz after the mid- 
1690s, and the extent to which "worms" is employed as an exemplar of the life forms 
of this category. 
In On Nature Itself, written in 1698, two years after Thoughts on Genesis, Leibniz 
speaks of a substance which is a "soul or a form analogous to a soul", which is "a first 
entelechy, that is, a certain urge or primitive force of acting". He uses the term 
"monad" which he had recently adopted, describing this "form analogous to a soul" as 
"what I usually call a monad, in which there is something like perception and 
140 Thoughts on Genesis, p. 113. 
14' L, p. 96. 
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appetite". He adds that "nor is there any reason why souls or things analogous to souls 
should not be everywhere. " 142 
The "monad" here, which is analogous to a soul, with something like perception 
and appetition, and which exists everywhere, is what will later be the "bare monad", 
the lowest category of the genus "monad". 
Later in the same year, in a letter to Johann Bernoulli, Leibniz explains how the 
form, or bare monad, represents a species itself: "If you have a clear idea of a soul, 
you will also have a clear idea of a form; for it is of the same genus, though a 
different species. " 143 No matter how bereft of life a piece of nature may seem, for 
example, a stone, the principle of a vital continuum requires that (bare) monads of 
relatively inferior activity exist to be found: 
I hardly know how far the flint should be divided so that organic bodies (and 
therefore [bare] monads) might occur; but I readily declare that our ignorance 
on the matter has no effect on nature. 144 
And in an echo of the "dust of Adamah" of Thoughts on Genesis, he also writes: 
Nature knows no boundary... There could be, indeed, there have to be, worlds 
not inferior in beauty and variety to ours in the smallest motes of dust, indeed, 
in tiny atoms. 141 
In another letter to Bernoulli the following month, Leibniz again describes his wish to 
define (bare) monads as a species of soul, distinguished by their indiscernibility: "I 
wanted whatever other primitive entelechies there may be remote from our senses to 
142 AG, pp. 162-63. 
143 18 November 1698, in AG, p. 168. 
'" Ibid. 
ias AG, p. 169. 
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be conceived on analogy with souls". But their notion is still far from being clearly 
developed: "I confess that they are not conceived perfectly. " 146 
In the June of 1699, Leibniz writes to de Voider of entelechies separately classified 
from ordinary souls: "When you ask further if an inanimate body has its own 
entelechies 'distinct from the soul', I reply that it has innumerable such 
entelechies. " 
147 
The use of "worms" to represent indiscernible life forms had been used in the 
correspondence to Bernoulli quoted above. But in a letter of January 1699, Leibniz 
extends the use beyond the more straightforward reference to those bacterial life 
forms revealed by the microscope, and asks, concerning the 
parts in cheese in which there appear to be no worms... What prevents there 
from being other smaller worms or plants in those parts in turn... and so ad 
infinitum, so that there would be nothing in the cheese free from such 
things? 148 
That an infinity of such "worms" exists in the abyss of nature, reminds one of 
Leibniz's words in Thoughts on Genesis, that Adamah "consist[s] of a confluence or 
swarm of innumerable worms". And to de Voider in the letter above, he writes how 
every body is "a place of confluence, like a cheese filled with worms". 149 
These expressions suggest that some of the metaphors Leibniz had met with in his 
collaboration with van Helmont led to their use as analogies for illustrating points 
being made in his philosophical writings. 
Although the three categories of monad are not systematically presented until 1714, 
in the Principles of Nature and Grace and The Monadology, the idea of a third 
14G 17 December 1698, in AG, p. 170. 
147 L, p. 520. 
148 AG, p. 170. 
149 L, p. 521. 
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species of soul, in addition to the previous two of the rational and non-rational, seems 
to begin to crystallize in Leibniz's mind in the late-1690s. It could be argued that his 
considerations of the three species of substances in van Helmont's works, played a 
part in such a crystallization. 
There is a further issue concerning the species of monads, which this study brings 
to light: an issue that involves a clash of Leibniz's rational cosmology and his 
theology. I have argued that Christian Lurianic Kabbalah asserts that nature is a 
continuum. This implies that created spirits differ amongst themselves only by degree 
(degree of vitality, perception, perfection) and not by ontological kind; which means 
that the kabbalistic "worlds" are only bands of degrees on the spirit continuum. This 
contradicts what van Helmont says in other places concerning these worlds, namely 
that they are ontologically separate realms of spirit beings, as is evidenced both by 
his identification of the world of Assiyah with the existence of matter, and by his 
asserting that this world exists for a definite age, i. e. with a beginning and end, before 
and after which it did not exist. When Leibniz criticizes this idea of worlds as realms 
of being separated ontologically and temporally from the rest of the created world, he 
accuses van Helmont of being "not well-informed about the constitution of the 
universe". 
150 I would suggest that van Helmont was well-informed because of his 
assertion that nature is a continuum, but not well-informed inasmuch as he adopted 
the kabbalistic system of literally separate worlds, which conflicts with the doctrine 
of the continuum. However, despite this explicit objection to the 
ontological separation of creatures, Leibniz proceeds to add that "whether all these 
entelechies are of the same kind... is not yet decided". It is certainly decided from a 
rational point of view, as 
being "more reasonable... than to make different worlds"; 
ISO Aý ý, xi, 22. 
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but Leibniz's indecision now is due to a theological conflict, for, if all entelechies are 
of the same kind, there is "the result that the lowest could arrive at the condition of 
the most noble". 151 In other words, it would be "more reasonable" that human souls 
developed from less noble ones, but theologically heterodox to say so. I have already 
addressed the extent to which Leibniz perverted his rational cosmology to 
accommodate theological requirements, in respect of the human soul, when I 
discussed the question of re-incarnation earlier in this chapter. But in some ways 
Leibniz's phrase "is not yet decided" is a bold one: even to hold open the possibility 
that reason might over-rule theology is a heresy in itself. 
Summarizing what this comparative work has revealed, the following may be said. 
Both Leibniz and the Chrisitan Lurianic kabbalists apply a common tripartite 
categorization to created substances. Leibniz's three types of monad have 
metaphorical parallels in the spirits of the three worlds of the kabbalists and in the 
three kinds of waters and lights of Thoughts on Genesis. Leibniz and the Christian 
Lurianic kabbalists shared the principle that created substances exist on a vitalistic 
continuum. I have pointed out that this implies that the "highest" and "lowest" of the 
substance categories must extend indefinitely towards the more and less vital ends of 
the continuum respectively. This implication is developed for the lowest category in 
Thoughts, where it is called the Adamah, and whose creatures are "worms". I have 
noted that it is not until after his involvement in Thoughts that Leibniz writes 
explicitly of three categories of monads, and uses descriptions of the lowest realm as 
containing "endless worlds in motes of dust" and as a "confluence of worms". This 
suggests that Leibniz's involvement in Thoughts led to a clarification of his ideas on 
isi FoL, p. 51. 
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the categorization of created substances, and an adoption of some of the Helmontian 
nomenclature. 
Finally, this comparative work has shown that Leibniz's criticism that the three 
worlds of the kabbalists cannot be literally separate, also applies to his categories of 
monads: that they are not different in kind but only in degree. This means that human 
rational souls are not essentially different from the souls of beasts and leaves open the 
possibility that they could even have evolved from them. Leibniz's evasive treatment 
of this issue suggests that he appreciated these unorthodox possibilities. 
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Chapter 6 The Creation of the Cosmos 
6.1 The Meaning of "Creation" 
I have set out Leibniz's conception of the ultimate nature of existence, both of the 
world and of God; but cosmology is also concerned with the nature of the origin of 
the world. Leibniz discusses this origin in terms of "creation"; but before setting out 
the details of this process, it is necessary that it is first established as to what exactly 
Leibniz means by the term "creation": What are the various notions involved in this 
idea? I have already argued that Leibniz's metaphysics is a transcendental rationalism. 
Essences are concepts, ideas or perceptions, and as such presuppose minds, which 
they depend on for their existence, and to which they are said to belong. In the same 
way, properties presuppose, depend upon, and belong to, substances. It makes no 
sense to speak of perceptions as having independent existence, as being or signifying 
anything, if they have no subject or mind of which they are the predicates or ideas. 
Now, I have argued that in Leibniz's metaphysics "existence" itself is a mere idea, a 
predicate that is additionally attributed to a subject, when the proposition to which it 
belongs can be demonstrated to be a true one. The subject of such a true proposition 
is said to "exist" and is called a "substance". The truth of a subject, thus its reality or 
existence as a substance, has been demonstrated when the sufficient reason has been 
found that shows that the properties the subject has, must be as they are and cannot, 
rationally, be otherwise. When that sufficient reason is included in the concept of a 
subject, then its truth is self-evident: it necessarily exists, or is a necessary substance. 
The only idea of this sort is the idea of God; and this is the ontological argument. But 
when the concept of a subject has its sufficient reason located in another, then its truth 
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depends on the truth or reality of the other, and its existence is said to be 
"contingent". It will soon be seen that it is the mechanism of supplying a sufficient 
reason to a contingent substance, by a necessary substance, that is at the heart of the 
notion of creation for Leibniz. 
Now, if what is called the world of things is to be regarded as nothing other than a 
set of properties or modes of a single substance, the (divine) necessary one, then it 
makes no sense to speak of real transformations or real initiations or a "creation" of 
the world. Indeed, there would then be no real difference between the world and God: 
"pantheism" and "creation" are mutually exclusive terms. The meaning of "creation" 
for Leibniz is essentially that notion which is contrary to that of "pantheism". That is, 
whereas "pantheism" treats of only one existing substance, of which all the things of 
the world are merely modes (this is Spinozism), "creation" presupposes a dichotomy 
between, on the one hand, a single substance and, on the other, a multiplicity of 
substances, which constitute the things of the world, conceived not as modes but as 
independently existing beings, and which are somehow produced from that one single 
substance: "The production of modifications has never been called creation, and it is 
an abuse of terms to scare the world thus. " 
1 
Creation, in the Leibnizian analysis, must be understood as the instantiation of (a 
plurality of) substances (and which constitute what is called the created world). But 
this instantiation, as with the whole of Leibniz's cosmology, takes place within a 
reality as it is conceived in his transcendental rationalism. That is, creative 
instantiation must not be conceived as a temporal process, as if there had once been 
only a single existing substance, and at a later point in time there arose in addition a 
multiplicity of substances. Rather, it must be conceived in terms of the ontological 
' H, section 395. 
224 
ordering of nature according to transcendental rationalism. In this conception, 
creative instantiation is the supplying of a sufficient reason for the existence of 
worldly substances. This presupposes that the substances of the world stand in need 
of a sufficient reason, or are non-necessary or contingent (and they are, "since there is 
an infinity of possible universes" 2). 
For Leibniz, God is a necessary substance or being who is the sufficient reason for 
his own existence, and who is also the sufficient reason for the existence of 
contingent or worldly substances. Thus, it is the entailment of the truth of being, or 
the emanation of existence within the ideal rational schema, and not a temporal 
succession, that is meant by creative instantiation. And since substances of this 
(actual) world precisely are contingent, or in need of instantiation by sufficient 
reason, they must be (mere) possible substances in the anterior stage of the logico- 
ontological order. Leibniz describes these "possibles" as possible thoughts. But this is 
not allegorical because it is axiomatic in transcendental rationalism that all things are 
thoughts, and instantiation into existence is merely the thought of a possible being (in 
God's mind) being made into the thought of an actual being, or, the thought of the 
subject of a possibly true proposition being made into the thought of the subject of an 
actually true proposition (a thought which is a "substance"). Substances therefore 
existed prior to their creation (as the thoughts of the subjects of possibly true 
propositions). 
Emanative creation is thus not that of the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo. One is 
therefore perplexed by several statements Leibniz makes to the effect that the world 
2 Monadology, section 53, in AG, p. 220. 
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of substances is created "out of nothing". For example, in the Theodicy of 1710, 
Leibniz says: "God produces substances from nothing". 3 
It seems to me that Leibniz says substances are created out of nothing simply to 
stress the point that the essence of "creation" is precisely that of inception, beginning, 
origination: of that which was not an independent substance, or not the thought of the 
subject of a true actual proposition, in the immediately prior step in the ontological 
order of things. Creation is, rather, out of a (prior) substantial and actual nothingness. 
Such initiation of the newly substantial and actual is necessarily contrary to the mere 
modification of the enduring (creator) substance, which would be "creation out of 
something" (Spinozism). It is certainly not the case that monads are spatial fragments 
of God's substance, since the Leibnizian concept of substance, the monad and God as 
supreme monad, does not include that of spatial extension: 
One may not say that the soul could have been emanated from the substance 
of God in such a way as 4o grant parts to God; therefore the soul can only be 
produced from nothing. 
Now, the thoughts of possible substances can only be the thoughts of God. "God's 
mind" is the totality of all such thoughts of possible substances and their 
combinations. And since these combinations add up to an infinity of possible 
universes, this mental world of God is beyond the comprehensibility of merely finite 
minds: the pre-creation, pre-instantiation, stage is beyond the horizon of human 
knowledge. Thus, there is a further sense in which creation can be conceived as an 
emergence out of nothing, though Leibniz does not use specifically the expression 
"creatio ex nihilo" for this. Since creation involves the production of an infinite 
3 H, section 395. See also, letter to Bourguet, 1709, in GP, iii, 544: "The origin of 
things out of nothing [is] through the power of the highest unity or God. ". 
4 RC, p. 74. 
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number of concepts, each of which combine to produce an infinite number of worlds, 
all of which must be compared to ascertain the best one, the process cannot, nor could 
it ever be, comprehended by a human being, or any finite mind. The details of 
creation are beyond our knowledge: what is created emerges out of the nothingness of 
unknowability. As Leibniz says: 
A truth is above reason when our mind (or even every created mind) cannot 
comprehend it. Such is, as it seems to me, the Holy Trinity; such are the 
miracles reserved for God alone, as for instance Creation; such is the choice of 
the order of the universe, which depends upon universal harmony, and upon 
the clear knowledge of an infinity of things at once. 5 
Comparison 
Though the meaning of "creation" in Christian Lurianic kabbalism is discussed in less 
philosophical language than Leibniz uses, for example, in terms of necessity, 
contingency or sufficient reasons, it is fundamentally the same as the philosopher's. 
"Creation", for them, most certainly involves the production of separately existing 
substances by a necessary substance (an "infinite efficient"), "whereby a separable 
Being is constituted, or made". 6 This non-pantheistic production of substances, like 
Leibnizian creation, is a process to be understood "in the order of Nature, though not 
in the order of Time". 
7 That is, in terms of the logico-ontological dependence of 
transcendental rationalism, which I have argued Christian Lurianic cosmology is also 
s H, Preliminary Dissertation, section 23. See also RB, section 443: "All monads were 
created by God and depend on him; yet we cannot understand in detail how this was done. "; and 
H, section 249: "The Creation, the Incarnation and some other actions of God exceed all the 
power of creatures and are truly miracles, or indeed Mysteries. ". 
6 Cabbalistical Dialogue, p. 2. 
Ibid., p. 7. 
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based on. Van Helmont uses the terms "subsistence" and "self-subsistence" where 
Leibniz uses "contingent" and "necessary", thus "creatures neither are, nor can subsist 
of themselves" by definition, leaving God or the creator to be that only self-subsisting 
or necessary substance, which itself stands in no need of a sufficient reason for its 
existence. Leibniz makes it clear that the contingency of this world of substances, 
which distinguishes it from the necessary substance, and thereby provides his concept 
of creation, presupposes, in the ontological order, a plurality of other possible 
universes. The kabbalists never raise this issue, but pass straight on to state that 
anterior to their creation, substances existed as ideas in God's mind. Although this 
legitimately follows from their Platonic rationalism, without the distinction of cosmic 
substances into possible ones and actual ones, there can be no role for God's will as 
the supplying of a sufficient reason for this one actual universe; indeed there can be 
no creation at all, since creation is understood here as precisely that transition in the 
ontological order from that of possibility to actuality. However, as I shall mention 
below, the assertion by Conway that God's mind is prior to his will, implies the 
choosing of an action from a plurality of "possible" ones which exist in his mind. Von 
Rosenroth mentions the doctrine of the light ray or cosmic measure of the kabbalists, 
which I will suggest below represents the determining of one actual world from a 
myriad of possibles. 
Creation, for the Christian Lurianic kabbalists, is the emanative instantiation of 
ideas pre-existent in the mind of God. Worldly substances are not made out of the 
substance of God (which is pantheism), but by the substance of God; nor are they 
created out of nothing, an illogicality "according to the Laws of the Essential 
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Description of Causes". 8 Leibniz adds these words to Thoughts on Genesis, which 
accord with both his own ideas and those of van Helmont: 
True, indeed, is it, that neither Chaos nor Atoms, nor any other material 
principle, was co-eternal with God, out of which the world was made; but 
withal it is false that the world in a proper sense was made out of nothing as 
out of a subject matter, since it is a proposition of eternal truth that nothing is 
made out of nothing. 9 
In the same place, however, he also writes that "creation out of nothing... may be 
allowed of in a good sense". I have discussed the "good senses" which can be given to 
creatio ex nihilo in Leibniz's doctrine, namely, creation as the instantiation of worldly 
substance from the "nothingness" of an ideal, non-actual pre-existence; and from the 
"nothingness" of epistemological incomprehensibility. The Christian Lurianic 
kabbalists never seek to give such "good senses" to the phrase in question, though 
they do follow from their conception of creation as instantiation, since it is the same 
as that of Leibniz's. As for creation out of the incomprehensible, I have pointed out 
that Ayin, epistemological nothingness, was an aspect of the infinite godhead in 
Jewish Kabbalism, and also that Conway refers to the aspect of the zimzum in which 
God is separated from the world as the inaccessibly incomprehensible: a finite mind 
cannot embrace the infinite. Yet, not knowing does not mean not existing in 
transcendental rationalism. As Leibniz says: "A truth is above reason when our mind 
(or even every created mind) cannot comprehend it. Such is, as it seems to me, the 
Holy Trinity. " 10 Since God and the emanative process of creation are such 
8 Ibid., p. 11. 
9p. 11. 
10 H, Preliminary Dissertation, section 23. 
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incomprehensibles, the world arises, as it were, through a veil of nothingness, and is 
what Leibniz calls a miracle or mystery. 11 
6.2 The Creative Event 
Leibniz believed that God and the world are essentially different, and that the latter 
was created. This can only mean that the world is the result of a transformation of 
reality, i. e. a change of the substantial status of pre-creation existence. Primeval 
reality changed from being one that included only a single substance to one including 
other substances; and since change presupposes an agent, the single necessary and 
eternal substance must be this agent: the only shift of reality conceivable, therefore, 
must be the introduction of more substances from and by the original substance. Now, 
when reality is considered in terms of only the one substance, then any and all of the 
infinite predicates that can be made of existence, must be made of, must belong to, 
this one subject. Hence, God has infinite attributes or infinite perception. At this 
stage, with only the one subject for all infinite attributes, reality is not substantially 
differentiated: God is the one undifferentiated substance, and his mind is the 
substantially undifferentiated "realm" of all ideas. And this one subject, as the one 
and only perceiver in existence, consequently knows all, and sees all, and this with a 
ubiquitous viewpoint. 
The creative process "begins" when God starts thinking: "When God calculates and 
exercises his thought, the world is made. " 
12 That is, out of the ideas that exist in his 
mind, God forms propositions: 
See H, section 249. 
12 Leibnirii Opera Philosophica, ed. by J. E. Erdmann, 2 vols (Berlin, 1840), i, 77. 
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Things are not produced by the mere combination of forms in God, but along 
with a subject also. The subject itself, or God, together with his ubiquity, 
gives the immeasurable, and this immeasurable combined with other subjects, 
brings it about that all possible modes, or things, follow in it. The various 
results of forms, combined with a subject, brings it about that particulars 
result. 13 
Now, God is reality conceived as having but one subject: consequently his substance 
is unlimited, or infinite, in the sense of being without ends or bounds. When God 
thinks he produces a plurality of (new) subjects: and reality with a plurality of 
subjects is a reality that is limited or finite. And the number of finite propositions that 
can be formed out of undifferentiated substance is infinite, i. e. their production can 
proceed without end, since however many are aggregated, or how much any or all of 
them are extended in space, it will always be possible to continue the process, for 
there cannot come a point at which the infinite source substance is exhausted: no 
point at which the multiplicity of new substances, taken together, pass from being an 
aggregate of limited substances into one substance that is unlimited. This idea of the 
infinite as that which is unlimited, undifferentiated, is referred to by Leibniz as the 
"positive infinite"; and though this can proceed into differentiation, as when God 
thinks, the reverse process of the differentiated becoming the undifferentiated, is 
forbidden. 
We may say that there is no space, time, nor number which is infinite, but that 
it is only true that however great may be a space, a time, or a number, there is 
always another greater than it without end; and that thus the true infinite is not 
found in a whole composed of parts. It is none the less, however, found 
elsewhere; namely, in the absolute, which is without parts, and which has 
influence over compound things, because they result from the limitation of the 
absolute. The positive infinite, then, being nothing else than the absolute, it 
may be said that there is in this sense a positive idea of the infinite, and that it 
13 Pk, section 523. 
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is anterior to that of the finite. 14 
Therefore when God thinks he forms propositions which are spatial limitations of his 
one unlimited substance: an order relation called space then pertains between these 
plural propositions. And as these relations can change, so there is also a temporal 
ordering: a temporal limitation of God's unlimited or eternal substance. Therefore, if 
God is going to think at all, i. e. if the perceptions in the infinite mind are to be formed 
into propositions, then he must think an infinity of such propositions. And such an 
infinity of propositions is what we call a universe. Simply, God is undifferentiated 
reality, or one infinite substance; world is differentiated reality, or an infinity of finite 
substances, or a plenum. 
Now, the truth of a particular proposition depends on its being logically compatible 
with all the other propositions that are thought of by God, and which together 
constitute a universe. If A=B is a true proposition, AAB cannot, by the principle of 
contradiction, also be true in the same universe. But since all the propositions God 
calculates are necessarily deduced of the eternal truths, and since his mind is 
omniscient, he knows when a universe of propositions is logically self-consistent, and 
so knows whether each of its particular propositions is true and therefore a real 
substance. Or rather, such a proposition is true and a substance if the universe within 
which its truth is determined, is itself a true one. For there is not just one universe of 
propositions that can be derived of the infinite ideas in God's mind, but rather an 
infinity of such internally consistent sets of propositions. Since there can only be one 
universe (by the principle of contradiction), unless a sufficient reason can be given as 
14 On Locke's Essay on Human Understanding, in Newßssays, trans. By A. Langley (Illinois: Open 
Court, 1949), pp. 16-17. 
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to why only one of these and none of the others can follow from necessary being, 
then truth, thus actuality, cannot be conferred on any one possible universe at all. 
Now, since there is an infinity of possible universes in God's ideas, and since 
only one of them can exist, there must be a sufficient reason for God's choice, 
a reason which determines him towards one thing rather than another. 15 
Now, this sufficient reason cannot be exclusively grounded in the eternal truths, since 
it is these themselves that have generated the very multiplicity of universes, for which 
a sufficient reason is sought for bestowing truth on but one of them. And yet, if a 
sufficient reason is to be that very demonstration of truth, its indubitability must and 
can only be derived of necessary being. Thus, what is sought as sufficient reason is a 
non-logical essence of God. According to Leibniz this is "goodness"; and since God 
is an infinite being, if he has the attribute of goodness, he must have it to an infinite 
degree. What "goodness" might exactly mean in relation to the cosmical substance 
that Leibniz has defined as God, is problematical to say the least, and a protracted 
investigation of this issue is outside the scope of the present work. 16 It must be noted, 
however, that if goodness is a non-logical essence, its truth cannot be proved on 
rational principles by Leibniz's own definition of what constitutes such a 
demonstration. It would seem that faith alone is what provides for God's goodness; 
but then it has already been seen that if a sufficient reason is to exist to provide truth 
to one and only one of the infinite possible universes, this sufficient reason cannot 
itself be grounded on rational principles, since it is these very rational principles and 
Is Monadology, section 53, in AG, p. 220. 
16 See Arthur Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University 
Press, 1936) for an account of the historical precedents of attributing goodness to the source of the 
world. 
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their application to the eternal truths, which generated the multiplicity of possible 
universes in the first instance. 
With all the possible universes before his mind, God isolates the one which 
displays his goodness the most. It seems that the greatest gift that goodness can give 
is existence; and the maximum existence or perfection is the gift of maximum 
goodness. Thus the universe that encompasses the maximum existence, specifically 
the maximum possible variety of being, coupled with the maximum possible order 
amongst those beings, is the best universe, the one which most displays God's 
goodness. God's thinking begins with the production of possible universes based on 
the eternal truths, and ends with the determination of the one true universe according 
to the principle of the best. This determination is his "will". 
And this reason can only be found in fitness, or in the degree of perfection that 
these worlds contain, each possible world having the right to claim existence 
in proportion to the perfection it contains. 
And this is the cause of the existence of the best, which wisdom makes 
known to God, which his goodness makes him choose, and which his power 
makes him produce. 17 
In the sense that the truth of the eternal ideas is independent of God, that the 
propositions and possible universes produced of them follow "automatically" from 
the principles of reason, Leibniz states metaphorically that, 
There is a struggle between all the possibles, all of them laying claim to 
existence, and that those which, being united, provide most reality, most 
perfection, most significance carry the day. It is true that all this struggle can 
only be ideal, that is to say, it can only be a conflict of reasons in the most 
perfect understanding. 
" Monadology, sections 54-55, in AG, p. 220. 
111 H, section 201. 
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That the possible universes "sort themselves out", that God does not determine the 
truth of the ideas which generate them, means God's will is not primary to his 
understanding. Rather, he first calculates in his mind all possible universes according 
to the eternal truths "given" him, then he applies his will: he produces something 
according to a truth not given him, but located in him, i. e. his goodness. 
Now, Leibniz defines a free action as one which is not logically necessitated. Since 
the reason for God's will, his goodness, is not a logical reason, his will is therefore not 
determined, or, it is free. The reason of goodness 
incline[s] without necessitating... God fails not to choose the best, but he is 
not constrained so to do: nay, more, there is no necessity in the object of God's 
choice, for another sequence of things is equally [logically] possible. For that 
very reason the choice is free and independent of necessity, because it is made 
between several possibles, and the will is determined only by the 
preponderating goodness of the object. 19 
If Leibniz has untied the Gordian knot of contingency and freedom he has done so on 
the strength of his definition that to will freely is to act according to a principle which 
is an essence of the agent and which is not itself constrained by logic: even though it 
may be constrained by its essence. The point of immediate interest now is that if one 
universe is to be "selected" from many logically possible ones, then it is so by means 
of a sufficient reason (wherever that reason be grounded, or however constraining on 
the selector it may be). 
Leibniz's metaphysics asserts that reality, existence, is conferred when truth is 
demonstrated, when a sufficient reason is discovered. The sufficient reason for the 
world is therefore what produces the existence of the world, i. e. is its creator; and this 
is God, whose essence of goodness provides the sufficient reason for the selecting or 
19 Ibid., section 45. 
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the willing of one world from amongst the possibles. It has been seen that the 
transmission of truth and reality by way of the ordering of reasons is the process 
known as emanation, where an active principle is the cause or reason for a corollary 
passive principle. And the force of logic inherent in this transmission of truth and 
being, is called "power" by Leibniz. A being is a sufficient reason, an active principle, 
for some other thing, has a will, when it has power behind it: when its own existence 
is demonstrated by the force of logic. Hence a would-be agent that lacks power, a 
reason for its own being, cannot exercise a will, or provide a sufficient reason for the 
being of another. In the case of God, whose existence is necessary, his power is 
infinite. 
It is the power of this substance [God] that renders its will efficacious. Power 
relates to being, wisdom or understanding to truth, and will to good. And this 
intelligent cause ought to be infinite in all ways, and absolutely perfect in 
power, in wisdom and in goodness, since it relates to all that which is 
possible. 20 
Since the creation of the universe is the supplying of a sufficient reason to one of the 
possible universes, the world is created by the emanation of God's power: 
The primitive essence of all substance consists in power; it is this force in God 
which causes God to exist of necessity and everything which is to emanate 
from him. Next comes the light or wisdom, which comprehends all possible 
ideas and all the eternal truths. The last component is love or the will, which 
chooses among the possibles that which is best, and that is the origin of 
contingent truth or the actual world. 21 
20 Ibid., section 7. 
21 To Morel], 1698, in Gr, i, 139. See also Discourse on Metaphysics, section 14, in AG, pp. 46-47: 
"Created substances depend upon God, who preserves them and who even produces them 
continually by a kind of emanation, just as we produce our thoughts... 
From [God] all individuals emanate continually. "; and see Discussion with G. Wagner, in Gr, i, 
396: , This series of actual possibilities, or the world, emanates out of God... by the certain and 
determined reason of the greater good. " 
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Emanative creation is a reversal of the rational process. In this latter, God is 
epistemologically posterior to the world, last in the order of discovery, for we begin 
with the knowledge that (some sort of) world exists, from which, because other 
universes are logically possible, we infer that this world is contingent, therefore in 
need of a sufficient reason, which is located in a being whose existence is necessary, 
or is its own sufficient reason, i. e. God. But with the necessary being established, 
God becomes ontologically anterior to the world, fast in the order of being, who is 
the sufficient reason for this contingent world by bestowing the truth of a full- 
demonstration grounded in the eternal truths, and who thus bestows reality on the 
world, or is the creator of the world: "The sovereign substance, from which 
everything emanates ... is the cause of existence and order, and in a word the last 
reason of things. " 
22 
Comparison 
In the kabbalistical scheme of creation the imagery is primary and the philosophical 
concepts have to be extracted. I have shown that in the Kabbala Denudata, the 
Adumbratio and the Principles, the Lurianic doctrine of the zimzum was adopted by 
the Christian Lurianic kabbalists. This doctrine should be philosophically interpreted 
as the transition in the ontological order (though it is nearly always expressed 
temporally) from that of the divine substance as undifferentiated to that of the same as 
being differentiated, i. e. from existence as substance devoid of any spatio-temporal 
division (as an infinite and eternal oneness) to existence as the same one substance, 
but now subject to spatio-temporal division (as one universal substance with an 
22 To Bayle, 1702, in GP, iii, 72. The emanative creation process is discussed by Mercer, pp. 230-242; 
Tymieniecka, pp. 123-131; and OH, I, 147-170. 
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infinity of modes). It seems to me that the tehiru, or space within God produced by 
the zimzum, stands for the container in which the modes or thoughts of God are 
located. Because these thoughts (as yet) are not substances in their own right, but 
mere modes of the only (divine) substance, the tehiru is still filled only with the 
("residue" (or reshimu) of the) divine substance. 
That "God had all things essentially in him before the Creation... by having the 
Ideas... of all things in him", 23 and that the reshimu existed prior to the exercise of 
God's will ("Then the light was let into the space... And that light is the Emanative 
Principle" 24) is why I have suggested that the reshimu equates to the thoughts of 
God prior to creation. I have remarked that the Christian Lurianic kabbalists failed to 
distinguish between possibles and actuals, though I argued that such a distinction is 
implicit if the concepts of will and creation are to mean anything at all. But a 
distinction in the creative process is referred to in the Adumbratio 25 and in the above 
quotation from the Kabbala Denudata, viz. that of a reshimu that exists prior to God's 
will acting on it, and which I suggest may be equated to the thoughts in God's mind 
prior to the exercise of his will, i. e. the thoughts of all possible universes. Certainly, it 
is a fact in Conway that a possible action of God is limited only to that "which does 
not imply a contradiction"; 
26 thus, like Leibniz, possible universes exist ideally in 
God's mind as possible tenders for actual universes to be created, as long as they are 
logically self-consistent. What God actually does, which of the possible universes he 
actually creates, is, according to Conway, finally determined by his goodness, 27 the 
same ultimate creative sufficient reason that Leibniz asserts. Moreover, since this 
23 The Divine Being, section 15. 
24 Kabbala Denudata, 1,1,146. 
u Chapter 4, section 2. 
26 Principles, p. 16. 
27 Ibid., p. 13,16. 
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determining of God's will is by his goodness, which is grounded in an essence of his 
own being, Conway writes that "the will of God is most free", because, like Leibniz, 
she defines a will to be free, not when it is undetermined (that is blind action), but 
when it acts "without any external force or compulsion". 28 That this conception of 
God's will and his freedom coincides with that of Leibniz's, is shown conclusively in 
his remarks on the Seder Olam. Here, van Helmont writes that: 
There is no indifference of will in [God]... he is a necessary Agent, and yet 
also the most free Agent. 
Therefore he did necessarily create... and that not by constraint from any 
foreign Agent, but from the Determination of his internal Goodness and 
Wisdom. 9 
Commenting on this, Leibniz writes: 
The author [van Helmont] starts in a way of speaking, which is somewhat 
shocking, because he says God is a necessary agent... We can give a good 
sense to it and that with some simple charity. Because in fact God is always 
determined to make the most perfect. And this does not contradict liberty. For 
true liberty consists in the perfect usage of the faculties. 30 
6.3 The Creation of the Plenum and of Creatures 
Leibniz's account of creation is almost entirely focussed on the issues of grounding 
the contingent (this universe) in the necessary (God). With this established, he has 
little else to say on the subject, and one must fill in some of the details oneself, such 
28 Ibid., p. 15. 
29 Sections 2-3. 
30 A, 1, xi, 20. 
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as the role of monads in the production of creatures and matter, by looking towards 
his fundamental analysis of the created world. Prior to its instantiation as an actual 
corporeal substance, a created being is a possible thought in the mind of God: that is, 
it is the idea of a possible true proposition, the subject of which corresponds to the 
unextended soul or single dominant monad of the corporeal substance, and the 
predicates to the extended body or collection of monads subordinated to the soul. As 
parts of the extended body of the corporeal substance all have their own souls, or 
governing principles, so the set of predicates of a proposition in God's mind has 
subsets, each of which has its own subject or complete concept. Because space, be it 
that of the extended body of a created corporeal substance or that of the predicate set 
of propositions in God's mind, is infinitely divisible and infinitely augmentable, so 
the monads of the created world each subordinate or govern an infinity of monads 
"below" them, and are each themselves subordinated or governed by an infinity of 
monads "above" them. Likewise, the complete concepts in the mind of God each 
emanate or imply, in the logical order of reason, an infinity of concepts "below" 
them, and are each themselves emanated or implied by an infinity of concepts 
"above" them. Hence, this created world of corporeal substances is founded on a 
plenum of monads, and a possible world of propositions in God's mind is founded on 
a plenum of concepts. Since this actual world, anterior to its creation, has an exact 
counterpart as a possible world (amongst an infinity of others) in God's mind, it is 
clear that the corporeal substances of this world, and the plenum of monads out of 
which they are formed, differ in no way from those propositions in God's mind, and 
the plenum of concepts out of which they are formed, except that created corporeal 
substances are posterior to the application of God's will, whilst mere propositions or 
possible substances are anterior: that is, corporeal substances are contingents 
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underwritten by a sufficient reason (the reason of the goodness of the necessary 
substance determining this best actual world), whereas mere propositions remain in 
undetermined contingency. 
Comparison 
The Christian kabbalists had famously identified Adam Kadmon to Christ, and in 
Thoughts on Genesis van Helmont definitely equates it both to Christ and to 
"Elohim": "Elohim corresponds to Adam: Adam Kadmon... Elohim is the 
Messiah". 31 But when Leibniz edits the draft, "Adam Kadmon" is omitted entirely. 
This may be for consistency, for the edition is kept mostly free of overtly kabbalistic 
terms; but, as will become apparent below, Leibniz was averse to what he conceived 
this Adam Kadmon to be. 
A precise explication of the nature of Adam Kadmon in philosophical terms is 
difficult to extract. By interpolating between the Christian Lurianic kabbalists' 
account of creation and the metaphysical nature of the world, I have interpreted Adam 
Kadmon to be both on the one hand the infinity of active spirit principles and the 
creatures which are formed out of these, what corresponds in Leibniz to the plenum 
of monads and corporeal substances; and on the other hand to be that counterpart of 
this world as it exists in the mind of God, a divine counterpart which also exists in the 
Leibnizian metaphysics. Adam Kadmon, the Messiah, Elohim, as the spirit plenum of 
the created world is rightly conceived in the kabbalistic doctrine both as the medium 
through which creatures are made, since a creature is a relation formed between and 
31 OH, I, 84; LH, 1, V, 2g, fol. 35. 
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of spirit principles; and as the overall container in which all creatures have their 
being, since Adam Kadmon is the infinitely extended plenum of spirits: "All things 
were created through him and in him". 32 And out of an unbounded plenum of spirit 
substances, it necessarily follows that an infinity of creatures must be created. This 
accords exactly with Leibniz's cosmology, as is shown by his remarks on paragraphs 
4 to 6 of the Seder Olam: 
God's operations are never limited to a finite number of substances. It is 
ridiculous in effect to close the universe into a sphere, full of a definite 
number of little moving things, or atoms. 33 
To the notes taken down from van Helmont for Thoughts on Genesis, Leibniz adds 
his own words on Elohim (Adam Kadmon), using "seeds" for "spirit principles": 
We understand that Aelohim is the Creator, who by His most exalted 
infinitely diffused, vital, vegetant, and generating virtue, conceived all things 
from eternal seeds hidden in Himself, and at length produced and sent forth 
the same out of Himself into multiplicity and distinction. 34 
The "vital, vegetant, and generating virtue" means the principle of activity as 
manifested in inter-substantial relations: what van Helmont refers to as the fiery 
principle, and what in Leibniz is the subordinating and governing power possessed by 
a single dominant soul monad. But the active principle of every seed or monad 
necessitates a passive principle: van Helmont's watery aspect of a creature: the 
extended body, or the Leibnizian collection of spirit-substances or monads 
subordinated to the soul. 
32 Adumbratio, chapter 3, section 13. 
33 A, 1, xi, 20-21. 
34 p. 15. 
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As well as being the infinity of substances of the plenum of the created world, 
Adam Kadmon is also the uninstantiated counterpart of this world: the thoughts in 
God of this universe as a possible one yet to be actualized. This Janus nature is 
mentioned by van Helmont in the draft notes to Thoughts. Adam Kadmon, or Elohim, 
"eminently encloses in himself all substances under him and he is the glorious 
spiritual universe". 35 But this succinct expression is not carried over by Leibniz into 
the published edition. 
In the Principles Conway writes that Christ has a dual aspect, both as "God... or 
the essential word of the father", and as "the word which is uttered and revealed, the 
perfect and substantial image of God's word". 36 As word or thought in God's mind, 
Christ or Adam Kadmon belongs to the substance of God; as uttered thought, he is 
substance separate from God. In other words, the plenum and the universe of things 
constituted from it, exists both as a thought of the single divine substance, and as a 
multiplicity of substances in their own right. This distinction is clear in Thoughts on 
Genesis where Leibniz writes that: 
The things which were produced by Aelohim out of seeds, whereas before 
they were in Him, now subsist by themselves and are left to themselves, being 
endued with an active and spontaneous power. 37 
And this transition is effected by the "uttering", or the discharging of power, into the 
thought of a thing: 
Now as he that speaks, gives forth a vital Force or Power, which is received 
by the Hearers; so likewise, Aelohim, by his inward Speech, or efficacious 
33 OH, I, 84; LH, I, V, 2g, fol. 35: "in se eminenter omnes sub ipso substantial estque universum 
spirituale gloriosum. ". 
36 principles, p. 21 
37 p. 12. 
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Thought, sent forth Vertue from himself, into the Object; which, although, 
whilst it was yet with him, it were Aelohim; yet as soon as it was made his 
object, it began to have a particular or proper Being of its own. 38 
I should note that Leibniz's uncertainties concerning his conception of the Adam 
Kadmon (Aelohim), in particular its ontological relations to God and creature, show 
themselves here. The pre-uttered thought of an object is a predicate of the divine 
substance, and therefore "in him". In Leibniz's manuscript version of the work, he 
does indeed write this; 39 but, as the quotation above shows, he changes this in the 
published version to "with him", which, at least in contrast to "in", implies that the 
pre-uttered object is not substantially identical to God. And yet, as I now pass on to 
show, the transition referred to by the uttering of thoughts of objects, actually 
parallels the creative transition in Leibniz's own cosmology. 
In the discussion of verse 4 of chapter 1 of Genesis "And God saw the light, that it 
was good... ", the notes taken down from van Helmont state that the light (the divine 
"Force or Power tending to Order" 40) was not only seen by God to be good, but also 
as something which had left him and therefore become a separate new creature: 
When he saw the light that it was good, he saw that it had gone out from 
himself... Now that which had gone out from himself was separated or more 
distinct from him, namely, was a new creature. 41 
This corresponds to the emanative creation process being dealt with here; but it is to 
the nature of God's seeing, his perception, and the question as to whether the light 
went out from God before he saw it, that is of particular interest to me now. For 
ss Ibid., p. 30. 
39 LH, I, V, 2g, fol. 49r: "... quod licet adhuc in ipso Aelohim esset... " 
4o Thoughts on Genesis, p. 33. 
41 OH, I, 90; LH, I, V, 2g, fol. 36: "Dum vidit lucem quod bona esset, vidit quod ex ipso 
exierat... Quod autem exierat eo ipso erst ab eo separatum vel potius distinctum nempe nova 
creatura. ". 
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Leibniz, in his version of the discussion of verse 4 introduces the philosophical 
distinction between knowledge a priori and a posteriori, the former of which is God's 
type of knowledge. Leibniz criticizes the usual understanding of verse 4 "as if 
Aelohim having first created the Light, afterward, as it were by Experience, saw it 
was Good". 42 Experience, or a posteriori knowledge, is that type of knowledge of 
objects that finite minds are restricted to, whereas the infinite mind knows objects a 
priori. Moreover, if God's actions are not to be blind, he must know before hand (a 
priori) how they will turn out: thus knowledge by experience would at best be 
superfluous for God. Thus Leibniz notes that the a posteriori 
way of seeing the Goodness of things, is unworthy of God, when it becomes 
to see things a priori (in their Causes) yea, it is very unworthy of a Wise man, 
to do first, and then consider whether it be well done. 43 
Indeed, the very nature of perception of the omniscient mind is sight by a priori 
knowledge. Since the truth of objects of the created world depends on their being 
members of the best world, it is necessary if God is to see them, that he knows a 
priori which of the possible worlds is best. Consequently, when God's sight, or his a 
priori knowledge, extends from merely seeing possible universes, by also considering 
(a priori) which will be the best, and extends to seeing this actual universe, then this 
also is creation, or the provision of the predicate of existence to a contingent set of 
thoughts of things. The following sentence which Leibniz added to Thoughts on 
Genesis, encapsulates the idealistic rationalism of his theory of creation: "Wherefore 
in Truth, whilst he saw it [the light], he made it; or in seeing that it was Good, he 
willed it, and in that he willed it, he made it. " 
44 God's seeing (a priori) that a possible 
42 Thoughts on Genesis, p. 37. 
43 Ibid 
44 Ibid., pp. 37-38. 
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universe is the best one is, in fact, what God's will turns out to be. And there is no 
difference between this seeing (of the best universe) and its being made. Thus this 
world exists both as an a priori vision in God, as "essential word", as objects made 
outward or separate from God by the discharging of power into his thoughts of them; 
and as "revealed word", as multiplicity of substances with their own proper being or 
active powers. Real objects of this actual world result from the a priori vision of God 
(including a priori knowledge of the best): "as the Corporeal Sight hath, or supposeth 
an outward Object, so the divine Vision makes an outward Object. " 45 And because 
the substances or monads of the revealed word were, in the anterior order of nature 
(before their creation), of the essential word, that is, were ideas in a divine vision, an 
a priori apprehension available only to the infinite mind, so the production of these 
substances, from the point of view of the perception of finite minds -outward or a 
posteriori perception- has all the qualities of the epistemological creatio ex nihilo I 
have already referred to. As Leibniz writes: 
It will be more proper to say with the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews, 
chap ii, verse 3, that visibles were made of invisibles; that is, that the seeds of 
this corporeal world lay hid after an ideal and spiritual manner in the superior 
world of Aelohim Himself, which at last were hatched and produced to 
outward perception. 
46 
This superior world of the hidden essential word in Adam Kadmon, is the kabbalistic 
world of Azilut. The three lower worlds of Beri'ah, Yezirah and Assiyah belong to the 
revealed word in Adam Kadmon, and, as I have already discussed, each refers to a 
tripartite division of the continuum of creatures composed of the monads or "seeds of 
this corporeal world". 
4s Ibid., p. 38. 
'6 Ibid., P. II. 
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6.4 The Origin of Matter 
The bodily component of a corporeal substance is what Leibniz calls matter, and this 
equation remains always. Despite the fact that corporeal substances higher up the 
continuum, more active than human beings, may have bodies too subtle for our 
senses, e. g. the bodies of angels, they nevertheless have bodies. For Leibniz's 
definition of a living being, a corporeal substance, comprises a single dominant 
monad as soul, and a collection of monads subordinate to it, and which is its body or 
matter. Consequently, matter is created at the same stage in the ontological order as 
are corporeal substances and the monadic plenum in general. There is no evidence in 
Leibniz that matter, at least that which appears so to us, only arose when corporeal 
substances at some higher position, slipped down the continuum. 
All things are active and possess Entelechies, spirits and souls only by virtue 
of the participation of... the same originative spirit (God), which gives them 
all their perfections. And matter itself is only a production of this same 
primary cause. Thus everything emanates from it as from a central point. 47 
In terms of Leibniz's three-fold categorization of monads, and from the point of view 
of human beings, the substances which form the collection, which appear to our 
senses as bodies, must be assigned to the category of bare monads. But the limits of 
human sensation do not determine what body or matter is, and nor do they restrict it 
to a specific stratum of the continuum. Rather, matter or body, as the passive aspect 
of a corporeal substance, exists everywhere on the continuum. 
47 RCS p. 88 
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Comparison 
Lurianic Kabbalah does not identify matter with body, but with a specific part of the 
continuum, within which spirit principles possess a vitality of a critically lower 
degree than those of the "non-material" beings above. The production of material 
bodies is always explained as being the result of a slip down the continuum of vitality 
by those previously non-material spirits. Van Helmont follows this line in those 
works of his which deal with this issue, but, as I have indicated above, that the 
material world is not absolutely devoid of life, which it could not be since it exists on 
an open-ended continuum of vitality, implies that even here, matter must be a relative 
attribute: presumably that which is commonly ascribed to those collections of spirit 
substances which appear as bodies to our human sense. 
But whatever the ultimate nature of matter might be for the kabbalists, they 
definitely assert that it is the result of a cosmic event: that of the Fall. Since, however, 
for Leibniz, matter is identical to body, and not a particular stratum of bodily vitality, 
there can be no post-creation event responsible for its production. However, it is 
possible that the bodies of corporeal substances could become more dense so that a 
previously subtle body came to have the appearance of a visible body, as the result of 
some event which sent that creature down the continuum. 
I have set out the causes and effects of the Fall, based on the account given in 
Thoughts on Genesis. Creatures are microcosms of governance and knowledge, 
originally all created in a universal 
harmony, as that instantiated replica of the cosmos 
of all things as it existed 
in the mind of God, or in the Azilutic realm of Adam 
Kadmon. As a result of the freedom that creatures had, some of them developed an 
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excessive self-governance and own-knowledge, essentially making a radical break 
from the macrocosmic order. This results, according to words added by Leibniz to 
Thoughts on Genesis, in a moral microcosm, in which the creature develops its own 
principles of right action, which is: 
levell'd at some imaginary private good of the ruler [a created soul], wherein 
the Fall of Adam did consist, who being deceived by Eve and the serpent, 
thought it a rapine or robbery to rule and govern things like God. 49 
And such a privatizing of morality is that radical break, 
which happened, when Adam taking to himself the property of an individual, 
became a schismatick, by rendring himself from the primitive unity, and made 
to himself an object to work upon, within himself. 49 
Such creatures which "row against the flow", to use van Helmont's analogy, 
eventually end up being swept down the continuum because they have made 
themselves incongruous to it, making their place in the order of vitality untenable. 
Their bodies, or spheres of governance, take on a less vital, more dense appearance, 
when they fall. Leibniz duly represents this aspect of the Fall in his edition of 
Thoughts, e. g. "All things, before the Fall, were more heavenly and transparent than 
earthly and opaque". 
50 This fall down the vital continuum by a creature manifests not 
only as an increase in the density of its body, but also as an increase in the confusion 
of the perceptions of its soul. Before the Fall, the perceptions of all creatures flowed 
out of their souls precisely as God had pre-established them in that universal ordering 
of ideas as it existed in his mind, and to which the pre-lapsarian world of creatures 
48 pp. 93-94. 
' Ibid., p. 138. 
s° Ibid., p. 16. 
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and their perceptions was a perfect replica. Since these perceptions are emanated in 
the logical order of nature, ultimately grounded or sourced in God, they are true 
perceptions. The draft notes for Thoughts on Genesis refer to a pre-lapsarian 
perception, which was mental or ideal; but Leibniz adds the notion that this mental 
sight was a universal one: 
Man before the Fall had all things within himself, and with a mental or 
intellectual glance of his mind pierc'd through them all, he had a total or 
universal sight, by which he penetrated to the inmost of things... In Adam 
they were all true ideas, and such as contained the spiritual things 
themselves. 51 
This universal vision cannot be the same as that of God: only an infinite being knows 
all things; and man, before the Fall, was still a finite mind. It seems that what Leibniz 
is referring to here is that since the perception of each creature is as it is by virtue of 
its place in the pre-established harmony of all things, each perception mirrors the 
entire universe, and so is universal in that sense, but the details of which are confused. 
Leibniz speaks of this immanence of God's omniscience in his own words, for 
example: "It seems to me that every mind is omniscient in a confused way. " 52 With 
the excessive self-governance and own-knowledge that led to the Fall, a creature's 
perceptions no longer wholly and passively emanate from its soul according to the 
logical order of the pre-established harmony. This radical separation of itself from the 
universal order is the creature no longer perceiving itself and all other things as one 
(one harmonious cosmos) but seeing other things as "outside" itself; and the 
dislocation of its perception from the a priori emanative vision results in the 
51 Ibid., pp. 146-47. 
52 pk, section 524. 
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epistemological fall down the continuum into the confusion or "outer darkness" of a 
posteriori vision. As Leibniz writes: 
But by the Fall, being turn'd out from the truth of things, tho' by having his 
eyes opened, he might seem to awake, yet so, as that whereas before his eyes 
beheld the inward light, they were now open to outer darkness. This is the 
reason why, since the Fall, all things appear to man, as if they were outward; 
for that he affecting his own propriety, that is, to be something of and by 
himself, is stept out of the band of universality. 53 
Summary 
To summarize the various issues surrounding creation. It has been noted that certain 
general principles regarding the meaning of "creation" are shared by Leibniz and the 
Christian Lurianic kabbalists. Both assert that "creation" cannot mean pantheism but 
must mean that creatures are separate substances to God's substance: separate not by a 
temporal unfolding but by an unfolding of the logico-ontological steps of a 
transcendental rationalist conception of the cosmos. Leibniz distinguishes the 
existential status of creator and creature by the logico-ontological distinction of the 
necessary and the contingent; the Christian Lurianic kabbalists by the self-subsistent 
and the subsistent. The contingency of creatures depends on there being (logically) 
more than one possible universe in God's mind: a point always made explicit by 
Leibniz, but left merely implicit by the kabbalists. For Leibniz, this emanative 
conception of creation is not that of creatio ex nihilo insofar as creatures or "thoughts 
actual" pre-existed as "thoughts possible" in God's mind; yet creatio ex nihilo may 
have a "good sense" insofar as creatures pre-existed in the nothingness of possibility 
s3 Thoughts on Genesis, p. 147. 
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and incomprehensibility. This is paralleled in the kabbalistic imagery of the zimzum: 
an attempt to portray both a separation of the world from God and, at the same time, a 
retention of something of him in the world. 
The creative "event" itself presupposes that God's mind is prior to his will. This 
view is shared by Leibniz and the Christian Lurianic kabbalists, as is their 
understanding that God's action is free: both agree that free will is not undetermined 
or blind action, but is an action which is ultimately determined by the agent itself and 
not another being. "Prior" to his act of creation, there was only the one divine 
substance with his mind and his infinite thoughts of all possible universes. This finds 
a symbolic correlate in the kabbalistic tehiru and its reshimu; and in Thoughts on 
Genesis, Leibniz makes use of van Helmont's interpretation of the first words of 
Genesis "In the head God created". The specific "act" of creation for Leibniz is the 
invocation of the sufficient reason for this one universe: the bridge between the 
necessary and the contingent in the logico-ontological order of transcendental 
rationalism: Leibniz's creative will of God. In kabbalistic imagery this event is 
represented by the light of Ein-Sof entering the reshimu as cosmic measure and 
emanative principle. 
This particular cosmogonical process implies that the created actual cosmic plenum 
of monads (spirit substances) and the corporeal substances (creatures) formed of them 
has an exact counterpart in a possible cosmic plenum which exists as an (infinite) set 
of propositions in God's mind. This finds a metaphorical illustration in the kabbalistic 
conception of Adam Kadmon and its syncretism with Christ: he is both the created 
world and its divine counterpart in God's mind. Conway describes Christ's having a 
dual aspect: as the uttered substantial image of God's word, he is the created world; 
and as the divine essential unuttered word, he is the same thing but as (uncreated) 
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thought of the world in God's mind. In the draft to Thoughts on Genesis a parallel is 
made between the actual created world and the divine light which (since the creation) 
is now external to God and is essentially a separate, distinct and new thing. In 
criticizing this metaphor Leibniz draws attention to God's mode of knowing: it is a 
priori: the light does not have to "go out" before God can see it and thereby know it a 
posteriori. Cosmological processes are to be understood within transcendental 
rationalism: it is God's knowing (a priori) what is the best world that precisely is the 
actualizing of one world. The actual world is a plenum of substances separate to the 
divine one by virtue of the distinction of the contingent and the necessary. But that 
the actual world also exists as a possible world in the mind of God means that there is 
an idealistic counterpart to it in the way that the metaphors of the Christian Lurianic 
kabbalists make clear. The dual nature of monads as both divine and mundane will be 
further clarified in the next chapter. 
Finally, it has been shown that Leibniz and the Christian Lurianic kabbalists both 
assert that nature is a vitalistic continuum. This implies that matter, as the passive 
aspect of a creature, is coeternal with monads, and therefore could not be generated 
subsequently. Leibniz is consistent in his account of the origin of matter, but the 
Christian Lurianic kabbalists contradict themselves by adopting the Lurianic doctrine 
of the breaking of the vessels. 
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Chapter 7 The Strata of Being 
7.1 Interaction amongst the Strata of Being 
It is appropriate that I now make explicit the relationship of God to the world of 
created monads. The nature of this relationship coincides with Leibniz's "fundamental 
meditations [which] revolve on two things, to know about unity and infinity. " 
These two terms express numerically the most essential distinction between God and 
the world. God is reality conceived under one substance: it is reality undifJ'erentiated, 
or infinite. The world is reality conceived under a plurality of substances: it is reality 
differentiated into finite parts. A monad is the substance of such a finite part. And 
since the summation of parts can proceed without end, never reaching an aggregate of 
which a further addition cannot be made, so there is said to be an infinity or 
uncountable number of parts, or, there is a plenum of monads. Leibniz uses the word 
, -infinity" here to describe the plurality of monads of the world to mean "endlessly 
countable", rather than as "a very large concrete number". 
Infinity, that is to say, the accumulation of an infinite number of substances, 
is, properly speaking, not a whole any more than the infinite number itself, 
whereof one cannot say whether it is even or uneven. 2 
parts of reality are destined always to remain parts: they do not, by numerical 
augmentation, grow to a point at which they dissolve into being one whole: parts 
cannot transcend from being that of reality differentiated into that of reality 
undifferentiated. The monad, as the substance of a piece of space and time, or as the 
To Sophie, 4 November 1696, in GP, vii, 542. 
2 H, section 195. 
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active principle of a body of monads, might extend itself across space and time, 
becoming the sufficient reason for ever greater parts of reality, by subsuming more 
and more monads; but because of the infinite (never-ending) number of monads 
available, a point at which further extension is no longer possible, at which all reality 
is encompassed, cannot be reached. Hence no monad of the world, no finite part, 
could ever become the one substance of reality: a monad could never become equal to 
God, "for God could not give the creature all without making of it a God. " 3 An 
ontological chasm separates, on the one hand, God as reality undifferentiated, as one 
substance, united, unlimited, infinite or perfect, with all possible attributes; and, on 
the other hand, world as reality differentiated, as infinitely many substances 
(monads), actually separated, limited, finite or imperfect. Here lies the fundamental 
distinction between God and creature. The monad is "infinitely less than a God", is "a 
diminished divinity". 4 Thus it is that God is transcendent not only to the particular 
monad but also to the infinite collection of them. God is not the aggregate of all 
things (that is what is called the world); nor is he the prime matter out of which 
bodies are constituted (bodies are collections of monads); and nor is he the substance 
out of which monads are apportionings (monads are not parts of God, but, as unities 
themselves, are created substances): 
and to which it must return as One should not imagine... that the soul is a 
portion which is detached from Him a drop of water to the ocean. Such would 
render God divisible, whereas in fact the soul is an immediate production of 
God. 5 
3 Ibid., section 31. 
4 Double Infinite Chez Pascal et Monade, in Gr, ii, 553-55. 
5 RC, p. 73. 
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Insofar as God's relationship to the monads he creates is a transcendental one, Leibniz 
makes worldly substances external to God: "When God resolved to act outside 
himself... it. 6 But there is another aspect to the God-monad relationship: that based on 
similarity. Conceptual connections between the two make what is called the 
immanence of God, and which expressions like "All is one" and "One is all", seek to 
illustrate: 
The saying that all is one should be counterposed with another, that the one is 
all... All things are one, but not formally as if they comprised one, or as if this 
great One was their matter. 
Insofar as the existence of each and every monad, being nothing but an "actualized" 
thought of God, depends on God, so he is said to be omnipresent or immanent in all 
things, and they are said to be located in him: "In God there are infinite, really diverse 
substances". 
8 
If God is transcendent numerically and spatially to monads by virtue of his being a 
unity that subsumes an infinity of substances, then a similar relationship holds 
between monad and body, for it has been seen that, because of the infinite divisibility 
of space, the number of monads contained in a body will be infinite. Thus a dominant 
monad subsumes an infinity of other monads. And in the same way as the world is 
ontologically separate 
from God, because it is a multiplicity of substances, whereas 
God is but one united substance, so the body itself is ontologically separate from its 
dominant monad. Thus Leibniz says of each monad that it is "at the same time 
6 H, section 204. 
7 RC, p. 89. 
8 L, p. 118. See also, A, 6, I, 123: 
"God is the one among everything". 
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infinitely less than a God, and incomparably more than a universe of matter", as well 
as being "a diminutive divinity" it is "a material universe eminently". 9 
Now, a monad cannot attain absolute perfection in the sense of becoming a 
substance that subsumes all others since subsumption is an unending process towards 
the ever larger, conceived either spatially or numerically. Conversely, no monad can 
be reduced to absolute imperfection or to a substance that subsumes no other, because 
subsumption is also an unending process towards the ever smaller. Consequently, all 
monads exist on a continuum which extends in one way infinitely towards smaller 
and smaller numbers, spaces and imperfection; and in the other way infinitely 
towards larger and larger numbers, spaces and perfection. 
I am not joking, but clearly admit, that there are animals in the world as much 
larger than ours are, as ours are larger than those tiny animals of the 
microscopists, for nature knows no boundary. 
Though there is no absolutely imperfect substance (no prime matter), there is an 
absolutely perfect one: God. And if the world is developing towards perfection then 
its increase must describe a hyperbolic curve as it approaches absolute perfection, for 
such is not finally reachable by created substance. 
Having made explicit the numerical-spatial distinction between God and monad it 
is now possible to understand how perceptions or properties, and appetitions or 
forces, differ between God and monad, as Leibniz describes them. Because God is 
existence conceived under only one subject, any and all attributes that can be made of 
existence, necessarily pertain to this one substance. Thus Leibniz says that God's 
9 Double Infinite; Gr, ii. 553-55. 
10 To Bernoulli, 18 November 1698, in AG, p. 169. See also H, section 19: "Our 
globe... [is] incomparably less than a physical point... since the proportion of that part of the 
universe which we know is almost lost in nothingness compared with that which is unknown. " 
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attributes are infinite, or are perfections (unlimited attributes). All qualities (that there 
can be) are concentrated in him; or, his perception is omniscient. Because monads are 
the subjects of true propositions in God's mind, their attributes are said to be derived 
from God's, since, prior to creation, there was only one substance (God's) to which all 
attributes could belong: "Whatever is of perfection in things, necessarily flows 
immediately from that highest fount [God]". 11 And because plurality necessitates the 
finitude of the entities concerned, these monads are limited expressions of the 
attributes or perfections of God. As each of these monads is a complete concept or 
thought in God's mind, so each is a limited perception of God from a particular point 
of view. So when God thinks and creates, 
a substance, which is of infinite extension insofar as it expresses everything, 
becomes limited in proportion to its more or less perfect manner of 
expression. 
12 
The degree of clarity of expression or perception of a particular monad depends on 
the extent to which it subsumes other monads; and this clarity increases when a 
monad subsumes more and more other monads. But it has been seen above that this 
process proceeds ad infinitum; therefore there cannot be a (worldly) monad whose 
perception is maximally clear and distinct (for there will always be more monads 
available for it to embrace). 
Where there are partial perceptions so will there ever be: 
aggregates of the limited cannot 
become an unlimited whole. Thus the monad's 
perception will always 
be infinitely less than God's; or, God's perception is 
transcendent to the monad's: "If [a monad] had only distinct thoughts it would be a 
To Veit Ludwig von Seckendorf, 31 December 1692, in Or, i, 83. 
12 Discourse on Metaphysics, section 15, in AG, p. 48. 
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God, its wisdom would be without bounds". 13 Yet, if the degree of perception or 
expression of attributes marks out the transcendental distinction of God and monad, 
that the monad's perception is a perception of God (albeit a finite one), or, its 
attributes are the (limited) attributes of God, emphasizes the similarity of the two 
types of being, i. e. the immanence of God in things. Thus: 
All things are one... That is [God] attends to them intimately and fully, and 
expresses Himself in the perfections which He communicates to them 
according to their degree of receptivity. And it is thus that one says Jovis 
omnia plena; that He fills all, that He is in all things and that also all things 
are in Him. 14 
But though what a monad clearly expresses, or perceives consciously, is only finite, 
there is a sense in which the infinity of God's attributes or perception is immanent in 
each monad. Because the expression or perception of each monad is what it is by 
virtue of the determination of its complete concept, a process which involves the 
presence to God's mind of all possible concepts in all possible relations, every monad 
is said to contain a vestige of this omniscience: 
In God the universe itself is not only concentrated, but it is also perfectly 
expressed, but in each monad he creates, there is only one part distinctly 
expressed, which is more or less big according as the soul is more or less 
excellent, and all the rest, which is infinite, is only expressed confusedly in 
it. 15 
13 H, section 124. 
14 RC, pp. 89-90. See also On the True Theologia Mystica, in L, p. 367: The divine perfections are 
concealed in all things". 
15 Extrait du Dictionnaire de M. Bayle article Rorarius p. 2599 sqq. de l'Edition de l'an 1702 avec tees 
remarques, in GP, 
iv, 553. See also Pk, section 524: "It seems to me that every 
mind is omniscient in a confused way"; and On the True Theologia Mystica, in L, p. 368: 
-Within our self-being there lies an infinity, a footprint or reflection of the omniscience and 
omnipresence of God". 
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Conscious perception or clear expression of attributes emanates out of the complete 
concept of a monad. What is unconscious in perception, or confused in expression of 
attribute, is what is implicit in the original formulation of the concept in God's mind, 
viz. its relations to all other possible concepts. Objectively, clear conscious 
perceptions or expressions concern those relationships between a monad and alI the 
other monads in its collective body which it subordinates. Those perceptions or 
expressions founded on the relationships between the monad and those monads 
beyond its collective body, are what are called confused unconscious perceptions or 
expressions: what Leibniz calls petites perceptions. And these relations extend ad 
infinitum throughout the plenum, becoming increasingly more distant and weak, more 
unconscious and confused; but nevertheless they exist. All is connected to everything 
else. Since monads are the worldly correlate of the concepts determined upon by God, 
thus it is that the subordinating relations between monads correlate with the inclusion 
of concepts within each other in God's mind. 
Now, the clarity of perception/expression of a monad increases as its collective 
body of subordinated monads increases; or, as its complete concept implies more 
other concepts. It has been seen that this process has no end: God's perception is 
transcendental to worldly perception. Conversely, a monad's clarity decreases, or its 
confusion increases, when the body of monads it subsumes, or is the dominant monad 
of, decreases. But this decrease also is without end: never will a monad be found that 
does not itself yet subsume further monads, that does not have at least some degree of 
perception/expression. Consequently, there is no zero clarity or infinite confusion. 
And "matter", conceived as the multiplicity of monads infinitely available for 
Subsumption, implies that a monad's perception will always be infinitely greater than 
"matter", or be transcendent to it. A monad is, 
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apperceiving everything confusedly, whereas God knows everything 
distinctly; [a monad] knows something distinctly, whereas the material 
universe does not feel and does not know anything at all... [A monad is] 
imitating God and imitated by the universe with respect to its distinct 
thoughts, similar to God by its distinct thoughts, similar to matter by its 
confused thoughts. 16 
The beatific vision seems, accordingly, to be conceived by Leibniz as that equation of 
perception of a finite being to that of the godhead: to the seeing of all things 
distinctly. Leibniz says that there 
will only be moral assurance until somebody discovers the a priori origin of 
the world we see... For having done that, he will have demonstrated that what 
appears to us is a reality... This would nearly approach the beatific vision. 17 
But since the transcendence of God to the finite mind is an unbridgeable gulf, so it is 
that 
that supreme felicity (with whatever beatific vision or knowledge of God it 
may be accompanied) can never be complete, because, since God is infinite, 
he can never be entirely known. 18 
Finally, i turn to the relationship between God and monad as it concerns emanative 
force. God is the explanation of existence reduced to a single subject, to one ultimate 
sufficient reason. As such, all changes to this existence, specifically the emergence of 
new substances, are termed effects, of which the cause is attributed to the only 
already present substance it can be: the one and only substance of God. Hence, as 
cause of everything, 
his emanative force, activity or will is infinite: he is omnipotent. 
16 Double Infinite, in Gr, ii, 553-55. 
1' To Simon Foucher, 1675, in AG, p. 4. 
18 Principles of Nature and Grace, section 18, in AG, p. 213. 
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The monads of the world, on the other hand, as the sufficient reasons for a mere part 
of reality, have a force of emanation, or appetition, which is finite. Since there is an 
infinity of monads, Leibniz tells us that this emanative force is "everywhere 
implanted by the Author of nature". 19 The active force or appetition that a monad is 
imbued with depends on the extent to which it is the sufficient reason for the 
properties of other monads which it subsumes. And though this force or appetition 
increases the more a monad is the sufficient reason for other monads, by subsuming 
more of them, as has been seen, the subsumption of monads can proceed without end, 
thus there cannot be a monad with maximum active force or appetition, such that it is 
the sufficient reason for all other monads. Finite forces cannot become infinite; and 
the monad's will or appetition will always be infinitely less than God's, or, God's will 
transcends the monad's. Nevertheless, the monad's appetition is emanative power, that 
same type of power that is the nature of God's will, on which it depends as its own 
sufficient reason, and of which it is the continuation, albeit in finite magnitude. 
Inasmuch as God is the sufficient reason for the existence and sustenance of the 
monad, and the ultimate sufficient reason for the properties/perceptions the monad 
has, God (his emanative force) is said to be immanent in the monad; or: 
God is everything by eminence, as the perfections of effects are in their 
cause... All things are one by emanation, because they are the immediate 
effects of Him. 
2 
19 Specimen Dynamicum, in L, p. 435. 
20 RCS p. 89. 
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Though a monad can never attain perfection or unlimitedness, the extent to which it 
approaches this is a measure of its approach to God, and indeed of the immanence of 
God in the monad, or its union with him. For example: 
One sees clearly that all other substances depend on God, in the same way as 
thoughts emanate from our substance, that God is all in all, and that he is 
intimately united with all creatures, in proportion to their perfection. 21 
When God created the world, out of all the possible combinations of concepts in his 
mind, he determined upon one set according to the sufficient reason of his goodness 
(hence the selection of the best). Now this sufficient reason, by virtue of its bestowing 
truth, is what actualizes concepts into substances: it is the will of God emanating 
substances. This process is described imagistically by Leibniz: God is "the primitive 
centre from whom all the rest [monads] emanate". 
22 But when he describes the 
immanence of God in each monad, he says: "We speak of God as being a sphere or a 
circle whose centre is everywhere and whose circumference is nowhere. " 23 
Force is active in a monad when it concerns the subsumption of other monads: and 
it is passive insofar as a monad is itself subsumed by another. But, as has been seen in 
the case of perception, there is no monad which exists only in a subordinate relation: 
thus there is no monad which is not yet the sufficient reason for some others: there 
can be no monad with zero active power, or infinite passive power, i. e. there is no 
primary matter. Matter conceived as the infinity of monads always available for 
subsumption, implies that a monad's appetition is always infinitely greater or 
transcendent to this general notion of matter. On the other hand, inasmuch as the 
21 Discourse on Metaphysics, section 32, in AG, p. 63. 
22 Extraft du Dictionnaire de M. Bayle article Rorarius p. 2599 sqq. de l'Edition de Pan 1702 avec nies 
remarques, in 
GP, iv, 553. 
23 RC, p. 66. 
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monad's appetition is the sufficient reason for its perception, for the properties of its 
body (of monads), it is said to be immanent in its body. 
Now, all monads partake of both active and passive power. In the sense that they 
subsume other monads, are the sufficient reasons for their own perceptions, i. e. 
possess appetition, so they are said to partake of perfection or being, or have 
something of the divine immanent in them, since the ultimate source of perfection lies 
in God. As far as monads are subsumed, they are mere effects, or have some lack of 
will, and instead are said to partake of imperfection or non-being. 
All creatures derive from God and from nothingness. Their self-being is of 
God, their non-being is of nothing. (Numbers too show this in a wonderful 
way, and the essences of things are like numbers. ) 
No creature can be without non-being; otherwise it would be God. 24 
The use of numbers here, refers to Leibniz's binary analogy for the relationship 
between God and monad. Binary numbers illustrate the presence of perfection or 
being (God, 1) and imperfection or non-being (0) in a corporeal substance. As a string 
of Is and Os, a creature contains something of divine immanence, perfection and 
being, and something of imperfection or non-being. On the other hand, representing 
corporeal substances as denary numbers, as summations of 1s (i. e. the integers >I), 
gives the misleading analogy that they are constituted of God (1), as if he were the 
matter of the world. 
When I thought out my binary arithmetic... I judged that in that lay hidden 
the most beautiful ideas of the creation, or the origin of things out of nothing, 
through the power of the highest unity or God. And it must be considered that 
the expression of numbers in binary reckoning arise out of unity and nothing; 
not through working up, as when I say 1+1 is 2, and 1+1+I is 3, and so on in 
turn, as in the same way, by comparing God with unity and creatures with 
24 On the True Theologia Mystica, in L, p. 368. 
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numbers, God becomes the matter of creatures; but through a certain or lesser 
influx of perception. 25 
George MacDonald Ross discusses the significance for Leibniz of binary numbers in 
creation theory, especially in relation to some sketches Leibniz made for a medallion. 
He notes that between these sketches an ambiguity is revealed as to whether or not 0 
is to represent unformed matter or the void. I have argued that there can be no 
unformed or prime matter in Leibniz's cosmology: it is indistinguishable from pure 
negativity or the void, an equivalence which Ross has noted is to be expected from a 
philosopher in the neo-Platonic tradition. 26 
The nature of the immanence of one thing in another is dealt with more precisely in 
Leibniz's discussion of hypostatical union. Two things are hypostatically united when 
the one is the immediate sufficient reason, cause or active principle of the other, 
which is its instrument, effect or passive principle. This is because the terms 
sufficient reason and instrument, or cause and effect, or active and passive, are all 
terms which are mutually dependent on each other: there can be no meaning to the 
concept "active" unless it is accompanied by that of "passive; and vice-versa. These 
pairs of terms are inextricable, so any two things which stand in an active-passive 
relation to each other, are hypostatically united. 27 
Now, God is the active principle or immediate sufficient reason for the existence of 
monads (by virtue of his selecting (actualizing) complete concepts). He is thus 
hypostatically united to each monad; and it has already been seen that the dependence 
of each monad on God's will for its existence, is regarded by Leibniz as an 
immanence of God in the monad. But the transcendental distinction between God and 
ZS To Bourguet, 1709, in GP, iii, 544. 
26 See Ross, "Leibniz and the Origin of Things". 
27 Leibniz discusses hypostatical union at length in his essay entitled On the Incarnation of God or on 
Hypostatical Union, of 1669-70; A, 6, i, 533. 
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monad, of the infinite and the finite, avoids an equation of the two substances and 
averts pantheism. 
Within the created world itself, we discover another type of hypostatical union, this 
one involving that of mind and body. Because the dominant monad, or mind, in a 
corporeal substance is the active principle or immediate sufficient reason for the 
properties of its body (the collection of monads subordinate to it), considered as 
passive principle or instrument of the mind, so the mind is hypostatically united to, or 
immanent in, its body. Thus, when mind acts it moves body; and when God acts he 
creates minds: "Mind does not act on body by creating, but by moving; God 
creates". 
28 As God is not the immediate sufficient reason for the properties of body, 
but only the ultimate sufficient reason behind the pre-established harmony of all 
created substances, he is not hypostatically united to body. God is the sufficient 
reason for the existence of minds (he creates them); but mind is the sufficient reason 
for the properties of body (it moves them). 
Now, because monads do not exist by metaphysical necessity but rather by the will 
or action of God, the continued existence of them, no less than their creation, depends 
on the continuation of his action. And since the (direct) action of God is, and only is, 
a creative one, this continuous action is sometimes called continuous creation by 
Leibniz. In the 1686 Discourse on Metaphysics, Leibniz writes: "It is very evident 
that created substances depend upon God, who preserves them and who even 
produces them continually by a kind of emanation". 29 In a letter to Bayle, circa 1698- 
1701, he says that it is from substance as actualized complete concept, 
28 lbid 
29 Discourse on Metaphysics, section 14, in AG, p. 46. 
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of which the phenomena are born through order, which it received at first and 
which has been conserved for it by the author of things, from which all 
realities or perfection always emanate in a manner of continuous creation. 30 
Because creation is the inception of the new (out of the nothingness of not previously 
existing), Leibniz uses the image of the flash. And since the world exists in a 
temporal continuum, there being an infinity of instants between any two points of 
time, the continuous act of creation by God manifests as an infinity of acts or flashes. 
Hence Leibniz writes: 
One can conclude also that the duration of things, or the multitude of 
momentary states, is a mass of an infinity of flashes of the divinity, of whom 
everything at each instant is a creation, or reproduction of all things... from 
one state to the next. 31 
God's will continuously acts in order to keep the universe of monads in existence, or, 
the sufficient reason for an enduring world is in an enduring cause or substance. 
Similarly, if monads are to be the sufficient reasons that explain the properties of 
worldly bodies, then they too must be substances or enduring causes; for if they cease 
to exist as active principles, the causal basis of things could be reverted back only to 
the active principle of God, which would be a return to occasionalism and pantheism. 
From this it again follows that the doctrine of occasional causes defended by 
several persons can lead to dangerous consequences... Since that which does 
not act, which lacks active force, which is robbed of discriminibility, robbed 
finally of all reason and basis for existing, can in no way be a substance. 32 
30 GP, iii, 58. 
" To Sophie, 31 October 1705; GP, vii, 564-65. See also, Monadologv, section 47, in AG, p. 219: 
"All created or derivative monads are products, and are generated, so to speak, by continual 
fulgurations of the divinity from moment to moment. " 
32 On Nature Itself, section 15, in AG, pp. 165-66. 
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Occasionalism and pantheism are avoided because monads are (enduring) substances 
that consequently exercise power. When a power appears not to be acting, when a 
mind seems not to be moving a body, this has to be seen as only the result of the 
action or motion being indiscernible. It has been seen that this power is the logical 
force of emanation in the order of reason, in which properties or perceptions flow out 
of the substance or complete concept. Leibniz gives the analogies of the law of the 
series and calculus. As the mathematical formula generates a series of terms or a 
curve describing a trajectory, so the complete concept emanates a series of properties 
or motion through space. 
Grant me therefore in the primitive tendencies [the dominant monad's 
appetition] what it is necessary to recognise in the derivative [properties or 
perceptions of the body of subordinated monads]. The case is like that of 
mathematical laws of series, or the nature of curves, where the entire 
progression is sufficiently contained in the beginning. 33 
Comparison 
In Leibniz's cosmology there are three strata: that of God, the plenum of monads, and 
the universe of corporeal substances. In this section I intend to show that these are 
essentially the same as the three strata identified by the Christian Lurianic kabbalists: 
God, the Adam Kadmon, and creatures; and that the philosophical relations between 
these are fundamentally the same, including the problematical middle stratum. 
33 To de Voider, 10 November 1703, in L, p. 533. 
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I have explained the ways in which God is related to monads, a relationship which 
includes both conceptual similarities and conceptual differences: and these find 
expression in the theosophical terms of immanence and transcendence. Similarity is 
centred on the idea of hypostatical union, or the causal inextricability of two 
substances. In Leibniz the substantiality of monads causally and inextricably depends 
on the substance of God (for they are ideas in his mind (ideas made "actual"), and a 
mind of ideas needs a real perceiving subject). Because of this Leibniz says that God 
is immanent or omnipresent to each and every monad. Inasmuch as the particular 
perceptions that a monad has are the result of God's own thinking, indeed his 
omniscient consideration of all possible universes of things, so in each being there is 
an immanence or "a footprint or reflection of the omniscience and omnipresence of 
God". 34 And this applies also to the will of God, which, as the sufficient reason as to 
why each and every monad has been created, is the original of that emanative force, 
which has its particular manifestation in the appetition of the monad. 
But if there is a sense in which each monad partakes of the substance, perception 
and will of God, there is, on the other hand, a sense in which each monad is 
distinguished from the divinity by the unbridgeable absolute divide of the infinite and 
the finite. Hence, the substance of God, as the one and only subject of existence 
undifferentiated, is infinite; 
whereas the substance of a monad, though the effect of God's own substance, is to be 
absolutely distinguished by magnitude as finite: for it is the subject of a 
(differentiated) part of existence. 
In Elucidarius Cabbalisticus, which Leibniz read sometime between 1706 and 
1710, he notes Spinoza's words that "Everything is in God and moves in God". 
34 On the True Theologia Mystica, in L, p. 368. 
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Leibniz agrees with this, superficially, insofar as it expresses God's immanence in 
monads. But he goes on to qualify this with the transcendental distinction: 
I think that everything is in God, not as the part in the whole, nor as an 
accident in a subject, but as place, yet a place spiritual or enduring, and not a 
place measured or framed... It is thus that all things are in him. 35 
The continuous nature of space, that the addition of parts, finitudes, has no end, 
implies that subjects of finitudes can never become equal to God. So though God 
"fills all", he is also to be fundamentally distinguished from creature: "It can be said 
that the difference between God and man is only one of more or less, though the ratio 
is infinite. " 36 
Likewise, the perception of God is infinite: he sees all things distinctly; but the 
perception of the monad is always finite: for existing on a continuum of clarity- 
confusion, there is always some minimum indistinctness in its perception, for "if it 
had only distinct thoughts it would be a God, its wisdom would be without 
bounds". 37 And, the will of God, being determined by no other being but his own (his 
essence of goodness), is unlimited or infinite; whereas the monad's will, as true 
emanated force in a complete concept determined by God's will, is, therefore, a 
limited or finite one: every monad's will exists on a continuum of activity-passivity, 
always with some minimum passivity or limitation. 
I have shown how the immanence of God in created spirit substances is applied by 
the kabbalists, using their analysis of the relationship between God and spirit as that 
of hypostatical union, as that inextricability of a cause and its effect. As Leibniz had 
described this connection as the omnipresence of God in all things, as his being "all in 
35 B, p. 8. 
36 Dialogue between Poliander and Theophile, in L, p. 218. 
37 H, section 124. 
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all", so van Helmont and Conway write in the Cabbalistical Dialogue that "the 
Creator produced first of all infinite Myriads of Spirits united to him, and with him... 
so that God might be all in all". 38 In De Homine, Leibniz notes that according to van 
Helmont "God contains all in one". 39 Leibniz continues, in words which sound more 
like his than van Helmont's: 
There is nothing greater nor smaller than the One, in whom all things exist. 
Created things are examples of the infinite unity. (God is a maximum of 
infinity, and a minimum of indivisibility, or a unity or lack of mass). 40 
This immanence is that "intimate penetration" of the logical force of the order of 
nature, as it emanates from the active principle to the passive. Thus the "spirit of 
Aelohim", or that emanated force of God as it is conceived to be related to the plenum 
of spirit substances, or the "waters", according to Leibniz in Thoughts on Genesis, did 
not 
only move the surface of the waters... but that it penetrated to the inmost parts 
of it; for all the faces in the waters, or Spirits hid in the water, received their 
activity and virtue from the Spirit of Aelohim. 41 
This omnipresent immanence of God is mentioned in the Seder Olam, where van 
Helmont writes that "God is so present in all things, that he is everywhere centrally 
existent". 42 But Leibniz criticizes this description stating that "it will be difficult to 
give a reasonable meaning for these words. God has no centre". 43 Yet, if God is to be 
38 p. 15. 
39 Section 9, in Gr, i, 96. 
40 Section 24, in OK, ii, 1059-60; LBr, 67, fols 52-53: "Nihil majus auf minus Uno in quo sunt omnia. 
Creata suns exemplata Unitatis infintae (Deus infinitae maximus, indivisibilitate seu unitote seu 
molis carentia minimus)". 
" p. 28. 
42 Section 20. 
43 A, 1, xi, 19. 
271 
immanent in the created world at all, and Leibniz clearly thinks he is, then he must be 
in those finitudes of substance called monads. Since these monads are centres, and 
that they exist as a plenum, i. e. everywhere, van Helmont's phrase for God's 
immanence as "everywhere centrally existent" fits the Leibnizian cosmology 
excellently. It is interesting to note that in the late Discourse on the Natural Theology 
of the Chinese, Leibniz writes: "We speak of God as being a sphere or a circle whose 
centre is everywhere and whose circumference is nowhere". 44 
I have highlighted another aspect of the infusion of Adam Kadmon/Christ by God: 
namely, as body is that which is hypostatically passive to the soul, its active principle, 
so there is a sense in which the Adam Kadmon/Christ, as hypostatically passive to 
God, might also be referred to as his body and his instrument or organ: 
The fulness of the Godhead dwells bodily in... Jesus Christ, according to the 
testimony of the Apostle Paul... Christ... is as it were a certain Body for the 
Divinity... God doth as it were corporally manifest himself to his Creatures 
by Christ. 45 
I had to highlight the reasons as to how this could follow from the implicit philosophy 
in the Helmontian cosmology: reasons which Leibniz complains are lacking in the 
work just quoted: 
The sentiments of the author [van Helmont], that God is a pure spirit, himself 
corporified, so to say, in Jesus Christ, for all time... these are very nice ideas, 
which flatter the imagination, but he fails to support them on solid 
foundations. 46 
However, Leibniz is not rejecting the (albeit unsupported) analogy that is being made. 
44 p. 66. 
as Seder Olam, section 25. 
46 A, 1, xi, 19-20. 
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If the immanence of God to the created spirit substances is asserted by the 
Christian kabbalists, so also is the transcendence, or absolute difference, between 
them. These differences, which can be charted in terms of number or space, 
perception or wisdom, can be made explicit and seen to coincide with those in the 
Leibnizian cosmology. It is the attributes of infinity and finity which the Christian 
kabbalists, along with Leibniz, say absolutely distinguishes God from created 
substances: "God is always infinitely greater than all his creatures, so that nothing can 
be compared to him". 47 And this is because, also like Leibniz, at bottom, God is 
existence conceived as undifferentiated, i. e. as a single infinite substance; whereas a 
created spirit is existence differentiated, and which differentiation results in an 
infinity of finite substances: the plenum or Adam Kadmon: 
Every Spirit is not the Divine Essence... in a numerical Identity... But that the 
Divine Essence can be divided... that we admit not... The Divine Essence 
itself is not constringed [limited], but... created spirit [is]. 48 
In De Homine Leibniz had noted that "God transcends all things, is extended in all 
things and is over all things, gives to all things that which they have". It is not clear 
whether these words are van Helmont's, Leibniz's, or the latter paraphrasing the 
former. However, the following words in De homine are surely those of Leibniz: 
As every number participates in unity, so also nothing which exists is free 
from the one. God is one, not by aggregation of the many, but by being most 
united and is the united font anterior to the multitude. The one is without 
multitude, but not the contrary. 49 
a' principles, p. 17. 
48 Cabbalistical Dialogue, pp. 14-15. 
49 Section 14, in OK, ii, 1057; LBR 67, fols 52-53: "Deus transcendit omnia, pertingit ad omnia et 
super omnia, dat omnibus quae habent"; "Ut omnis numerus unitatis est particeps, ita nihil 
existentium est expers unius. Deus est unum non collectione e pluribus sed unitissima et fontanaii 
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I have argued that the Lurianic concept of the zimzum was adopted by the Christian 
Lurianic kabbalists to illustrate the fundamental separation of God and creature: the 
transcendence in which God "is said to exist outside the place of the world". 50 At the 
same time, the zimzum highlights the immanence of God in the created world, by 
virtue of the residue of God which is left in the space produced by the contraction, "as 
when fragrance is not completely taken away but is at least diminished as when a 
glass full of fragrant oil is emptied". 51 
But the world, according to the doctrines I am comparing, does not end with a 
plenum of separate spirit substances or monads: there is a third stratum of being: the 
extended bodies which are ontologically different to the unextended substances out of 
which they are formed. Now, the immanence of a soul in a body, like that of God in a 
soul, is that notion of the presence of a cause in its effect. Hence, a soul, as the 
substantial active principle for a body, is said to be immanent in it: not by mechanical 
causation, but in the emanative order of transcendental rationalism. This, in general, 
is explicated as the causal transmission from a cause (single unextended active 
principle) to an effect (multiple extended passive principle). It is to this that van 
Helmont is referring, when, in the Seder Olam, he writes of Christ's presence as being 
"extended by the essential Radiations from the Centre of his most Divine Soul into all 
Creatures". 52 But Leibniz rejects the assertion that real rays emanate from souls into 
other things: 
It is easy to say that the soul of Jesus Christ is emanatively present through his 
rays... but it will be difficult to give a reasonable meaning for these words... 
The soul has no rays properly speaking. 53 
unitate ante omnem multitudinem. Unum sine multitudine esse, sed non contra". 
50 Principles, p. 18. 
s' Kabbala Denudata, 1,2,89. 
52 Section 20. 
53 A, 1, xi, 19. 
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But it is not at all clear that van Helmont intends by these "rays" anything more than 
analogy; and radiating light was a common simile for causal emanation. However, 
even as analogy, Leibniz goes on to criticize the notion that emanation involves the 
real presence of a cause in its effect: 
A presence via rays is just a metonym, by a metonym comes an effect instead 
of a cause. Because the Sun, in the words of rigorous philosophy, is never 
present to us, anymore than the bow itself is in the place where the arrow is 
received. 54 
This is an essential rejection of the concept of immanence, which I have already 
shown to be present in Leibniz's cosmology. Indeed the Discourse on the Natural 
Theology of the Chinese both asserts the immanence of the cause in the effect and 
describes this as an emanation: 
All things are active... by virtue of the participation of the... same originative 
Spirit (God)... a production of this same primary cause... Everything 
emanates from it as from a central point. 5 
I. e. by an unextended active principle. Now, the monads in the bodily collection 
associated with a soul have what Leibniz calls their petites perceptions and insensible 
appetitions. In the sense that these, in the emanative order of nature, flow from the 
soul or complete concept which rules them, the perception and appetition of the soul 
is immanent in them. Since the Christian Lurianic analysis of soul and body accords 
with Leibniz's, the essences of perception and will of the soul are immanent in the 
body, i. e. in those countless spirit substances which comprise it. Hence the body, 
sa Ibid. 
ss p. 88 
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being inextricably united to its soul, is not utterly dead and stupid, but is infused by 
some degree of perception ("i. e. hath Life, Sense and Knowledge" 56), and which 
"proceeds from its inner being" 57 or soul. 
As for the transcendence that the soul has over the body, this equally follows in 
Leibniz and the Christian Lurianic kabbalists. Both doctrines assert that the soul is a 
single monad or spirit substance, and that the body is an infinity of the same. An 
unbridgeable numerical chasm exists between them; and the perception and appetition 
of the soul is always greater than the infinitesimal petites perceptions and appetitions 
of the monads of its body. 
God is immanent in every monad of the plenum, in every spirit substance of the 
Adam Kadmon or Christ, in that each of these is a thought of God, and, as thought, 
belongs to the substance of the thinker. Hence, there is a divine aspect to the plenum. 
On the other hand, each monad is immanent in the body associated with it, in that it is 
the active principle for its body, or, is a substance in its own right, separate from God. 
The worldly aspect of the Messiah plenum, i. e. the plenum of active spirit substances, 
as opposed to the plenum of God's thoughts, is called "the Man Christ" by van 
Helmont; and since this is immanent in all creatures, he attributes omnipresence to 
this "Man" Christ. But this omnipresence of spirit substances in creatures, is of a 
lower order than that omnipresence of God in spirits: the "Attributes of 
omnipresence... of the Man Christ, are nevertheless inferiour to those which 
appertain unto God". 58 But Leibniz, not appreciating the precise cosmological role 
that Christ has here, can make no sense of plural omnipresences: 
sb Seder Olam, section 30. 
57 Principles, p. 69. 
58 Seder Olam, section 19. 
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[That] the omnipresence of Jesus Christ is different to the omnipresence of the 
divine, in the way the author explains it, is like what the English call non- 
sense, a play on words without meaning. 59 
But it is the case that in the Leibnizian cosmology there are also the same two 
omnipresences: that of God in all monads, and that of each monad in its body. And 
although each part of the world, each body, does comprise an infinity of monads, to 
which a dominant soul monad is omnipresent, this omnipresence is nevertheless 
inferior to that of God's, which is an immanence in the entire world, in each and every 
one of the infinite monads of the plenum. Thus, in the monadic plenum, the divine 
realm of God and his thoughts is fused together with the worldly realm of souls and 
their bodies. It is in this sense that the Christian kabbalists speak of Christ, that 
plenum of spirit substances of Adam Kadmon, as partaking of both God and creature, 
that he "is the true and appropriate medium between the two. " 60 Concerning this joint 
ownership of the soul of a creature, van Helmont says in the draft notes to Thoughts 
on Genesis, that "spirit is not properly ours, but the Lord's; yet the soul is properly 
ours through the working out of our body". 61 
In the Seder Olam, van Helmont had also written that: 
Besides this world Briah, higher than which our Original doth not reach (if we 
have respect to the parts composing humane Nature) there is understood 
another World, more noble, and (in the Order of Nature), more antient than 
the rest, immediately flowing from the Author, God himself, called in Hebrew 
Aziluth, which signifies the Nearest to the most high and supreme God 
himself. 62 
59 A, 1, xi, 19. 
60 Principles, p. 60. 
61 LH, 1, V, 2g, fol. 36: "Spiritus non est nobis proprius, sed Domini; sed anima nobis propria est per 
elaborationem nostri corporis". 
bZ Section 43. 
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I have interpreted the world of Beri'ah (along with Yezirah and Asiyyah) as that of the 
created spirit substances and the creatures formed of them; and the world of Azilut, I 
have interpreted as the same spirit substances insofar as they exist as ideal 
contingents in the mind of God. According to the doctrine, as I have explicated it, the 
Adam Kadmon, the Messiah, as the plenum of spirit substances, partakes of both God 
(spirits as God's thoughts: the world of Azilut) and creature (spirits as created souls: 
the lower worlds), and it is in this sense that the Adam Kadmon is a medium between 
God and the creatures. Indeed, the passage above continues, regarding Azilut, that it: 
"cannot agree to any other than Christ, the Saviour and Mediator between God and 
Men". In his critique of these words, Leibniz writes: 
If by the world of Azilut the author understands the intelligible world which is 
in God's thoughts, one could allow it, but it must not be said that it holds a 
middle position between God and the creatures, since it belongs to God 
himself. 63 
Leibniz is conceiving the ascription "medium" not as that double aspect that spirits of 
the Messiah plenum have (as ideas of God and as the souls of creatures), but as a 
third ontological stratum between God and creatures. And yet the monads of Leibniz's 
own cosmology have precisely this double aspect, each partaking both of the divine 
and the corporeal: A monad is "a diminutive divinity" and "a material universe 
eminently"; is "imitating God and imitated by the universe"; is "similar to God by its 
distinct thoughts, similar to matter by its confused thoughts". 64 
However, by the time Leibniz comes to write up his edition of Thoughts on 
Genesis, he is at least clear now about van Helmont's conception of Aelohim or the 
63 OK, ii, 1053; LH, 1, V, 2d, fols 22-22r. 
64 Gr, ii, 553-55. 
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Christ plenum of monads, as he who both partakes of being "joyned" to God, and 
who contains the active principles of the created world: 
With him [God] is joyned Aelohim... who hath relation to the ideas of things, 
and contains in himself, the treasure of vertues and powers, which by creation 
he brings forth in time. 65 
It is the case then, as Conway writes, that the "order of things... [is] three, namely, 
God as the highest, Christ as the mediator, and the creation as the lowest rank of 
all". 66 Van Helmont writes the same in the Seder Olam: "This Ens Medium, or 
middle Being between God and creatures, is Christ the Heavenly Adam". 
67 
Commenting on this, Leibniz says: 
Sometimes he [van Helmont] says he [the Messiah] is truly God, equal to the 
Father, and of the same nature; sometimes he makes him a medium between 
God and the creatures, which is an untenable expression. It is impossible that 
there is a medium between the absolute being and the limited being. 68 
I have already discussed the sense in which the "medium" of Christ should be 
conceived, and how Leibniz, at this time, has failed so to do. But Leibniz continues 
his remarks, drawing a distinction between God and creature in terms of infinity and 
finity, arguing that, since, mathematically, there is no medium between these two, 
there can therefore be no being between God and creature: 
65p 105. 
66 Principles, p. 41. 
67 Section 11. 
68 A, 1, xi, 21. Leibniz repeats this criticism in a letter to Loeflerus of 13 December 1694, in D, i, 19: 
"Here in outline or scholium should be rejected Arianus, who [says] Christ made the creatures, 
but as the principal one, through whom were created other creatures, of which opinion also the 
Author of a new book favours, entitled Seder Olam, who also wishes the Messiah to have existed 
from the beginning as a medium between God and the remaining creatures, so that through him 
everything was created". 
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If the author of the book knew mathematics, he would never say that the 
Messiah or the celestial Adam, is a middle being between God and creatures. 
One cannot know how to find a Middle being between the finite and the 
infinite, which is not either finite or infinite. And the mediating line 
proportional between the finite line and the infinite, must be that same infinite. 
He further says that: 
It is true that one can conceive of degrees of the infinite, that must be 
understood as inferior infinites; but what would happen is that there would 
then be many Messiahs, because the degrees of the inferior infinites are 
innumerable. 69 
Yet it is true that in Leibniz's own cosmology, such inferior infinites do exist: every 
monad, by virtue of its subsuming an infinity of other monads in its body, is such an 
inferior infinite. A monad is "at the same time infinitely less than a God, and 
incomparably more than a universe of matter. " 70 Moreover, because each and every 
monad is positioned on a continuum, in which space has no maximum or minimum 
magnitude, there is an infinity of these inferior infinites. 
The Messiah in Christian Kabbalah does not correspond to a greatest spirit 
substance (and such cannot exist in an unbounded universe, an endlessly augmentable 
continuum of monads), but it is that very conception of the monadic plenum itself. So 
when Leibniz adds that "the true philosophy never allows an inferior being to God, 
which is also superior to all other possible beings", " he does so on the basis of his 
own misconception of the cosmic Messiah. However, it is the case that in Leibniz's 
own cosmology, the monad is a being which lies between God and creatures: God is 
not identical to the created monad, which is an active principle for apart of existence; 
nor is a monad identical to a creature, which is a complex relation of monads. The 
69 A, 1, xi, 18-19. 
70 Gr, ii, 553-55. 
71 A, 1, xi, 19. 
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"three orders of things" mentioned by Conway, viz. God, Christ, creation, correspond 
in Leibniz to God, monadic plenum, corporeal substances. 
At the same time, it must be understood that neither the Christian kabbalists nor 
Leibniz, assert that there are three types of substance; and neither, by implication, are 
there two creative events. For the bodies of creatures, corporeal substances, are 
composed of the relations between spirit substances or monads, of which only the 
latter are truly created. Leibniz writes that a monad is 
the only one which deserves being called (a Being), a substance after God, 
since multitude is nothing but a heap of several substances and not at all a 
Being, but Beings. 72 
The Christian Lurianic kabbalists quote John 1 verse 14 that the Messiah "is the only 
born, who (is produced) of the Father. " 73 
Monads are created by God, who is the sufficient reason for their existence; but 
bodies are formed not by God but out of monads, and by the sufficient reason of a 
single ruling monad: "Mind does not act on body by creating but by moving; God 
creates. " 
74 In Christian Kabbalah, the Trinity is interpreted so that God is only 
present in creatures via the spirit substances (the Messiah). The Holy Ghost is this 
indirect presence of "God insofar as he is with the Messiah in creatures. of . 
75 
72 Gr, ii, 553-55. 
73 Adumbratio, chapter 3, sections 10-11. 
74 On the Incarnation of God, in A, 6, I, 533. 
75 Principles, p. 11. 
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7.2 On the Double-Aspected Nature of Monads and the Adam Kadmon 
I have argued at some length that the spirit substances of Christian Lurianic 
Kabbalah, collectively known as Adam Kadmon, have two ontological aspects, a 
feature which also pertains to Leibniz's monads. One aspect is the ideal one: this 
universe as (the infinity of) thoughts of one (divine) substance God: the kabbalistic 
realm of Azilut, and Leibniz's complete concepts. The other aspect is the substantial 
one: this universe as (the infinity of) active principles or individual substances 
separate from the divine one: the kabbalistic spirits of the realms of Bri'ah, Yezirah 
and Assiyah, and Leibniz's monads (minds, souls and bare entelechies). 
I think there are no grounds for suggesting that Leibniz's thoughts in this area were 
fundamentally influenced by his involvement with Christian Lurianic Kabbalah. As 
early as 1688, in the theological writings related to the Catholic Demonstrations, 
Leibniz had written that "the ideas of God and the substances of things are the same", 
though they are "different in relation... as action and passion". These will eventually 
be termed monads, and are both ideas (of God, and in a passive relation to him) and 
substances (of creatures, and in an active relation to them). Thus "the substance of 
things is an idea. Idea is the union of God and creatures, so that the action of agent 
and patient is one. " 
76 One of the chapters for the planned project of the Catholic 
Demonstrations is entitled "The origin of the first human mind explained through a 
particle gathered of the divine aura". An accompanying note continues: "The origin of 
77 the first mind [is] from God, drawn out from the active power". 
76 L, pp. 118-19. 
77 A, 6, i, 496. 
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Creatures are comprised of both an active and a passive principle, or a soul and a 
body. But the soul also has a passive aspect to it, as a complete concept in the mind of 
God, now actualized. In Double Infinite of 1695 (? ), the newly adopted term "monad" 
is described in its passive aspect as "a diminished divinity... [a] quasi-All... imitating 
God... similar to God". And its active aspect, as ruler over the infinity of subordinate 
monads in its body, is described as "a material universe eminently... [a] quasi- 
Nothing... imitated by the universe... similar to matter". 78 The double aspect is further 
referred to in a letter to de Voider of 1699: 
The soul is not, for me, the idea of matter itself but the source of ideas for 
itself and in itself... An idea is, so to speak, something dead and unchangeable 
in itself, as is a figure; soul is rather something living and full of activity... 
But in another sense of the word, I could say that in some way the soul is a 
living or substantial idea, or more correctly, that it is an 'ideating' substance. 79 
It is noteworthy that the most explicit statement of the Janus and medial nature of 
monads in the Double Infinite essay, coincides with one of the very first usages of the 
new term. It could be that this essay, written as it was at the zenith of Leibniz's 
kabbalistic interests and involvements with van Helmont, represents a certain 
clarification in Leibniz's mind concerning the divine and creaturely aspects of the 
monad. In the Seder Olam, seemingly read by Leibniz shortly before he wrote Double 
Infinite, he was exposed to van Helmont's thoughts on this topic. 80 Van Helmont had 
written there about the world of Azilut, that ideal representation in the mind of God of 
the created spirits of the lower worlds. But Leibniz, while accepting that "if by the 
world of Azilut the author understands the intelligible world which is in God's 
'S Gr, ii, 553-55. 
'`' L, p. 520. 
80 Leibniz had read the Seder Olam by July 1694 (see chapter 1); and Grua dates Double Infinite as 
after 1695 (? ) (see Gr, ii, 553). 
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thoughts, one could allow it", he criticizes what he perceives to be its medial nature as 
a third type of being, which is neither God nor creature: "It must not be said that it 
holds a middle nature between God and the creatures, since it belongs to God 
himself'. 81 Yet, the spirit substances of the lower kabbalistic worlds, which have 
their ideal counterparts in Azilut, have a correspondence of the same kind in Leibniz's 
doctrines. Indeed, they had led him to write "that in some way the soul is a living or 
substantial idea... an 'ideating' substance". Spirit substances or monads belong both to 
God and to creature: they are "similar to God" and "similar to matter". 
By 1696 Leibniz had read at least some of Conway's Principles. She writes there of 
Christ the ens medium between God and creatures, as he who has an aspect as 
"God... or the essential word of the father", and another as "the word which is uttered 
and revealed, the perfect and substantial image of God's word". 
82 But if it is not 
certain that he read this in Conway, it was he who wrote in De Homine, probably in 
the same year 1696, and seemingly paraphrasing van Helmont in his own words, that 
"All things exist in [Christ], who is the greatest; and who is in every smallest thing". 
Christ, as the monad plenum extended without limit, contains all things; and as every 
unextended monad, he is "in every smallest thing". And every monad is both an 
active power in the creature, "is a centre or seed, which contains [the] power... from 
where... things proceed"; and is a passive thought of God's mind, "an image of 
angelic nature... In the angel there exists spiritually the seeds of all things... The 
angel is an absolute image of God". Furthermore, "The true theology consists in the 
meeting of Adam and of Christ, of ourselves and of God. " 83 And in Thoughts on 
Genesis Leibniz wrote, also in the same year, that "Aelohim [the ens medium]... hath 
OK, ii, 1053; LH, I, V, 2d, fols. 22-22r. 
gZ Principles, p. 21. 
83 Sections 23,24,27; OK, ii, 1059-60; L Br, 67, fols 52-53. 
284 
relation to the ideas of things, and contains in himself, the treasure of vertues and 
powers, which by creation he brings forth in time". 84 And it was he also who wrote 
that 
Aelohim, by his inward Speech, or efficacious Thought, sent forth Vertue from 
himself, into the Object; which, although, whilst it was yet with him, it were 
Aelohim; yet as soon as it was made his object, it began to have a particular or 
proper Being of its own. 85 
In the MS version of this last passage, Leibniz had referred to the pre-uttered object 
as "in him". That Leibniz changed this to "with him", which implies the co-existence 
with God of the objects of thought, rather than their identity with his being (the 
thoughts as predicates of God's being), suggests some uncertainty in his mind 
concerning the dual nature of Aelohim. That Leibniz may not have fully 
comprehended the Helmontian doctrine is a possible reason for his baffling remarks 
in an essay written six years after Thoughts, entitled Reflections lections on the Doctrine of a 
Single Universal Spirit. Here, he outlines this doctrine as that which asserts there is 
only one spirit substance responsible for animating the world: that there is no 
plurality of particular spirits for particular parts of the world. He uses the analogy of 
the organ: that there is but one wind, as single causal agent for the particular sounds, 
as mere effects, produced when the wind passes through particular pipes, rather than 
each sound having its own particular causal wind. The doctrine is clearly pantheistic, 
reducing individual living beings to mere effects, and their souls to mere appearances. 
This, Leibniz says, is what the metaphysics of Spinoza and the Neo-Cartesians turns 
out to be. But it is puzzling why he goes on to say that of those who assert the 
doctrine of a universal spirit there are some who 
84 p. 105. 
85 Ibid., p. 30. 
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believe, like the Cabbalists, that God created it. [This] is also the opinion of 
the Englishman Henry More and other newer philosophers, particularly of 
certain chemists who believe that there is a universal Archeus or world-soul; 
some of them here maintained that this is the spirit of the Lord moving over 
the waters, of which the beginning of Genesis speaks. 86 
This latter is almost certainly a reference to the Helmontian doctrine as set out in 
Thoughts on Genesis. Leibniz is suggesting that this doctrine asserts that God created 
a world soul which moves upon the waters, and is the sole and universal animator of 
the creatures of the waters. In the notes for Thoughts taken down by Leibniz, van 
Helmont states that "the Spirit of Elohim was carried over the faces of the waters"; 
that "the spirit of Elohim... is carried, is kept moving, establishes and supervises 
action in the waters (not upon the faces or superfices, but by intimate penetration)". 87 
If this "Spirit of Aelohim" were the only real spirit present in the world then Leibniz's 
claim that van Helmont's is a doctrine of a created single universal spirit would be 
comprehensible. But van Helmont asserted (rightly or wrongly) that a multiplicity of 
created substances existed. Leibniz himself wrote this up in Thoughts: 
The things which were produced by Aelohim out of seeds, whereas before 
they were in Him, now subsist by themselves and are left to themselves, being 
endued with an active and spontaneous power. 88 
Is it the case that Leibniz conceives there to be a soul of the world in the Helmontian 
doctrine, which he terms a single created universal spirit? A soul of the world, as an 
ultimate ruling principle, or purely active spirit, to which all other spirits are mere 
86 L, p. 555. 
87 LH, 1, V, 2g, fol. 36: "Spiritus Elohim ferebatur super faciebus aquarum"; "Spiritus Elohim... 
ferebatur, motabat, stabat, actionem exercebat in aquas (non super faciebus seu superficiei, sed 
penetrando intima)". 
88 Thoughts on Genesis, p. 12. 
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subordinates, is ruled out by van Helmont's assertion of the vital continuum: there can 
be no maximum sphere of rulership for the created world. Leibniz knew this for it 
was he who wrote in Thoughts, using van Helmont's notes, that: 
Every part of the World hath its own Expansion, as well as something above 
the same, by which it is governed and assisted; yet is the whole Expansion 
altogether Infinite: And tho' there be a present limited Sphere to every 
Expansion, yet have they a power of stretching or spreading themselves more 
and more, without end. 9 
Is it the case that the multiple created substances which van Helmont asserts exist, are 
denied to do so by Leibniz (and are thus reduced to being mere effects) on account of 
a lack of demonstration in the Helmontian doctrine? In Thoughts, the Christian 
Trinity of Father, Son and Holy Ghost is equated to Jehova, Aelohim and the Spirit of 
Aelohim. Leibniz wrote that "the ineffable name... Jehovah... signifies the principle 
or beginning of all essence, aeternal, immense, and unchangeable, primitive, which is 
subject to no time". Aelohim (Adam Kadmon in more kabbalistic terminology) is the 
Son, "the right hand of Jehovah, or he that sits at his right hand, that is, the first 
begotten". Aelohim has a dual nature. As the totality of all ideas of things, it is God's 
mind ("Aelohim... hath relation to the ideas of things"); as the totality of all 
substances of things, it is the created world ("Aelohim... contains in himself, the 
treasure of vertues and powers, which by creation he brings forth"). 90 Creation, then, 
happened when "this world, being conceiv'd by Aelohim, was brought forth out of the 
Mystery of the eternal Venues and Seeds of a former State". 91 And "creation, or the 
sowing of seeds, out of the spiritual world into the corporeal... belongs to 
89 Ibid., pp. 49-50. 
90 Ibid., p. 105. 
91 Ibid., p. 29. 
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Aelohim". 92 Creatures, or the "faces in the waters", are ideas empowered or 
actualized by the spirit of Aelohim, the Holy Ghost, or the will of God: "all the faces 
in the waters, or Spirits hid in the water, received their activity and virtue from the 
Spirit of Aelohim". 93 To the extent that the power or being that creatures have is a 
consequence of God's will, so his will, or the spirit of Aelohim, is immanent in each 
creature: "The Spirit of Light is from the Spirit of Aelohim, or a virtue begotten by 
Him in the things that are". Yet no creature is pure light, or unlimited power, 
"because otherwise the creatures would not be distinguished from God, or Jehovah, 
who is light without darkness". 94 God's transcendence to and immanence in creatures 
is summed up in the words: "the Universal, Supreme, and Eternal Spirit in Aelohim... 
determines Himself to certain creatures; whereas, in Himself, He is common to all, 
and indetermined". 
95 
The Helmontian doctrine, then, certainly wants there to be multiple created 
substances; but is their existence satisfactorily determined? I have argued that the 
Helmontian cosmological schema is paralleled in Leibniz's own: of God's infinite 
eternal substance, his mind with its ideas of things, and his will which actualizes 
ideas into the substances of creatures separate to his own substance. I have also 
shown how it is that Leibniz holds that there can be sufficient reasons in the universe 
(for the existence of things) that are worthy of the name substance and which are 
separate from the divine one, rather than being mere effects of him as the ultimate 
sufficient reason. If this universe, in all its detail, was entirely deducible from the 
eternal truths as belonging to the primary substance, then all things would indeed be 
no more than the thoughts of God, and God's will would be without function. But that 
92 Ibid., p. 191. 
93 Ibid., p. 28. 
94 Ibid., p. 23. 
95 Ibid., pp. 25-26. 
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this universe is not so deducible (an infinity of posssible universes is logically 
entailed by God's thoughts) permits a role for God's will, as extramundane sufficient 
reason for this one universe, and provides a meaning for "creation" as the 
instantiation of mundane sufficient reasons for parts of the universe. But, the 
Helmontian doctrine, including its expression in Thoughts on Genesis, does not 
account for God's will (the spirit of Aelohim) in a way that could convince Leibniz 
that the substances it is supposed to create are anything other than (still) mere 
thoughts of God. Leibniz has left us a sign in Thoughts of his own dissatisfaction with 
the incompleteness of van Helmont's doctrine. After mentioning how this (corporeal) 
world of self-subsisting things is produced out of the ideal world in Elohim, the 
concept of the alternative universe half raises its head: 
But whether or no Aelohim produced any other worlds, the brothers of this, 
which were not involved in Adam's fall, is a matter of more profound inquiry, 
and the determination of it is foreign to the business before me. 96 
Out of loyalty to van Helmont, Leibniz does not determine this issue here; but in 
1706-10 (? ) the reason for his dissatisfaction is made explicit, when he criticizes 
Wachter's thesis, Elucidarius cabalisticus, that the cosmologies of Spinoza and the 
Kabbalah did, after all, include individual created substances that were separate from 
the divine one. As Leibniz himself notes of the thesis, Wachter "defends the Cabbala 
of the Hebrews and Spinoza; and shows that they distinguish God and the world". But 
at the outset of his remarks, Leibniz writes that "on this point he is not very 
satisfactory. For, according to [Spinoza and the kabbalists], God is effectively a 
substance, and the creature is effectively the accident of God". 97 
9' Ibid., p. 12. 
9' B, pp. 1-2. 
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In the fourth chapter of his thesis, Wachter makes numerous quotations from 
Spinoza with the aim of showing how the philosopher's cosmology agrees with that of 
Kabbalah. The bulk of Leibniz's remarks concern this chapter; but he is less interested 
in whether or not Spinoza and the kabbalists agree, but concerns himself with 
analysing Wachter's claims, wherever he makes then, that these cosmologies actually 
do distinguish God from the world. 
Wachter had quoted proposition 17 of part 1 of The Ethics, and Leibniz 
paraphrases it thus: 
For my part, I [Spinoza] think I have shewn clearly enough, that all things 
follow from the supreme power of God, by the same necessity, just as it 
follows from the nature of a triangle, that its three angles are equal to two 
right angles. 98 
But to Leibniz's thinking, if all the things of the universe are deducible from the 
eternal truths as they exist in God's mind, as predicates of his substance, then the 
things of the universe remain mere thoughts of God. And since these things follow by 
absolute necessity there can be no function left for God's will to perform, and the 
term creation ceases to have any useful meaning. This would be the case if God and 
the world were as Spinoza's philosophy would have them. However, Leibniz says 
that things follow from God, as properties from a triangle, is proved by no 
argument, nor is there an analogy between essences and existing things. 99 
Remarking on Wachter's quotation of the scholium to proposition 10 of part 2 of The 
Ethics, Leibniz advances his metaphysical distinction of the necessary and 
98 B, p. 10. 
9`'B, p. 10. 
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contingent: 
The axiom: that belongs to the essence of a thing, without which it cannot 
exist nor be conceived, should be applied to necessary things or species, not to 
individuals nor contingents... Hence they [individual contingent worldly 
things] have no necessary connection with God. 100 
It is because "things are possible in many ways", 101 and that the sufficient reasons for 
the things of this particular universe are not necessary but contingent, that is, are not 
deducible from, are not grounded in, the eternal truths in God's mind, that they are 
sufficient reasons for the parts of the world, i. e. are substances in their own right: are 
vital principles and not mere thoughts of God. 
Wachter quotes Spinoza's scholium to proposition 13 of part 2 of The Ethics, and 
Leibniz paraphrases this as "All things have souls, though in different degrees, rests 
on another singular opinion, that an idea of everything is given of necessity in God, 
of which, God is the cause". Leibniz consequently criticizes this for its apparent 
failure to add anything more to a soul than its being a mere idea in God's mind: 
There is not the slightest reason for supposing that the soul is an idea. Ideas 
are something merely abstract, as numbers and figures, and cannot act... The 
soul is not an idea, but the source of innumerable ideas. For it has besides the 
present idea, a certain activity or production of new ideas. 102 
That substances exist separate from the divine one, gives a meaning to the notion of 
"creation". Creation is the underwriting of why this particular universe of substances 
exists, rather than the many other possible ones, by the extramundane sufficient 
reason of God's will, grounded in his essence of omnibenevolence, which, since this 
100 B, pp. 5-6. 
'01 B, P. 10. 
102 B, P. 9. 
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is grounded not in the eternal truths, and therefore not logically determined, not 
imposed on God, is why Leibniz says God's will is free. And so, in reply to Spinoza 
that "God is, by the same necessity, the cause of himself and the cause of all things", 
and that "the power of things is the power of God", Leibniz says: 
I do not admit [this]. God exists necessarily, but he produces things freely, 
and the power of things is produced by God, but is different from the divine 
power, and things work themselves, although they received their powers of 
acting. 1 03 
To return to my question whether it is the case that Leibniz states that the Helmontian 
doctrine is that of a single universal spirit because it is not explained how substances 
separate from the divine one are possible, I think the answer is yes on this point. 
Without the distinction of the necessary and the contingent, there can be no Adam 
Kadmon/Aelohim, as that immediate production of substances out of which creatures 
are formed, and which is the mundane aspect of the ideal representation of things as it 
exists in the mind of God. 
There are two important conclusions to be drawn from all this. Firstly, it is now 
clear that with the single exception of the distinction of the necessary and contingent, 
there is no significant difference between the cosmology of Christian Lurianic 
Kabbalah and that of Leibniz. And this impinges on my second conclusion, that the 
blithe and unhelpful way in which Leibniz states the Helmontian doctrine to be that of 
a single universal spirit, without bothering to explain why this was so, when the latter 
at least wanted separate substances to exist, appears to be the result of a need by 
Leibniz to distance himself from "kabbalistic" philosophies. For it is not the case that 
103 B, p. 8. 
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he was confused about van Helmont's cosmology by the time he came to write the 
Reflections on the Doctrine of a Single Universal Spirit in 1702. 
293 
Conclusion 
In Part 2 of this thesis the cosmological doctrines of Leibniz and Christian Lurianic 
Kabbalah have been compared in detail. This has shown the existence of many 
fundamental similarities between their conceptions of space and matter; time and 
motion; the nature of soul and body, and their relationship; the continuum; creation; 
and the relationship between God, the cosmos and the individual created being. The 
exposition offered here has shown how Leibniz's thought in each of these areas is 
derivable from his epistemological and metaphysical principles: principles which had 
been established in his philosophy from at least the late 1660s. In addition, references 
have been made to specific assertions by Leibniz on these cosmological themes in the 
years prior to the mid-1690s, the time of his first significant contact with Christian 
Lurianic Kabbalah. All this strongly suggests that the similarities highlighted should 
not be taken as evidence of a conceptual influence on Leibniz by Christian Lurianic 
Kabbalah. 
Evidence has been presented to show that Leibniz's ideas on some issues may have 
been clarified as a result of his kabbalistic encounters. This appears to have been the 
case for Leibniz's considerations on the transformation of the same animal, on his 
categorizing of monads, and on the nature of monads as being both divine and 
mundane at the same time (their double-aspected nature). For each of these 
developments it has been shown that they follow from principles already latent in the 
Leibnizian metaphysic: hence I refer to them as clarifications by kabbalism, as 
opposed to the sort of conceptual influence in which a new principle becomes 
adopted. 
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It is, therefore, to be concluded that the detailed similarities that have been 
highlighted here are essentially instances of intellectual convergence. I have 
mentioned in the Introduction and Chapter 1 the broadly neo-Platonic influences on 
Leibniz and the Kabbalah. It is from this source that the base of cosmological 
principles common to Leibniz and Christian Lurianic Kabbalah had its origin. 
In addition to isolating common principles, Part 2 of this thesis has also identified 
metaphors for these principles as they were utilized in Christian Lurianic Kabbalah. 
Drawing on established kabbalistic, Hermetic and alchemical nomenclature and 
imagery, we have seen, for example, the soul, as active principle, described as fire, 
heat, light, Sun, and the body, as passive principle, as water, cold, dark, Moon; the 
passive pole of the continuum has been described as an abyss full of faces, or a slime 
of worms; and the cosmogonical process was described using the highly elaborate 
symbolism of Lurianic Kabbalah. Evidence has been put forward to show that 
Leibniz himself, on occasions, made some use of these metaphors, especially in 
essays written soon after the mid-1690s. However, the cosmological imagery of 
Christian Lurianic Kabbalah was never anything more than mere metaphor for 
Leibniz. As discussed in the Introduction and Chapter 3, Leibniz did not believe that 
Lurianic Kabbalah was a body of truths of the Prisca Theologia sort: this was not 
what had intrigued him to read the works of Christian Lurianic Kabbalah. Leibniz 
was interested to see whether, behind the metaphorical words of these exoteric 
writings, there was a set of principles that could be validated by, and correlated to, his 
own rational metaphysics. In Part 2 the cosmological principles of Christian Lurianic 
Kabbalah have been successfully paralleled to the Leibnizian doctrine by virtue of 
relating their underlying principles. 
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The particular investigation that Leibniz made of Christian Lurianic Kabbalah fell 
under the greater raison d'etre for his doing philosophy: namely, to try to forge links 
wherever possible between all the world's various exoteric religious writings: to rid 
the world of religious and social conflict and thus to make it a better place. 
But in Christian Lurianic Kabbalah Leibniz found not only a particular exercise in 
religious harmonizing, but a project which, itself, was strongly motivated to the same 
end. When Leibniz collaborated with van Helmont on Thoughts on Genesis, he was 
able to assist the latter in his analytic reduction of the words of Genesis to his own 
Hermetic, relatively rational, doctrine. This process of rationalizing the exoteric was 
one which Leibniz himself was already engaged in. Furthermore, in this collaborative 
work, Leibniz was able to "add many of my own thoughts" on account of the 
proximity that his thought had with that which underlay Christian Lurianic Kabbalah. 
Finally, in addition to the points made above regarding the relationship between 
Leibniz and Christian Lurianic Kabbalah, Part 2 has highlighted aspects of Leibniz's 
cosmology not much dealt with in the literature, including Leibniz's own writings. I 
have argued that Leibniz's principles of the transformation of the same animal 
inevitably implies the revolution of souls from gross body to gross body; that, on 
account of his assertion of the continuum, there is no reason to deny that human 
minds could have evolved out of sub-human souls; and it has been argued that the 
precise status of monads must be a dual one: as simultaneously divine and mundane. 
Regarding the first two of these points, it has been noted that Leibniz either 
obfuscated or said little about these rationally-implied conclusions because of their 
theological unorthodoxy. And this epitomises the wider context of the history of 
philosophy within which the work of this thesis is located: the extent to which reason 
or faith should predominate in providing answers to fundamental philosophical 
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